The DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 8 of the 51 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
A Comprehensive Attack Flow Model and Security Analysis for Wi-Fi and WPA3
Open accessPublished version of a preprint
Abstract
The presence of wireless communication grows undeniably more prevalent each year. Since the introduction of the IEEE 802.11 standard for Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN) in 1997, technologies have progressed to provide wireless accessibility to industries and consumers with growing ease and convenience. As the usage of personal devices, such as phones and watches, that connect to the Internet through Wi-Fi increases, wireless attacks on users are becoming more critical. This paper provides a novel attack model to offer an organized and comprehensive view of the possible attacks on Wi-Fi latest security standards. All existing attacks will be investigated, with emphasis on more recent attacks, such as the KRACK and PMKID Dictionary attacks. The main contribution of this paper is to analyze the technology offered in the new Wi-Fi Protected Access III (WPA3) security scheme and provide the first comprehensive security analysis and discussion to determine whether it has addressed the vulnerabilities of its predecessor. An interesting finding of this paper is that WPA3 still lacks in addressing all the issues existing in WPA2 and exploring other mitigations for future research.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This paper presents a four-phase attack flow model for Wi-Fi networks and evaluates whether WPA3 mitigates each known attack. It concludes WPA3 fixes several WPA2 vulnerabilities—deauthentication, offline dictionary attacks, handshake capture decryption, and KRACK—but still leaves evil twin, SSL stripping, DNS spoofing, and parts of rogue AP and ARP spoofing unaddressed.
Key findings
- Table 1 reports WPA3 solves deauthentication, handshake capture dictionary attack, PMKID hash dictionary attack, handshake capture en/decryption, and KRACK; it partially addresses rogue access point and ARP spoofing; it does not solve evil twin, SSL stripping, or DNS spoofing.
- WPA3’s SAE/dragonfly handshake and PMF/SA query make deauthentication and offline dictionary attacks infeasible: the paper states an adversary cannot derive the PMK/PTK without \(r_A\), \(r_B\), and the password element, and obtaining \(m_A\) from \(E_A\) and PE is computationally intractable.
- Remaining feasible attacks include rogue AP key phishing when the client is not connected, evil twin MITM, ARP spoofing client session hijacking, SSL stripping, and DNS spoofing after an MITM position; ARP spoofing MITM is blocked only if client isolation is enabled.
- The model defines four outcomes: denial of service, deception, impersonation, and stolen information.
Methods
- Design: a conceptual attack flow model organized into states, attacks, and outcomes across four phases, applied first to WPA2-PSK and then to WPA3.
- Analysis: case-based security evaluation with assumptions and proofs for each attack, summarized in Table 1; no empirical dataset, measurements, or experimental validation are reported.
- Data/sample: not stated in the paper; the work is a protocol and literature analysis rather than an empirical study.
Limitations
- Stated: WPA3 still lacks solutions for all WPA2 issues; future research is required for ARP spoofing protection and rogue AP/evil twin defenses, and SSL stripping/DNS spoofing are out of WPA3’s layer 3 scope.
- Stated: rogue AP is only partially addressed, with client education recommended; evil twin currently has no protection.
- Evident: the security proofs are qualitative and conceptual, with no experimental validation or quantitative performance data; conclusions depend on assumptions such as client isolation being enabled and KRACK patches being applied.
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Claims the paper makes
8 Valid · 3 Not valid · 42 Not checked · 143 Own results and interpretations
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“This process exploits the four-way handshake that wireless security protocols use to authenticate their users when connecting to the network.”
§ A Comprehensive Attack Flow Model and Security Analysis for Wi-Fi and WPA3 > 2.3.2. Limitations
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [2] Vanhoef, M., and Piessens, F. (November, January 30). Key reinstallation attacks: Forcing nonce reuse in WPA2. Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Dallas, TX, USA. source
The Introduction says the attack targets the 4-way handshake used by protected Wi-Fi networks. Section 2.3 explains that the handshake provides mutual authentication when a client connects, and Section 3 identifies it as vulnerable to a key reinstallation attack. (LLM, conf=0.92)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“It has also been demonstrated that WPA2 can be exploited by a method known as KRACK, for which we will go into further depth in Section 4.2.7.”
§ A Comprehensive Attack Flow Model and Security Analysis for Wi-Fi and WPA3 > 2.3.2. Limitations
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [2] Vanhoef, M., and Piessens, F. (November, January 30). Key reinstallation attacks: Forcing nonce reuse in WPA2. Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Dallas, TX, USA. source
The Introduction (page unavailable) states that both WPA- and WPA2-certified products are affected by the attacks. The Abstract (page unavailable) describes the key reinstallation attack against the Wi-Fi handshake, supporting the claim that WPA2 can be exploited by KRACK. (LLM, conf=0.94)
boostedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Vanhoef and Piessens discovered a vulnerability in the four-way handshake that would give any adversary the ability to decrypt a user's traffic without needing to capture the handshake and have knowledge of the key [2].”
§ A Comprehensive Attack Flow Model and Security Analysis for Wi-Fi and WPA3 > 3.2.6. Attack-KRACK Exploit
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [2] Vanhoef, M., and Piessens, F. (November, January 30). Key reinstallation attacks: Forcing nonce reuse in WPA2. Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Dallas, TX, USA. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction and Conclusion say the four-way handshake is vulnerable to key reinstallation attacks that can enable frame decryption; §6.4 says the attack does not recover the session key. But §3.3 requires an adversary in a man-in-the-middle position to manipulate handshake messages, including a retransmission of message 3. The paper therefore does not support the claim that any adversary can decrypt traffic without capturing handshake messages. (LLM, conf=0.87)
hedgedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
In the paper
“WPA3 uses the password-based Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE) technique to authenticate the client to the AP [28].”
§ A Comprehensive Attack Flow Model and Security Analysis for Wi-Fi and WPA3 > 4.1. Overview
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites [28] (2018, October 30). Wi-Fi Certified WPA3 Technology Overview. Available online: https://www.wi-fi.org/downloads-registered-guest.
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
In the paper
“However, WEP has been proven to be easily broken [8][9][10].”
§ A Comprehensive Attack Flow Model and Security Analysis for Wi-Fi and WPA3 > 2.1. Wireless Equivalency Protocol
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites [8][9][10]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
boostedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
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Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The check wasn’t confident either way, so it gives no verdict — never disputed.
In the citing paper
“When using the standardized security level, when the network key is not obtained by preinstallation, the trust center will send the network key currently used by the ZigBee network to the device in an unencrypted form[65].”
From A Survey of IoT Privacy Security: Architecture, Technology, Challenges, and Trends (2024) · cites this paper as [65]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe check wasn’t confident either way, so it gives no verdict — never disputed.
In the citing paper
“Yang etal. [65] sent ping messages, ACK messages, and SYN synchronization messages to Wi-Fi devices to cause DoS attacks on devices. The researchers found that this approach could speed up the energy depletion rate of the equipment by 18.5%.”
From A Survey of IoT Privacy Security: Architecture, Technology, Challenges, and Trends (2024) · cites this paper as [65]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated major: it would touch a result — a value a result rests on, reported and recomputed p-values on opposite sides of the significance level, two passages that conflict with no sign which is right, or a cited work retracted before this paper was published.
In the paper
§ A Comprehensive Attack Flow Model and Security Analysis for Wi-Fi and WPA3 > Case 2: Client Not Connected
“The adversary will then take the plaintext entries, calculate the PMK, PTK and MIC to compare to the captured handshake and find the correct key.Therefore, preforming a rogue access point attack to obtain network keys is feasible.”
§ A Comprehensive Attack Flow Model and Security Analysis for Wi-Fi and WPA3 > 4.2.6. Handshake Capture En/Decryption
“Hence, the adversary would not be able to derive a PMK and PTK to compare to a captured MIC and find the correct password that exists within word list.Therefore, preforming handshake capture decryption is unfeasible.”
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Dragonblood: Analyzing the Dragonfly Handshake of WPA3 and EAP-pwd
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“Deauthentication is a straightforward attack that creates a DoS for one or more users [37], while integrity and confidentially are affected in attacks on WPA2-PSK, specifically, the keys that are used between an API and a client [38].”
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BackgroundRetractedA Comprehensive Review of Wireless Security Protocols and Encryption Applications
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“The attacker can then force the victim to connect to the rogue network instead of the legitimate one, positioning themselves as an on-path attacker [22].”
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“Because every encrypted communication will have a different packet number and unique keystream, XOR cancellation is not conceivable [41].”
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“The authentication messages are exchanged among sub-access point of Switched-AP, IED, and the server of RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service) [28].”
Dragonblood: A Security Analysis of WPA3's SAE Handshake.
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MethodANALYZING AND EVALUATING THE SECURITY STANDARDS IN WIRELESS NETWORK: A REVIEW STUDY
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Pengaruh Wireless Security Protocol Pada Throughput Jaringan Wireless 802.11ax
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“Selanjutnya pada penelitian mengenai fitur kemanan baru WPA3 yang dilakukan oleh (Kohlios & Hayajneh, 2018), mode keamanan WPA3 menawarkan skema baru yang lebih baik bila dibandingkan dengan mode keamanan WPA2, seperti adanya perbaikan masalah re-authentication, off-line dictionary attacks dan the…”
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Batista, L. P. E. J., Gomes, H., & Almeida, J. R. (2025) · Procedia Computer Science · doi:10.1016/j.procs.2025.02.107 · Cited by 1
Towards an Architecture for Online Scheduling of Autonomous Robots in Agriculture
Bachelet, B., Battistoni, P., Bimonte, S., Cariou, C., Chalhoub, G., Coutarel, F., & Tricot, N. (2022) · International Journal of Smart Vehicles and Smart Transportation · doi:10.4018/ijsvst.313059 · Cited by 1
SAP: A Secure Low-Latency Protocol for Mitigating High Computation Overhead in WI-FI Networks
Jain, V., Wetzker, U., Laxmi, V., et al. (2023) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2023.3302529 · Cited by 1
“…Counter Mode with Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Protocol (AES-CCMP) [4] for symmetric encryption of the messages, as AES-CCMP provides a high level of security for encryption, used by all standard protocols (such as WPA2 and WPA3) and not been proved vulnerable to attacks [4].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialAlsharbaty, F. S., & Ali, Q. I. (2023) · International Journal of Advanced Natural Sciences and Engineering Researches · doi:10.59287/ijanser.1504 · Cited by 1
Radhi, B. M., Hussain, M. A., Abduljabbar, Z. A., et al. (2024) · International Conference on Artificial Intelligence in Information and Communication (ICAIIC) · doi:10.1109/icaiic60209.2024.10463470 · Cited by 1
“However, the drawback of the proposed system is that the board has WEP or WPA security, both of which have been compromised [11].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialMachine Learning-based Intrusion Detection System Through WPA3 Protocol in Smart Contract System
Sayduzzaman, M., Tamanna, J. T., Rahman, M., Sazzad, S., & Rahman, T. (2024) · International Journal of Innovative Science and Research Technology (IJISRT) · doi:10.38124/ijisrt/ijisrt24mar2149 · Cited by 1
Segment-Based Formal Verification of WiFi Fragmentation and Power Save Mode
Shen, Z., Karim, I., & Bertino, E. (2024) · ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS) · doi:10.1145/3634737.3637667 · Cited by 8
A Study of Semi-Fungible Token based Wi-Fi Access Control
Ye, L., Chen, B., Sun, C., et al. (2024) · IEEE International Conference on Communication Technology (ICCT) · doi:10.1109/icct62411.2024.10946664 · Cited by 1
“Although the Wi-Fi Alliance released WPA3 in 2018, which further improves the security and privacy protection of Wi-Fi networks [6], many user terminals and access points (APs) currently do not support the latest WPA3 protocol.”
Yu, H., Zhou, J., & Ma, M. (2025) · Journal of Information Security and Applications · doi:10.1016/j.jisa.2025.104075 · Cited by 1
Pengaruh Penggunaan Beacon Interval Dalam Meningkatkan Throughput Jaringan Wireless IEEE 802.11ax
Saputro, V. A., & Raharjo, S. (2022) · Jurnal SISKOM-KB (Sistem Komputer dan Kecerdasan Buatan) · doi:10.47970/siskom-kb.v6i1.324 · Cited by 1
“WPA versi 3 dikenalkan ke publik pada 25 Juni 2018, dimana pada WPA versi 3 menggunakan metode enkripsi Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE) yang menggantikan metode otentikasi Pre shared key [13] dengan enkripsi ini pengguna jaringan nirkabel akan terlindungi dari upaya brute force yang dilakukan oleh attacker…”
BackgroundMulti-Channel Attacks ReviewPreprint
Thankappan, M. (2022) · doi:10.36227/techrxiv.19773136
Multi-Channel Attacks ReviewPreprint
Thankappan, M., Rifà-Pous, H., & Garrigues, C. (2023) · doi:10.36227/techrxiv.19773136.v2
Modeling and Verification of WPA3 Security Protocol Based on SPIN
Xiao, M., Qiao, S., Liu, T., Yang, K., Li, Z., & Zhan, D. (2023) · Communications in computer and information science · doi:10.1007/978-981-99-7743-7_16
Developing an Attack Model for compromising Privacy over Secure Connection Protocols
Almakdi, S., & Alshehri, M. S. (2023) · IEEE International Conference on Computer and Communication Engineering Technology (CCET) · doi:10.1109/ccet59170.2023.10335137 · Cited by 1
“Some of the very famous ones include: Data Investigation Report by Verizon [8] in [9] revealed MITM attack to be the biggest threat to network security.”
BackgroundComprehensive Study of IoT Vulnerabilities and CountermeasuresPreprint
Coston, I., Plotnizky, E., & Nojoumian, M. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4695812
Enhancing Wi-Fi Security by Preventing Backward Compatibility Attacks on WPA3 ProtocolsPreprint
Tareef, A., Abadleh, A., Alkasasbeh, A. A., & Alghamdi, M. (2024) · Research Square · doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-4830716/v1
dos Santos, L. M., Guimarães, A. P., & dos Santos, P. D. S. L. (2025) · Cuadernos de Educación y Desarrollo · doi:10.55905/cuadv17n5-043
Design and Implementation of a Secure Communication Architecture for IoT Devices
Dumitrache, C., & Anghelescu, P. (2025) · Journal of Sensor and Actuator Networks · doi:10.3390/jsan14040064
Assessment of Wireless Network Security Protocols
Milošević, M., Drašković, V., & Ciric, V. M. (2025) · International Conference on Electrical, Electronic and Computing Engineering (IcETRAN) · doi:10.1109/icetran66854.2025.11114111
“Since the attack was proposed, some patches to APs and devices have been released [6].”
Generating False Handshakes: A Modern Honeypot Strategy for Wi-Fi Network Protection
Банах, Р., & Popovych, T. (2025) · International Conference on Advanced Computer Information Technologies (ACIT) · doi:10.1109/acit65614.2025.11185905
“These improvements enhance network security; however, side-channel attacks such as Dragonblood can still undermine the protection level [6–7].”
Analysis of Vulnerabilities and Practical Attacks on WPA3-Enterprise in Corporate Wireless Networks
Тлеубердин, С., Issainova, A., Adamova, A., et al. (2025) · Procedia Computer Science · doi:10.1016/j.procs.2025.10.256
The Advancement of Wi-Fi 7 Technology: Standard and Case Study
Guo, G., Qamar, F., Ismail, F. F., et al. (2025) · doi:10.1109/iceei68459.2025.11330716
“Since each interaction with the AP will generate a new PMK, the attacker can only read the Wi-Fi password by trying one password at a time, which effectively protects the security of Wi-Fi [20].”
APScavenge: Centralized WPA-Enterprise network security assessment tool
Batista, L. P. E. J., Gomes, H., & Almeida, J. R. (2026) · SoftwareX · doi:10.1016/j.softx.2026.102623
Provable Security and Privacy Analysis of WPA3’s SAE and SAE-PK Protocols
Chen, S., Pan, K., & Sanina, O. (2026) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-25317-0_6
Coston, I., Hezel, K. D., Plotnizky, E., & Nojoumian, M. (2026) · Applied Sciences · doi:10.3390/app16104809
CNN Based Cyber Defense Architecture for 802.11 Networks
Ceylan, M. A., Kılınçer, İ. F., & Ertam, F. (2026) · Erciyes Üniversitesi Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü Fen Bilimleri Dergisi · doi:10.65520/erciyesfen.1934250
Developing a Framework for Analysis of WPA3 and Router Attacks
Kulmuratova, A., Aldosh, B., Sapash, S., et al. (2026) · doi:10.1109/iccsdfai70505.2026.11648018
“Earlier protection mechanisms such as WEP and WPA are no longer considered adequate, while WPA2, despite its widespread adoption, has been shown to remain vulnerable to multiple attack classes, including password-guessing attacks and key reinstallation attacks (KRACK) [1], [2], [7].”
Beyond Hardware Acceleration: A Heuristic Decision Framework for Optimizing WPA2 Dictionary Attacks
Chalyi, O. (2026) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2026.3737853
Metadata
- Authors
- Kohlios, C. P., & Hayajneh, T.
- Affiliations
- Fordham University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Hayajneh, Thaier
- ORCID
- Hayajneh, Thaier
- Venue
- Electronics
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2018-10-30
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- 284
- ISSN
- 2079-9292 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2898565097
- Cited by
- 77
- References
- 34
- Citations by year
- 2026: 9 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 1
- FWCI
- 3.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- dx.doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Electronics (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Preprints.org (acceptedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Wireless Networks and Protocols
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Keywords
- Wi-Fi security, WPA3, WPA2, wireless local area networks, IEEE 802.11, security vulnerabilities, wireless network attacks
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-11, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-11 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.