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Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians

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Avis, Eric, Ferraz, Claudio, Finan, Frederico · 2016 · National Bureau of Economic Research
Cited by 170

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Political corruption is considered a major impediment to economic development, and yet it remains pervasive throughout the world.This paper examines the extent to which government audits of public resources can reduce corruption by enhancing political and judiciary accountability.We do so in the context of Brazil's anti-corruption program, which randomly audits municipalities for their use of federal funds.We find that being audited in the past reduces future corruption by 8 percent, while also increasing the likelihood of experiencing a subsequent legal action by 20 percent.We interpret these reduced-form findings through a political agency model, which we structurally estimate.Based on our estimated model, the reduction in corruption comes mostly from the audits increasing the perceived threat of the non-electoral costs of engaging in corruption.

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Metadata

Authors
Avis, E., Ferraz, C., & Finan, F.
Venue
National Bureau of Economic Research
Published
2016-07
OpenAlex
W2480773686
Cited by
170
References
3
Type
report
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3386/w22443
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Avis, E., Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2016). Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians. National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w22443

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