Assessing Security Implications of Genome Editing: Emerging Points From an International Workshop
Open accessAbstract
Genome editing, which includes the deliberate alteration of a selected DNA sequence in a cell using targeted nucleases, is greatly facilitating basic research in the life sciences.In particular, it is contributing significantly to our understanding of biological functions and disease mechanisms.The new genome editing tools are expected to empower innovation for societal applications in human and animal health, agriculture and food systems, and the bioeconomy.As with other tools, there may also be potential for misuse, either inadvertently and associated with biosafety concerns or deliberately and associated with biosecurity concerns. ASSESSMEnT BY ACADEMiES WORLDWiDEBecause of the rapid development and widespread use of tools such as CRISPR-Cas9 in many countries with various, sometimes divergent regulation and governance of research, international dialog is essential for resolving contentious points and evaluating the implications for ensuring responsible research and innovation.Academies of science and medicine worldwide have already undertaken considerable analysis of the potential benefits and risks of genome editing as part of their broader interests in emerging technologies in the biosciences.For example, in Europe, the European Academies Science Advisory Council (EASAC) published a report (EASAC, 2017) last year providing a broad perspective on multiple genome editing applications, and in the US, the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine (NASEM) have published several comprehensive reports, including on gene drives (NASEM, 2016) and human cell editing (NASEM, 2017).Recently, in October 2017, EASAC and NASEM, together with the global InterAcademy Partnership (IAP) and the German National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina convened an international workshop of experts in genome editing, security studies, and public policy in Herrenhausen, Germany.This meeting addressed some of the emerging implications, for potential benefits as well as potential misuse, and what might be done to mitigate any potential harm.This workshop was designed to emphasize the pivotal role of transparent and inclusive dialog with stakeholders and the promotion of a research culture that builds trust through responsibility and integrity.Researchers cannot dissociate themselves from the uses of the new knowledge they generate and they must take into consideration the reasonably foreseeable consequences of their activities.A report of this workshop has now (January 2018) been published (IAP, 2018) and our article here briefly draws attention to some of the key areas covered in detail in the report.Initial workshop sessions explored applications of societal value spanning medicine, plant and animal breeding in agriculture, microbial production, and gene drive systems that might transform an entire population of a selected species.Some of the potential opportunities are listed in Table 1.Participants in the workshop acknowledged the importance of doing more to share good practice in research policy and regulation worldwide to allow the flexibility to manage and enable innovation.
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Some viral vectors are considered risky for potential oncogenesis.
“Although many viral vectors are safe and effective delivery vehicles for clinical gene therapy, some viral vectors are considered risky for potential oncogenesis.”
From Viral Vector Systems for Gene Therapy: A Comprehensive Literature Review of Progress and Biosafety Challenges (2020) · cites this paper as [3]
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GASKELL, G. D., Bárd, I., Allansdottir, A., et al. (2017) · Nature Biotechnology · doi:10.1038/nbt.3958 · Cited by 147 · see citing works
How should the applications of genome editing be assessed and regulated?
Fears, R., & ter Meulen, V. (2017) · eLife · doi:10.7554/elife.26295 · Cited by 34 · see citing works
Self-citationEthical principles for the use of human cellular biotechnologies
Groups, T. D. A. R. D. O. T. B. W., Wolpe, P. R., & Rommelfanger, K. S. (2017) · Nature Biotechnology · doi:10.1038/nbt.4007 · Cited by 20 · see citing works
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Research works printed but not linked: 3
- IAP. (2018). “Assessing the security implications of genome editing technology,” in Report of an International Workshop in Herrenhausen. Available at: https://www.volkswagenstiftung.de/sites/default/files/downloads/Summary_Report_Genome_Editing.pdf (Accessed: January 18, 2018).
- NASEM. (2016). Gene Drives on the Horizon: Advancing Science, Navigating Uncertainty, and Aligning Research with Public Values. 27536751
- NASEM. (2017). Human Genome Editing: Science, Ethics and Governance. National Academies Press. 28796468
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Ghosh, S., Brown, A. M., Jenkins, C., & Campbell, K. (2020) · Applied Biosafety · doi:10.1177/1535676019899502 · Cited by 218 · see citing works
- Authors
- Fears, R., & ter Meulen, V.
- Affiliations
- German National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Fears, Robin
- ORCID
- Fears, Robin
- Venue
- Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2018-03-28
- Volume
- 6
- Pages
- 34-34
- ISSN
- 2296-4185 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC5882869
- OpenAlex
- W2792337643
- Cited by
- 15
- References
- 3
- Citations by year
- 2025: 2 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 1 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 4 · 2017: 1
- FWCI
- 0.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Molecular Biology › CRISPR and Genetic Engineering
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Global Security and Public Health
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Physiology › Biomedical Ethics and Regulation
- Keywords
- genome editing, security implications, biosecurity, biosafety, CRISPR/Cas9, gene drive, responsible research and innovation, research governance, bioethics, stakeholder engagement, science policy, emerging technologies, research integrity, public trust in science, Leopoldina
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