A Security Framework for the Internet of Things in the Future Internet Architecture
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a recent trend that extends the boundary of the Internet to include a wide variety of computing devices. Connecting many stand-alone IoT systems through the Internet introduces many challenges, with security being front-and-center since much of the collected information will be exposed to a wide and often unknown audience. Unfortunately, due to the intrinsic capability limits of low-end IoT devices, which account for a majority of the IoT end hosts, many traditional security methods cannot be applied to secure IoT systems, which open a door for attacks and exploits directed both against IoT services and the broader Internet. This paper addresses this issue by introducing a unified IoT framework based on the MobilityFirst future Internet architecture that explicitly focuses on supporting security for the IoT. Our design integrates local IoT systems into the global Internet without losing usability, interoperability and security protection. Specifically, we introduced an IoT middleware layer that connects heterogeneous hardware in local IoT systems to the global MobilityFirst network. We propose an IoT name resolution service (IoT-NRS) as a core component of the middleware layer, and develop a lightweight keying protocol that establishes trust between an IoT device and the IoT-NRS.
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Cites
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BackgroundRecommendation for block cipher modes of operation: GaloisCounter Mode (GCM) and GMAC
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“Unfortunately, unlike many other wireless environments, such as cellular and Wi-Fi networks, it is difficult for IoT networks to provide confidentiality for data transmission due to the resource-constrained nature of low-end devices, which are a large fraction of IoT devices [30].”
BackgroundSelf-citation
Cited by
IoT Privacy and Security: Challenges and Solutions
Tawalbeh, L., Muheidat, F., Tawalbeh, M., & Quwaider, M. (2020) · Applied Sciences · doi:10.3390/app10124102 · Cited by 764
Survey on blockchain for Internet of Things
Wang, X., Zha, X., Ni, W., Liu, R. P., Guo, Y. J., Niu, X., & Zheng, K. (2019) · Computer Communications · doi:10.1016/j.comcom.2019.01.006 · Cited by 567
Blockchain and Smart Contracts for Insurance: Is the Technology Mature Enough?
Gatteschi, V., Lamberti, F., Demartini, C., Pranteda, C., & Santamaría, V. (2018) · Future Internet · doi:10.3390/fi10020020 · Cited by 516
Intrusion detection systems for IoT-based smart environments: a survey
Elrawy, M. F., Awad, A. I., & Hamed, H. F. A. (2018) · Journal of Cloud Computing · doi:10.1186/s13677-018-0123-6 · Cited by 481
An Empirical Study on System Level Aspects of Internet of Things (IoT)
Swamy, S. N., & Kota, S. R. (2020) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2020.3029847 · Cited by 267
Lightweight security protocols for the Internet of Things
Wu, X.-W., Yang, E.-H., & Wang, J. (2017) · 2017 IEEE 28th Annual International Symposium on Personal, Indoor, and Mobile Radio Communications (PIMRC) · doi:10.1109/pimrc.2017.8292779 · Cited by 32
“The Internet of Things (IoT) security has attracted a lot of attention over the recent years [1-11], due to the huge potential of IoT technologies for economic and social impact [12, 13].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Liu, X., Zhao, M., Li, S., Zhang, F., & Trappe, W.
- Venue
- Future Internet
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2017-06-28
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 27
- ISSN
- 1999-5903 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2733358165
- Cited by
- 135
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 10.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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