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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 3 of the 24 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Encryption for Industrial Control Systems: A Survey of Application-Level and Network-Level Approaches in Smart Grids

Open access
Narayanan, Mahesh, Hafeez, Muhammad Asfand, Munir, Arslan · 2026 · Journal of Cybersecurity and Privacy

Abstract

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are fundamental to the operation, monitoring, and automation of critical infrastructure in sectors such as energy, water utilities, manufacturing, transportation, and oil and gas. According to the Purdue Model, ICS encompasses tightly coupled OT and IT layers, becoming increasingly interconnected. Smart grids represent a critical class of ICS; thus, this survey examines encryption and relevant protocols in smart grid communications, with findings extendable to other ICS. Encryption techniques implemented at both the protocol and network layers are among the most effective cybersecurity strategies for protecting communications in increasingly interconnected ICS environments. This paper provides a comprehensive survey of encryption practices within the smart grid as the primary ICS application domain, focusing on protocol-level solutions (e.g., DNP3, IEC 60870-5-104, IEC 61850, ICCP/TASE.2, Modbus, OPC UA, and MQTT) and network-level mechanisms (e.g., VPNs, IPsec, and MACsec). We evaluate these technologies in terms of security, performance, and deployability in legacy and heterogeneous systems that include renewable energy resources. Key implementation challenges are explored, including real-time operational constraints, cryptographic key management, interoperability across platforms, and alignment with NERC CIP, IEC 62351, and IEC 62443. The survey highlights emerging trends such as lightweight Transport Layer Security (TLS) for constrained devices, post-quantum cryptography, and Zero Trust architectures. Our goal is to provide a practical resource for building resilient smart grid security frameworks, with takeaways that generalize to other ICS.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

This survey reviews encryption for industrial control systems in smart grid communications, classifying mechanisms as application-level/protocol-bound or network-level and comparing their security, performance, and deployability. It concludes that no single approach is best: application-level encryption offers end-to-end granularity but is harder to retrofit, while network-level encryption is easier to deploy but may terminate at gateways and not provide end-to-end protection.

Key findings

  • Application-level/protocol-bound protections include Modbus/TCP over TLS, IEC 60870-5-104 over TLS, DNP3 Secure Authentication, OPC UA native encryption, and MQTT over TLS; DNP3-SA provides integrity and origin authentication but does not encrypt telemetry or control payloads.
  • Network-level protections include VPNs, IPsec, and MACsec; IPsec is suited to wide-area links, while MACsec is lightweight for intra-substation Layer 2 traffic such as IEC 61850 GOOSE/SV, but MACsec does not scale across wide-area routed networks.
  • Reported performance figures include Modbus/TCP over TLS increasing average per-request latency from around 1 ms to approximately 1.6–1.8 ms depending on cipher suite, roughly 50% slower than plain Modbus/TCP; on-device RTU/PLC encryption adds ≈10–20% CPU/QPS overhead and about 10% throughput loss versus no encryption, while proxy-based Modbus/TCP encryption can reduce throughput by up to ∼60% under heavy load.
  • SSL VPN tunnels in cloud-based SCADA deployments add about 1 ms to end-to-end latency, with most delays still in the 20–50 ms range; WAN distance and routing dominate over cryptographic cost. The survey also highlights emerging trends such as lightweight TLS, post-quantum cryptography, and Zero Trust architectures, with alignment to NERC CIP, IEC 62351, and IEC 62443.

Methods

  • Design: a comprehensive survey, not an empirical study, that functionally classifies encryption as application-level/protocol-bound versus network-level and maps mechanisms onto smart grid topologies and the Purdue model.
  • Data/sample: reviews protocol-level solutions (DNP3, IEC 60870-5-104, IEC 61850, ICCP/TASE.2, Modbus, OPC UA, MQTT) and network-level mechanisms (VPNs, IPsec, MACsec), drawing on cited literature and standards rather than new measurements.
  • Analysis: qualitative comparative evaluation of security, performance, deployability, legacy compatibility, and regulatory alignment; Table 1 maps encryption possibilities across TCP/IP layers, and Table 2 compares application-level versus network-level encryption.

Limitations

  • The paper states limitations of the surveyed mechanisms: performance/latency overhead, key and certificate management complexity, legacy hardware/software incompatibility, deployment complexity, MACsec’s local-scope restriction, DNP3-SA leaving telemetry unencrypted, and IPsec issues with NAT traversal and multicast/broadcast traffic.
  • Evident from the text: the survey reports no new testbed measurements or systematic review protocol; quantitative figures are drawn from cited studies, and comparative conclusions are qualitative and may not generalize to all ICS deployments.
  • Evident from the text: some protocol sections appear abbreviated or fragmented in the provided version, and deployment claims are not independently validated by the authors.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.3390/jcp6010011

Cites

30 of 30 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

2 Valid · 15 Not valid · 19 Not checked · 39 Own results and interpretations

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Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

3 of 3

Citations

Cites

Show all 24 references

Research works printed but not linked: 8

  1. Ujvarosi, A. (2016). Evolution of SCADA systems. Bulletin of the Transilvania University of Brasov. Series I-Engineering Sciences, Transilvania University Press.
  2. Raj, 2020, Chapter Six—Industry 4.0: Industrial Internet of Things (IIOT), The Digital Twin Paradigm for Smarter Systems and Environments: The Industry Use Cases, Volume 117, 129
  3. George, 2024, The impact of IT/OT Convergence on digital transformation in manufacturing, Partn. Univers. Int. Innov., 2, 18
  4. Chaiyasoonthorn, S., Wiboonrat, M., Mitatha, S., Sriudomsilp, T., and Siripongdee, S. (2024, January 10–13). The Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) Convergence in Industrial World. Proceedings of the CBI+EDOC’24 (BIWeek 2024)—Case Reports, Vienna, Austria.
  5. Ehuan, 2025, Cybersecurity Implications of IT and OT Convergence, Chem. Eng., 122, 28
  6. Dubroca, S. (2016, January 10–12). MACsec: Encryption for the wired LAN. Proceedings of the Netdev 1.1, Seville, Spain.
  7. Nousiainen, A. (2024). Applying Cybersecurity for IEC 60870-5-104 Communication Between Control Station and Substation. [Master’s Thesis, University of Vaasa, School of Technology and Innovations].
  8. Saleki, N. (2023). Establishing Secure Remote Access Within Ics Network. [Master’s Thesis, Eindhoven University of Technology, Department of Mathematics and Computer Science].

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Narayanan, M., Hafeez, M. A., & Munir, A.
Affiliations
Florida Atlantic University (US)
Corresponding author
Munir, Arslan
Venue
Journal of Cybersecurity and Privacy
Publisher
MDPI AG
Published
2026-01-04
Volume
6
Issue
1
Pages
11
ISSN
2624-800X (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W7118179005
Cited by
3
References
24
Citations by year
2026: 3
FWCI
7.65
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Cybersecurity and Privacy (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
Funders
U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (DE-CR0000050)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Power Systems and Technologies
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Smart Grid and Power Systems
Keywords
industrial control systems, smart grid security, encryption, DNP3, IEC 60870-5-104, IEC 61850, Modbus, OPC UA, MQTT, virtual private networks, IPsec, MACsec, key management, NERC CIP, IEC 62351, IEC 62443, post-quantum cryptography, zero-trust architecture, critical infrastructure cybersecurity, renewable energy integration

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This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Encryption for Industrial Control Systems: A Survey of Application-Level and Network-Level Approaches in Smart Grids. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3390/jcp6010011
The paper
Narayanan, M., Hafeez, M. A., & Munir, A. (2026). Encryption for Industrial Control Systems: A Survey of Application-Level and Network-Level Approaches in Smart Grids. Journal of Cybersecurity and Privacy. https://doi.org/10.3390/jcp6010011

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.