The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
What Happens When You Tax the Rich? Evidence from Executive Compensation
Open accessAbstract
This paper reexamines the responsiveness of taxable income to changes in marginal tax rates using detailed compensation data on several thousand corporate executives from 1991 to 1995. The data confirm that the higher marginal rates of 1993 led to a significant decline in taxable income. This small group of executives can account for as much as 20% of the aggregate change in wage and salary income for the 1 million richest taxpayers and one person alone can account for over 2%. But the decline is almost entirely a short-run shift in the timing of compensation rather than a permanent reduction in taxable income. The short-run elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net of tax share exceeds one but the elasticity after one year is at most 0.4 and probably close to 0. The response comes almost entirely from a large increase in the exercise of stock options in the year before the tax change, followed by a decline in the year of the tax change and the change is concentrated among executives at the top of the income distribution. Executives without stock options are 6 times less responsive to taxation. Other types of compensation such as salary and bonus or nontaxed income are either not responsive to tax rates or not large enough to make a difference. The estimated elasticities show that the dead weight loss of recent tax increases was around 15 to 25 percent of the revenue generated.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987: Supply and Demand Factors
Katz, L. F., & Murphy, K. M. (1992) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118323 · Cited by 4,793
Cited by
Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998
Piketty, T., & Saez, E. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535135 · Cited by 3,769
Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence
Chetty, R., Looney, A., & Kroft, K. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.4.1145 · Cited by 2,742
The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review
Saez, E., Slemrod, J., & Giertz, S. H. (2012) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.50.1.3 · Cited by 1,299
The elasticity of taxable income: evidence and implications
Gruber, J., & Saez, E. (2002) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(01)00085-8 · Cited by 990
Research Commentary —Too Big to Fail: Large Samples and the p -Value Problem
Lin, M., Lucas, H. C., & Shmueli, G. (2013) · Information Systems Research · doi:10.1287/isre.2013.0480 · Cited by 972
Metadata
- Authors
- Goolsbee, A.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 1997-12
- OpenAlex
- W2891344209
- Cited by
- 227
- References
- 1
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: What Happens When You Tax the Rich? Evidence from Executive Compensation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3386/w6333
- The paper
- Goolsbee, A. (1997). What Happens When You Tax the Rich? Evidence from Executive Compensation. National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w6333
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.