Enlisting Employees in Improving Payroll-Tax Compliance: Evidence from Mexico
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A growing body of research suggests that difficulties in collecting taxes are an important constraint on economic performance in developing countries.Evidence from rich countries points to third-party reporting -in particular, employer reports of employees' wages -as a potential remedy.To what extent does the accuracy of third-party reporting carry over to developing countries, with their weaker enforcement regimes?In this paper, we compare two sources of wage information from Mexicofirms' reports of individuals' wages to the Mexican social security agency and individuals' responses to a household labor-force survey -to investigate the extent of wage under-reporting by formal firms and how it responded to an important change in the social security system.We document that under-reporting is extensive, and that compliance is better in larger firms.Using a difference-in-differences strategy based on the 1997 Mexican pension reform, which effectively tied pension benefits more closely to reported wages for younger workers than for older workers, we show that the reform led to a relative decline in under-reporting for younger age groups.This result reinforces the view that the discrepancies between the two data sources can be interpreted as evidence of evasion, and suggests that giving employees incentives and information to improve the accuracy of employer reports can be an effective way to improve payroll-tax compliance.
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Cites
The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity
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Trade, Quality Upgrading, and Wage Inequality in the Mexican Manufacturing Sector *
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Self-citationDo Taxpayers Bunch at Kink Points?
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No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax
Pomeranz, D. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20130393 · Cited by 822
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Tax farming redux: experimental evidence on performance pay for tax collectors
Khan, A. Q., Khwaja, A. I., & Olken, B. A. (2016) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjv042 · Cited by 267
The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review
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Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries
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Cited by
No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax
Pomeranz, D. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20130393 · Cited by 822
Dodging the Taxman: Firm Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement
Carrillo, P., Pomeranz, D., & Singhal, M. (2017) · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.20140495 · Cited by 280
Tax farming redux: experimental evidence on performance pay for tax collectors
Khan, A. Q., Khwaja, A. I., & Olken, B. A. (2016) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjv042 · Cited by 267
Entry Regulation and the Formalization of Microenterprises in Developing Countries
Bruhn, M., & McKenzie, D. (2014) · The World Bank Research Observer · doi:10.1093/wbro/lku002 · Cited by 211
Information Technology and Fiscal Capacity in a Developing Country: Evidence from Ethiopia
Ali, M., Shifa, A., Shimeles, A., & Woldeyes, F. B. (2015) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2587857 · Cited by 37
Metadata
- Authors
- Kumler, T., Verhoogen, E., & Frías, J.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2013-08
- OpenAlex
- W1550388353
- Cited by
- 65
- References
- 8
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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