The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence
Open accessAbstract
This paper offers and tests a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for general training they receive.The superior information about crucial ingredient in the worker's ability our model is that the current employer has relative to other firms.This informational advantage gives the employer an ex post monopsony power over the worker which encourages the firm to provide training.We show that the model can lead to multiple equilibria.In one equilibrium quits are endogenously high, and as a result employers have limited monopsony power and are willing to supply only little training, while in another equilibrium quits are low and training high.We also derive predictions from our model not shared by other explanations of firm sponsored training.Using microdata from Germany, we show that the predictions of the specific human capital model are rejected, while our model receives support from the data.
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Cites
Job Mobility and the Careers of Young Men
Topel, R. H., & Ward, M. P. (1992) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118478 · Cited by 1,693
Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargaining Approach
Grout, P. A. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911498 · Cited by 945
Differences and Changes in Wage Structures
Freeman, R. B., & Katz, L. F. (1995) · University of Chicago Press eBooks · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226261843.001.0001 · Cited by 317
Reconciling Markets and Institutions: The German Apprenticeship SystemPreprint
Soskice, D. (1994) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 284
Career development and specific human capital collection
Prendergast, C. J. (1992) · Journal of the Japanese and International Economies · doi:10.1016/0889-1583(92)90021-u · Cited by 76
Specific Capital, Adverse Selection, and Turnover: A Comparison of the United States and Japan
Abe, Y. (1994) · Journal of the Japanese and International Economies · doi:10.1006/jjie.1994.1014 · Cited by 26
Cited by
Thelen, K. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511790997 · Cited by 2,477
The Structure of Wages and Investment in General Training
Acemoglu, D., & Pischke, J. (1999) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250071 · Cited by 1,046
Self-citationForeign direct investment and spillovers through workers’ mobility
Fosfuri, A., Motta, M., & Rønde, T. (2001) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/s0022-1996(00)00069-6 · Cited by 1,003
Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence
Acemoglu, D., & Pischke, J.-S. (1998) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355398555531 · Cited by 992
Self-citationThe School-to-Work Transition: A Cross-National Perspective
Ryan, P. (2001) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.39.1.34 · Cited by 943
Metadata
- Authors
- Acemoglu, D., & Pischke, J.-S.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 1996-06
- OpenAlex
- W2890683413
- Cited by
- 755
- References
- 6
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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