The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Mitigating Security Vulnerabilities in 6G Networks: A Comprehensive Analysis of the DMRN Protocol Using SVO Logic and ProVerif
Open accessAbstract
The rapid evolution of mobile and optical communication technologies is driving the transition from 5G to 6G networks. This transition inevitably brings about changes in authentication scenarios, as new security demands emerge that go beyond the capabilities of existing frameworks. Therefore, it is necessary to address these evolving requirements and the associated key challenges: ensuring Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) to protect communications even if long-term keys are compromised and integrating Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) techniques to defend against the threats posed by quantum computing. These are essential for both radio and optical communications, which are foundational elements of future 6G infrastructures. The DMRN Protocol, introduced in 2022, represents a major advancement by offering both PFS and PQC while maintaining compatibility with existing 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) standards. Given the looming quantum-era challenges, it is imperative to analyze the protocol’s security architecture through formal verification. Accordingly, we formally analyze the DMRN Protocol using SVO logic and ProVerif to assess its effectiveness in mitigating attack vectors, such as malicious or compromised serving networks (SNs) and home network (HN) masquerading. Our research found that the DMRN Protocol has vulnerabilities in key areas such as mutual authentication and key exchange. In light of these findings, our study provides critical insights into the design of secure and quantum-safe authentication protocols for the transition to 6G networks. Furthermore, by identifying the vulnerabilities in and discussing countermeasures to address the DMRN Protocol, this study lays the groundwork for the future standardization of secure 6G Authentication and Key Agreement protocols.
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“In deployed systems, adversaries can harvest ciphertext opportunistically across heterogeneous network layers that span wireless access links, fixed backhaul paths, satellite relays, and carrier interconnects [9].”
From Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later: A Temporal Cybersecurity Risk in the Quantum Transition (2025) · cites this paper as [9]
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“Classical public-key cryptography faces an existential threat from quantum algorithms [9].”
From Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later: A Temporal Cybersecurity Risk in the Quantum Transition (2025) · cites this paper as [9]
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“As telecommunication infrastructures evolve toward quantum-era connectivity, the assumption that encryption ensures perpetual secrecy is no longer valid [9,10].”
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“Control and user-plane data in fifth-generation (5G) and future sixth-generation (6G) networks, satellite links, and cloud backbones often persist for decades in logs, archives, or distributed ledgers [9].”
From Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later: A Temporal Cybersecurity Risk in the Quantum Transition (2025) · cites this paper as [9]
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“Satellite communication lifetimes (10-20 years) are derived from ITU-R recommendations and operational practices in LEO/MEO satellite constellations where telemetry and control data are archived for the operational lifetime of satellites and beyond for forensic analysis [9,37].”
From Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later: A Temporal Cybersecurity Risk in the Quantum Transition (2025) · cites this paper as [9]
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On the security of public key protocols
Dolev, D., & Yao, A. (1983) · IEEE Transactions on Information Theory · doi:10.1109/tit.1983.1056650 · Cited by 5,833
Burrows, M., Abadi, M., & Needham, R. (1990) · ACM Transactions on Computer Systems · doi:10.1145/77648.77649 · Cited by 2,523
The Road Towards 6G: A Comprehensive Survey
Jiang, W., Han, B., Habibi, M. A., & Schotten, H. D. (2021) · IEEE Open Journal of the Communications Society · doi:10.1109/ojcoms.2021.3057679 · Cited by 1,710
Reasoning about belief in cryptographic protocols
Gong, L., Needham, R., & Yahalom, R. (1990) · Proceedings. 1990 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/risp.1990.63854 · Cited by 628
Hussain, S. R., Echeverria, M., Karim, I., Chowdhury, O., & Bertino, E. (2019) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/3319535.3354263 · Cited by 229
Toward 6G Optical Fronthaul: A Survey on Enabling Technologies and Research Perspectives
Fayad, A., Cinkler, T., & Rak, J. (2024) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2024.3408090 · Cited by 166
Jeon, H.-B., Kim, S.-M., Moon, H.-J., Kwon, D.-H., Lee, J.-W., Chung, J., Han, S., Chae, C., & Alouini, M. (2023) · IEEE Communications Magazine · doi:10.1109/mcom.001.2200220 · Cited by 149
Automatic Verification of Security Protocols in the Symbolic Model: The Verifier ProVerif
Blanchet, B. (2014) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-10082-1_3 · Cited by 143
On Unifying Some Cryptographic Protocol Logics
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A Beyond-5G Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol
Damir, M. T., Meskanen, T., Ramezanian, S., & Niemi, V. (2022) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-23020-2_14 · Cited by 29
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Burrows, 1989, A Logic of Authentication, Proc. R. Soc. Lond. Math. Phys. Eng. Sci., 426, 233
- Waidner, 1994, Formal Verification of Authentication Protocols, IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., 11, 749
Cited by
Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later: A Temporal Cybersecurity Risk in the Quantum Transition
Kagai, F., Branch, P., But, J., & Allen, R. (2025) · Telecom · doi:10.3390/telecom6040100 · Cited by 15
Metadata
- Authors
- You, I., Kim, J., Pawana, I. W. A. J., & Ko, Y.
- Affiliations
- Kookmin University (KR)
- Gyeongsang National University (KR)
- Corresponding author
- Ko, Yongho
- Venue
- Applied Sciences
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2024-10-24
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 21
- Pages
- 9726
- ISSN
- 2076-3417 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4403733819
- Semantic Scholar
- 1ca569b29fae116f3d5aea8c4a35d5230aad6c46
- Cited by
- 7
- References
- 20
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 6
- FWCI
- 1.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Applied Sciences (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Institute of Information & Communications Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) (2022-00207416)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
- Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics › Quantum Information and Cryptography
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › IPv6, Mobility, Handover, Networks, Security
- Keywords
- 6G, forward secrecy, post-quantum cryptography, mutual authentication, key exchange, formal verification, ProVerif, 3GPP standards, network security vulnerabilities
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- You, I., Kim, J., Pawana, I. W. A. J., & Ko, Y. (2024). Mitigating Security Vulnerabilities in 6G Networks: A Comprehensive Analysis of the DMRN Protocol Using SVO Logic and ProVerif. Applied Sciences. https://doi.org/10.3390/app14219726
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