Teacher Quality Policy When Supply Matters
Open accessAbstract
Recent proposals would strengthen the dependence of teacher pay and retention on performance, in order to attract those who will be effective teachers and repel those who will not.I model the teacher labor market, incorporating dynamic self-selection, noisy performance measurement, and Bayesian learning.Simulations indicate that labor market interactions are important to the evaluation of alternative teacher contracts.Typical bonus policies have very small effects on selection.Firing policies can have larger effects, if accompanied by substantial salary increases.However, misalignment between productivity and measured performance nearly eliminates the benefits while preserving most of the costs.
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Teacher Effects and Teacher-Related Policies
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- Authors
- Rothstein, J.
- Affiliations
- National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
- Corresponding author
- Rothstein, Jesse
- ORCID
- Rothstein, Jesse
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2012-09
- OpenAlex
- W3125216654
- Cited by
- 20
- References
- 4
- Citations by year
- 2021: 1 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 6
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- National Bureau of Economic Research (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Institute for Research on Labor and Employment
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Education › School Choice and Performance
- Social Sciences › Education › Teacher Professional Development and Motivation
- Social Sciences › Education › Teacher Education and Assessments
- Keywords
- teacher quality, teacher salaries, teacher retention, performance-based pay, teacher contracts, teacher labor market, self-selection, Bayesian learning, teacher bonuses, teacher supply, teacher productivity
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