The DOI matches its Crossref record; 84 of the 84 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Labor Supply Effects of Social Insurance
Open accessAbstract
This chapter examines the labor supply effects of social insurance programs.We argue that this topic deserves separate treatment from the rest of the labor supply literature because individuals may be imperfectly informed as to the rules of the programs and because key parameters are likely to differ for those who are eligible for social insurance programs, such as the disabled.Furthermore, differences in social insurance programs often provide natural experiments with exogenous changes in wages or incomes that can be used to estimate labor supply responses.Finally, social insurance often affects different margins of labor supply.For example, the labor supply literature deals mostly with adjustments in the number of hours worked, whereas the incentives of social insurance programs frequently affect the decision of whether to work at all.The empirical work on unemployment insurance (UI) and workers' compensation (WC) insurance finds that the programs tend to increase the length of time employees spend out of work.Most of the estimates of the elasticities of lost work time that incorporate both the incidence and duration of claims are close to 1.0 for unemployment insurance and between 0.5 and 1.0 for workers' compensation.These elasticities are substantially larger than the labor supply elasticities typically found for men in studies of the effects of wages or taxes on hours of work.The evidence on disability insurance and (especially) social security retirement suggests much smaller and less conclusively established labor supply effects.Part of the explanation for this difference probably lies in the fact that UI and WC lead to short-run variation in wages with mostly a substitution effect.Our review suggest that it would be misleading to apply a universal set of labor supply elasticities to these diverse problems and populations.
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Citations
Cites
Natural and Quasi- Experiments in Economics
Meyer, B. (1994) · Journal of Business and Economic Statistics · doi:10.2307/1392369 · Cited by 1,792
Self-citationUnemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells
Meyer, B. D. (1990) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938349 · Cited by 1,178
Self-citationNatural and Quasi-Experiments in Economics
Meyer, B. D. (1995) · Journal of Business & Economic Statistics · doi:10.1080/07350015.1995.10524589 · Cited by 1,100
Self-citationJob Search and Labor Market AnalysisPreprint
Mortensen, D. T. (1984) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 915
How Social Security and Medicare Affect Retirement Behavior In a World of Incomplete Markets
Rust, J., & Phelan, C. (1997) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2171940 · Cited by 888
Labor supply of men: A surveyPreprint
Pencavel, J. (1987) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 756
Unemployment Insurance and Job Search Decisions
Mortensen, D. T. (1977) · ILR Review · doi:10.1177/001979397703000410 · Cited by 746
Unemployment Compensation and Labor Market Transitions: A Critical Review
Atkinson, A. B., & Micklewright, J. (1991) · Journal of Economic Literature · Cited by 691
Unnatural Experiments? Estimating the Incidence of Endogenous Policies
Besley, T., & Case, A. (2000) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00578 · Cited by 682
The impact of the potential duration of unemployment benefits on the duration of unemployment
Katz, L. F., & Meyer, B. D. (1990) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(92)90056-l · Cited by 665
Self-citation
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Hall, R. E., & Milgrom, P. R. (2008) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.98.4.1653 · Cited by 750
The Individual Experience of Unemployment
Wanberg, C. R. (2012) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-120710-100500 · Cited by 664
The Take Up of Social Benefits
Currie, J. (2004) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w10488 · Cited by 645
The Labor Market in the Great Recession
Elsby, M. W. L., Hobijn, B., & Şahin, A. (2010) · Brookings Papers on Economic Activity · doi:10.1353/eca.2010.0001 · Cited by 447
Transfers in Cash and In-Kind: Theory Meets the Data
Currie, J., & Gahvari, F. (2008) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.46.2.333 · Cited by 402
Welfare Reform in European Countries: A Microsimulation Analysis
Immervoll, H., Kleven, H. J., Kreiner, C. T., & Saez, E. (2007) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02000.x · Cited by 376
Job search and unemployment insurance: New evidence from time use data
Krueger, A. B., & Mueller, A. (2010) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.12.001 · Cited by 322
Self-citationSchmieder, J. F., von Wachter, T., & Bender, S. (2012) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjs010 · Cited by 276
Inference on Causal Effects in a Generalized Regression Kink Design
Card, D., Lee, D. S., Pei, Z., & Weber, A. (2015) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta11224 · Cited by 269
Metadata
- Authors
- Krueger, A., & Meyer, B.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2002-06
- Volume
- 4
- Pages
- 2327-2392
- OpenAlex
- W2138836438
- Cited by
- 300
- References
- 84
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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