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Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
Open accessAbstract
We study the competition between two political parties for seats in a parliament.The parliament will set two types of policies: ideological and non-ideological.The parties have fixed positions on the ideological issues, but choose their non-ideological platforms to attract voters and campaign contributions.In this context, we ask: Flow do the equilibrium contributions from special interest groups influence the platforms of the parties?We show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of infonried voters and members of special interest groups.The party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the special interests.
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Olson, M. (1965) · doi:10.4159/9780674041660 · Cited by 14,191
Cited by
Ramanna, K. (2008) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2007.11.006 · Cited by 417
Distance to Frontier, Selection, and Economic Growth
Acemoglu, D., Aghion, P., & Zilibotti, F. (2002) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.485483 · Cited by 371
Informational Lobbying and Legislative Voting
Schnakenberg, K. E. (2017) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12249 · Cited by 145
Metadata
- Authors
- Grossman, G., & Helpman, E.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 1994-10
- OpenAlex
- W4300611253
- Cited by
- 197
- References
- 1
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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