Demystifying In-Vehicle Intrusion Detection Systems: A Survey of Surveys and a Meta-Taxonomy
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Breaches in the cyberspace due to cyber-physical attacks can harm the physical space, and any type of vehicle is an alluring target for wrongdoers for an assortment of reasons. Especially, as the automobiles are becoming increasingly interconnected within the Cooperative Intelligent Transport System (C-ITS) realm and their level of automation elevates, the risk for cyberattacks augments along with the attack surface, thus inexorably rendering the risk of complacency and inaction sizable. Next to other defensive measures, intrusion detection systems (IDS) already comprise an inextricable component of modern automobiles in charge of detecting intrusions in the system while in operation. This work concentrates on in-vehicle IDS with the goal to deliver a fourfold comprehensive survey of surveys on this topic. First, we collect and analyze all existing in-vehicle IDS classifications and fuse them into a simpler, overarching one that can be used as a base for classifying any work in this area. Second, we gather and elaborate on the so-far available datasets which can be possibly used to train and evaluate an in-vehicle IDS. Third, we survey non-commercial simulators which may be utilized for creating a dataset or evaluating an IDS. The last contribution pertains to a thorough exposition of the future trends and challenges in this area. To our knowledge, this work provides the first wholemeal survey on in-vehicle IDS, and it is therefore anticipated to serve as a groundwork and point of reference for multiple stakeholders at varying levels.
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Citations
Cites
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BackgroundResultInfluential
Cited by
Blockchain Intelligence for Internet of Vehicles: Challenges and Solutions
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Metadata
- Authors
- Karopoulos, G., Kambourakis, G., Chatzoglou, E., Hernández-Ramos, J. L., & Kouliaridis, V.
- Venue
- Electronics
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2022-03-29
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 1072
- ISSN
- 2079-9292 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4220910237
- Cited by
- 81
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 7.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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