The DOI matches its Crossref record; 36 of the 36 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Understanding the Determinants of Managerial Ownership and the Link Between Ownership and Performance
Open accessAbstract
Both managerial ownership and performance are endogenously determined by exogenous (and only partly observed) changes in the firm's contracting environment.We extend the cross-sectional results of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and use panel data to show that managerial ownership is explained by key variables in the contracting environment in ways consistent with the predictions of principal-agent models.A large fraction of the cross-sectional variation in managerial ownership is explained by unobserved firm heterogeneity.Moreover, after controlling both for observed firm characteristics and firm fixed effects, we cannot conclude (econometrically) that changes in managerial ownership affect firm performance.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
Separation of Ownership and Control
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467037 · Cited by 19,058
Specification Tests in Econometrics
Hausman, J. A. (1978) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913827 · Cited by 18,820
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1986) · Cited by 17,275
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
Fama, E. F. (1980) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260866 · Cited by 10,466
Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1996) · Corporate Bankruptcy · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609435.005 · Cited by 9,306
Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261385 · Cited by 8,408
The Modern Corporation and Private Property
Kline, J. V., Berle, A. A., & Means, G. C. (1933) · Columbia Law Review · doi:10.2307/1115736 · Cited by 7,361
Management ownership and market valuation
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90048-7 · Cited by 6,895
The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences
Demsetz, H., & Lehn, K. (1985) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261354 · Cited by 6,236
Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value
McConnell, J. J., & Servaes, H. (1990) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(90)90069-c · Cited by 4,309
Theory of the firm; managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1996) · Firms, Organizations and Contracts · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198774358.003.0006 · Cited by 4,245
Greene, W. (2000) · University of Maribor digital library (University of Maribor) · Cited by 3,746
Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends
Easterbrook, F. H. (1984) · eYLS (Yale Law School) · Cited by 3,065
Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders
Agrawal, A., & Knoeber, C. R. (1996) · The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/2331397 · Cited by 2,801
Risk measurement when shares are subject to infrequent trading
Dimson, E. (1979) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(79)90013-8 · Cited by 2,754
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
Jensen (Deceased), M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1998) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.94043 · Cited by 2,749
Estimating betas from nonsynchronous data
Scholes, M., & Williams, J. (1977) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(77)90041-1 · Cited by 2,743
Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition
(1985) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036883 · Cited by 1,736
Errors in variables in panel data
Griliches, Z., & Hausman, J. A. (1986) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/0304-4076(86)90058-8 · Cited by 1,617
The Modern Corporation and Private Property
Payne, P. M., Berle, A. A., & Means, G. C. (1933) · Virginia Law Review · doi:10.2307/1066523 · Cited by 1,544
The modern corporation and private property
Berle, A. A. 1.-1., & Means, G. C. (2009) · Cited by 1,431
The effects of management buyouts on operating performance and value
Kaplan, S. (1989) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(89)90047-0 · Cited by 1,319
Simultaneous Determination of Insider Ownership, Debt, and Dividend Policies
Jensen, G. R., Solberg, D. P., & Zorn, T. S. (1992) · The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/2331370 · Cited by 1,064
Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment
Hubbard, R. G. (1990) · University of Chicago Press eBooks · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226355948.001.0001 · Cited by 679
Self-citationFirm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders
Agrawal, A., & Knoeber, C. R. (1997) · CFA Digest · doi:10.2469/dig.v27.n2.82 · Cited by 658
Generalized method of moments specification testing
K. Newey, W. (1985) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/0304-4076(85)90154-x · Cited by 596
A Test of the Agency Theory of Managerial Ownership, Corporate Leverage, and Corporate Dividends
Crutchley, C. E., & Hansen, R. S. (1989) · Financial Management · doi:10.2307/3665795 · Cited by 517
Executive pay and performance Evidence from the U.S. banking industry
Hubbard, R. G., & Palia, D. (1995) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(94)00816-j · Cited by 491
Self-citationThe distribution of power among corporate managers, shareholders, and directors
Jensen, M. C., & Warner, J. B. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90038-4 · Cited by 447
Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance: Incentives or Rewards?Preprint
Kole, S. R. (1996) · SSRN Electronic Journal · Cited by 141
Zeckhauser, R., & Pound, J. (1990) · NBER Chapters · Cited by 140
Cole, R. A., & Mehran, H. (1998) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(98)00039-7 · Cited by 128
Errors in Variables in Panel Data
Griliches, Z., & Hausman, J. A. (1984) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/t0037 · Cited by 92
The Effect of Changes in Ownership Structure on Performance: Evidence from the Thrift Industry
Cole, R. A., & Mehran, H. (1996) · Finance and Economics Discussion Series · doi:10.17016/feds.1996.06 · Cited by 82
Executive Pay and Performance: Evidence from the U.S. Banking Industry
Hubbard, R., & Palia, D. N. (1994) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w4704 · Cited by 63
Self-citation
Cited by
An International Comparison of Capital Structure and Debt Maturity Choices
Fan, J. P. H., Titman, S., & Twite, G. (2012) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s0022109011000597 · Cited by 1,081
Financial Accounting Information and Corporate Governance
Bushman, R. M., & Smith, A. J. (2002) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.253302 · Cited by 849
Masulis, R. W., Pham, P. K., & Zein, J. (2011) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhr052 · Cited by 523
Are executive stock options associated with future earnings?
Hanlon, M., Rajgopal, S., & Shevlin, T. (2003) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2003.10.008 · Cited by 474
Performance consequences of mandatory increases in executive stock ownership
Core, J. (2002) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(02)00127-7 · Cited by 412
Metadata
- Authors
- Himmelberg, C., Hubbard, R. G., & Palia, D.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2000-02
- OpenAlex
- W2095608235
- Cited by
- 686
- References
- 36
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.