The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets
Abstract
This article reviews and evaluates the empirical literature on adverse selection in insurance markets. We focus on empirical work that seeks to test the basic coverage–risk prediction of adverse selection theory—that is, that policyholders who purchase more insurance coverage tend to be riskier. The analysis of this body of work, we argue, indicates that whether such a correlation exists varies across insurance markets and pools of insurance policies. We discuss various reasons why a coverage–risk correlation may not be found in some pools of insurance policies. The presence of a coverage–risk correlation can be explained either by moral hazard or adverse selection, and we discuss methods for distinguishing between them. Finally, we review the evidence on learning by policyholders and insurers.
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Cites
Barsky, R. B., Juster, F. T., Kimball, M. S., & Shapiro, M. D. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555280 · Cited by 2,400
Risk Aversion, Wealth, and Background Risk
Guiso, L., & Paiella, M. (2008) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/jeea.2008.6.6.1109 · Cited by 1,057
Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice
Cohen, A., & Einav, L. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.3.745 · Cited by 708
Self-citationAsymmetric Information in Health Insurance: Evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey
Cardon, J. H., & Hendel, I. (2001) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2696362 · Cited by 411
Deductible Contracts Against Fraudulent Claims: Evidence from Automobile Insurance
Dionne, G., & Gagné, R. (2001) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/00346530151143824 · Cited by 67
Brockett, P. L., & Golden, L. L. (2007) · Journal of Risk and Insurance · doi:10.1111/j.1539-6975.2007.00201.x · Cited by 56
Cited by
The Nature of Risk Preferences: Evidence from Insurance Choices
Barseghyan, L., Molinari, F., O'Donoghue, T., & Teitelbaum, J. C. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.6.2499 · Cited by 348
Automobile insurance classification ratemaking based on telematics driving data
Huang, Y., & Meng, S. (2019) · Decision Support Systems · doi:10.1016/j.dss.2019.113156 · Cited by 119
A critical examination of the climate engineering moral hazard and risk compensation concern
Reynolds, J. (2015) · The Anthropocene Review · doi:10.1177/2053019614554304 · Cited by 96
Cream Skimming: Innovations in Insurance Risk Classification and Adverse Selection
Cather, D. A. (2018) · Risk Management and Insurance Review · doi:10.1111/rmir.12102 · Cited by 22
Dynamic Moral Hazard: A Longitudinal Examination of Automobile Insurance in Canada
Shi, P., Zhang, W., & Boucher, J. (2018) · Journal of Risk and Insurance · doi:10.1111/jori.12172 · Cited by 8
Metadata
- Authors
- Cohen, A., & Siegelman, P.
- Venue
- Journal of Risk and Insurance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2010-03
- Volume
- 77
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 39-84
- ISSN
- 0022-4367 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-6975
- OpenAlex
- W2031533523
- Cited by
- 418
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 48.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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