Executive control over unconscious cognition: attentional sensitization of unconscious information processing
Open accessAbstract
Unconscious priming is a prototypical example of an automatic process, which is initiated without deliberate intention. Classical theories of automaticity assume that such unconscious automatic processes occur in a purely bottom-up driven fashion independent of executive control mechanisms. In contrast to these classical theories, our attentional sensitization model of unconscious information processing proposes that unconscious processing is susceptible to executive control and is only elicited if the cognitive system is configured accordingly. It is assumed that unconscious processing depends on attentional amplification of task-congruent processing pathways as a function of task sets. This article provides an overview of the latest research on executive control influences on unconscious information processing. I introduce refined theories of automaticity with a particular focus on the attentional sensitization model of unconscious cognition which is specifically developed to account for various attentional influences on different types of unconscious information processing. In support of the attentional sensitization model, empirical evidence is reviewed demonstrating executive control influences on unconscious cognition in the domains of visuo-motor and semantic processing: subliminal priming depends on attentional resources, is susceptible to stimulus expectations and is influenced by action intentions and task sets. This suggests that even unconscious processing is flexible and context-dependent as a function of higher-level executive control settings. I discuss that the assumption of attentional sensitization of unconscious information processing can accommodate conflicting findings regarding the automaticity of processes in many areas of cognition and emotion. This theoretical view has the potential to stimulate future research on executive control of unconscious processing in healthy and clinical populations.
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Cognitive capacities indicated by nonverbal behavior alone are generally not sufficient to demonstrate conscious awareness.
“However, because not all cognitive processing leads to conscious experience (52, 58-62), cognitive capacities indicated by nonverbal behavior alone are generally not sufficient to demonstrate conscious awareness”
From A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness (2017) · cites this paper as [62]
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References 123 · Cited by 103
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Posner M. I. Snyder C. R. R. (1975). “Attention and cognitive control,” in Information Processing and Cognition: The Loyola Symposium, ed Solso R. L. (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates), 55– 85
- Authors
- Kiefer, M.
- Affiliations
- Universität Ulm (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Kiefer, Markus
- ORCID
- Kiefer, Markus
- Venue
- Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2012
- Volume
- 6
- Pages
- 61-61
- ISSN
- 1662-5161 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC3311241
- OpenAlex
- W2052963125
- Cited by
- 103
- References
- 123
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 14 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 12 · 2016: 11 · 2015: 14 · 2014: 8 · 2013: 8 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 5.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by-nc
- Locations
- Frontiers in Human Neuroscience (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Funders
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (PAK 270/2)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neurobiology of Language and Bilingualism
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition › Visual Attention and Saliency Detection
- Keywords
- executive function, unconscious cognition, unconscious priming, subliminal priming, automaticity, attentional resources, task sets, intention to act, semantic processing
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