The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Do Managers Do Good with Other People's Money?
Open accessAbstract
We find support for two key predictions of an agency theory of unproductive corporate social responsibility.First, increasing managerial ownership decreases measures of firm goodness.We use the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut to increase after-tax insider ownership.Firms with moderate levels of insider ownership cut goodness by more than firms with low levels (where the tax cut has no effect) and high levels (where agency is less of an issue).Second, increasing monitoring reduces corporate goodness.A regression discontinuity design of close votes around the 50% cut-off finds that passage of shareholder governance proposals leads to slower growth in goodness.
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Cites
The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits
Friedman, M. (2007) · Corporate Ethics and Corporate Governance · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-70818-6_14 · Cited by 11,733
How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., & Mullainathan, S. (2004) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355304772839588 · Cited by 10,641
Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
Charness, G., & Rabin, M. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302760193904 · Cited by 3,970
Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2003) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/376950 · Cited by 3,777
Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility
BÉNABOU, R., & TIROLE, J. (2010) · Economica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.2009.00843.x · Cited by 2,237
Corporate goodness and shareholder wealth
Krüger, P. (2015) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.09.008 · Cited by 1,901
Economic Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility
Kitzmueller, M., & Shimshack, J. (2012) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.50.1.51 · Cited by 1,116
Testing for Altruism and Social Pressure in Charitable Giving
DellaVigna, S., List, J. A., & Malmendier, U. (2012) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjr050 · Cited by 1,080
Red and blue investing: Values and finance
Hong, H., & Kostovetsky, L. (2012) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.01.006 · Cited by 749
Self-citationExecutive Pay, Hidden Compensation and Managerial Entrenchment
Kuhnen, C. M., & Zwiebel, J. H. (2007) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.972622 · Cited by 116
Cited by
The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Firm Value: The Role of Customer Awareness
Servaes, H., & Tamayo, A. (2013) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1120.1630 · Cited by 2,534
Sustainable investing in equilibrium
Pástor, Ľ., Stambaugh, R. F., & Taylor, L. A. (2021) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.12.011 · Cited by 2,226
Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Risk: Theory and Empirical Evidence
Albuquerque, R., Koskinen, Y., & Zhang, C. (2019) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2018.3043 · Cited by 2,204
Corporate Sustainability: First Evidence on Materiality
Khan, M., Serafeim, G., & Yoon, A. (2016) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr-51383 · Cited by 1,959
Corporate goodness and shareholder wealth
Krüger, P. (2015) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.09.008 · Cited by 1,901
Metadata
- Authors
- Cheng, I.-H., Hong, H., & Shue, K.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2013-09
- OpenAlex
- W2135856626
- Cited by
- 215
- References
- 10
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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