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Too Much Data: Prices and Inefficiencies in Data Markets

Open access
Acemoglu, Daron, Makhdoumi, Ali, Malekian, Azarakhsh, Ozdaglar, Asuman · 2019 · National Bureau of Economic Research

Abstract

When a user shares her data with an online platform, she typically reveals relevant information about other users.We model a data market in the presence of this type of externality in a setup where one or multiple platforms estimate a user's type with data they acquire from all users and (some) users value their privacy.We demonstrate that the data externalities depress the price of data because once a user's information is leaked by others, she has less reason to protect her data and privacy.These depressed prices lead to excessive data sharing.We characterize conditions under which shutting down data markets improves (utilitarian) welfare.Competition between platforms does not redress the problem of excessively low price for data and too much data sharing, and may further reduce welfare.We propose a scheme based on mediated data-sharing that improves efficiency.

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Metadata

Authors
Acemoglu, D., Makhdoumi, A., Malekian, A., & Ozdaglar, A.
Venue
National Bureau of Economic Research
Published
2019-09
OpenAlex
W2974598553
Cited by
197
References
3
Type
report
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Too Much Data: Prices and Inefficiencies in Data Markets. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3386/w26296
The paper
Acemoglu, D., Makhdoumi, A., Malekian, A., & Ozdaglar, A. (2019). Too Much Data: Prices and Inefficiencies in Data Markets. National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w26296

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