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Adverse Selection in Health Insurance
Open accessAbstract
Individual choice over health insurance policies may result in risk-based sorting across plans. Such adverse selection induces three types of losses: efficiency losses from individuals being allocated to the wrong plans; risk sharing losses since premium variability is increased; and losses from insurers distorting their policies to improve their mix of insureds. We discuss the potential for these losses, and present empirical evidence on adverse selection in two groups of employees: Harvard University, and the Group Insurance Commission of Massachusetts (serving state and local employees). In both groups, adverse selection is a significant concern. At Harvard, the University's decision to contribute an equal amount to all insurance plans led to the disappearance of the most generous policy within 3 years. At the GIC, adverse selection has been contained by subsidizing premiums on a proportional basis and managing the most generous policy very tightly. A combination of prospective or retrospective risk adjustment, coupled with reinsurance for high cost cases, seems promising as a way to provide appropriate incentives for enrollees and to reduce losses from adverse selection.
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Cited by
Chapter 11 The anatomy of health insurance
Cutler, D. M., & Zeckhauser, R. J. (2000) · Handbook of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/s1574-0064(00)80170-5 · Cited by 644
Self-citationPaying for Health Insurance: The Trade-Off between Competition and Adverse Selection
Cutler, D. M., & Reber, S. J. (1998) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355398555649 · Cited by 602
Self-citationTesting for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets
Cohen, A., & Siegelman, P. (2010) · Journal of Risk and Insurance · doi:10.1111/j.1539-6975.2009.01337.x · Cited by 418
Cutler, D. M., McClellan, M., & Newhouse, J. P. (2000) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2600999 · Cited by 300
Self-citationFrom Physician to Consumer: The Effectiveness of Strategies to Manage Health Care Utilization
Flynn, K. E., Smith, M. A., & Davis, M. K. (2002) · Medical Care Research and Review · doi:10.1177/107755802237811 · Cited by 36
Metadata
- Authors
- Cutler, D., & Zeckhauser, R.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 1997-07
- OpenAlex
- W3122540132
- Cited by
- 164
- References
- 0
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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