Plural embodiment(s) of mind. Genealogy and Guidelines for a radically embodied approach to mind and consciousness
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This article focuses on a scientific approach to the study of cognition that Warren McCulloch introduced in the era of cybernetics as "experimental epistemology." In line with recent attempts to highlight its contribution to cognitive science and AI, our article intends to draw attention to its unexplored influence on contemporary embodied approaches to the investigation of mind and consciousness. To this end, we will survey a series of models of cognitive systems genealogically related to the McCulloch-Pitts networks-based modeling approach, i.e., von Foerster's model of the biological computer, the Maturana-Varela model of the autopoietic system, and Varela's model of emergent selves. Based on examination of the relevant aspects of these models, we will argue that they offered the McCulloch-Pitts "cybernetic of networks" a coherent methodological and theoretical line of development, complementary to the well-known computationalist one. As we will show, this alternative evolutionary line empowered the biological orientation of McCulloch's experimental epistemology, laying foundations for contemporary "radically embodied" approaches to mind and consciousness - in particular the Thompson-Varela approach. We will identify the heritage of this tradition of inquiry for future research in cognitive science and AI by proposing guidelines that synthetize how its methodological and theoretical insights suggest taking into account the role(s) played by the biological body in cognitive processes - consciousness included.
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The principal architects-von Foerster, Maturana, and Varela-produced three influential variants of the McCulloch-Pitts cognitive network model: the biological computer, the autopoietic system, and the autonomous system.
“As shown in (Ceruti and Damiano, 2018), the principal architects of this development–Heinz von Foerster, Humberto Maturana, and Francisco Varela, all directly connected to McCulloch through collaborations–produced three influential variants of the McCulloch-Pitts cognitive network model: the biological computer (von Foerster, 1960; von Foerster, 2003), the autopoietic system (Maturana and Varela,”
From Wetware network-based AI: a chemical approach to embodied cognition for robotics and artificial intelligence (2026) · cites this paper as Ceruti and Damiano, 2018
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Cites
University of Messina, M., Damiano, L., Stano, P., & University of Salento, L. (2018) · Complex Systems · doi:10.25088/complexsystems.27.3.199 · Cited by 28 · see citing works
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Damiano, L., Fleres, A., Roli, A., & Stano, P. (2026) · Frontiers in Robotics and AI · doi:10.3389/frobt.2025.1694338 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“In the formulation proposed by Varela, (1979), this concept generalizes Piaget’s earlier notion of closure (Piaget, 1967) and captures the circular interdependence of processes—and thus of the components’ transformations—that characterizes self-organizing systems (e.g., Ceruti and Damiano, 2018).”
Self-citation
- Authors
- Ceruti, M., & Damiano, L.
- Affiliations
- IULM University (IT)
- University of Messina (IT)
- Corresponding author
- Damiano, Luisa
- ORCID
- Damiano, Luisa
- Venue
- Frontiers in Psychology
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2018-11-29
- Volume
- 9
- Pages
- 2204-2204
- ISSN
- 1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC6281752
- OpenAlex
- W2903475250
- Cited by
- 8
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2018: 1
- FWCI
- 0.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- Frontiers in Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- Warren McCulloch, experimental epistemology, cybernetics, embodied cognition, consciousness, autopoiesis, emergent self, computational theory of mind, body and cognition
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