The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 3 of the 24 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Encryption for Industrial Control Systems: A Survey of Application-Level and Network-Level Approaches in Smart Grids
Open accessAbstract
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are fundamental to the operation, monitoring, and automation of critical infrastructure in sectors such as energy, water utilities, manufacturing, transportation, and oil and gas. According to the Purdue Model, ICS encompasses tightly coupled OT and IT layers, becoming increasingly interconnected. Smart grids represent a critical class of ICS; thus, this survey examines encryption and relevant protocols in smart grid communications, with findings extendable to other ICS. Encryption techniques implemented at both the protocol and network layers are among the most effective cybersecurity strategies for protecting communications in increasingly interconnected ICS environments. This paper provides a comprehensive survey of encryption practices within the smart grid as the primary ICS application domain, focusing on protocol-level solutions (e.g., DNP3, IEC 60870-5-104, IEC 61850, ICCP/TASE.2, Modbus, OPC UA, and MQTT) and network-level mechanisms (e.g., VPNs, IPsec, and MACsec). We evaluate these technologies in terms of security, performance, and deployability in legacy and heterogeneous systems that include renewable energy resources. Key implementation challenges are explored, including real-time operational constraints, cryptographic key management, interoperability across platforms, and alignment with NERC CIP, IEC 62351, and IEC 62443. The survey highlights emerging trends such as lightweight Transport Layer Security (TLS) for constrained devices, post-quantum cryptography, and Zero Trust architectures. Our goal is to provide a practical resource for building resilient smart grid security frameworks, with takeaways that generalize to other ICS.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This survey reviews encryption for industrial control systems in smart grid communications, classifying mechanisms as application-level/protocol-bound or network-level and comparing their security, performance, and deployability. It concludes that no single approach is best: application-level encryption offers end-to-end granularity but is harder to retrofit, while network-level encryption is easier to deploy but may terminate at gateways and not provide end-to-end protection.
Key findings
- Application-level/protocol-bound protections include Modbus/TCP over TLS, IEC 60870-5-104 over TLS, DNP3 Secure Authentication, OPC UA native encryption, and MQTT over TLS; DNP3-SA provides integrity and origin authentication but does not encrypt telemetry or control payloads.
- Network-level protections include VPNs, IPsec, and MACsec; IPsec is suited to wide-area links, while MACsec is lightweight for intra-substation Layer 2 traffic such as IEC 61850 GOOSE/SV, but MACsec does not scale across wide-area routed networks.
- Reported performance figures include Modbus/TCP over TLS increasing average per-request latency from around 1 ms to approximately 1.6–1.8 ms depending on cipher suite, roughly 50% slower than plain Modbus/TCP; on-device RTU/PLC encryption adds ≈10–20% CPU/QPS overhead and about 10% throughput loss versus no encryption, while proxy-based Modbus/TCP encryption can reduce throughput by up to ∼60% under heavy load.
- SSL VPN tunnels in cloud-based SCADA deployments add about 1 ms to end-to-end latency, with most delays still in the 20–50 ms range; WAN distance and routing dominate over cryptographic cost. The survey also highlights emerging trends such as lightweight TLS, post-quantum cryptography, and Zero Trust architectures, with alignment to NERC CIP, IEC 62351, and IEC 62443.
Methods
- Design: a comprehensive survey, not an empirical study, that functionally classifies encryption as application-level/protocol-bound versus network-level and maps mechanisms onto smart grid topologies and the Purdue model.
- Data/sample: reviews protocol-level solutions (DNP3, IEC 60870-5-104, IEC 61850, ICCP/TASE.2, Modbus, OPC UA, MQTT) and network-level mechanisms (VPNs, IPsec, MACsec), drawing on cited literature and standards rather than new measurements.
- Analysis: qualitative comparative evaluation of security, performance, deployability, legacy compatibility, and regulatory alignment; Table 1 maps encryption possibilities across TCP/IP layers, and Table 2 compares application-level versus network-level encryption.
Limitations
- The paper states limitations of the surveyed mechanisms: performance/latency overhead, key and certificate management complexity, legacy hardware/software incompatibility, deployment complexity, MACsec’s local-scope restriction, DNP3-SA leaving telemetry unencrypted, and IPsec issues with NAT traversal and multicast/broadcast traffic.
- Evident from the text: the survey reports no new testbed measurements or systematic review protocol; quantitative figures are drawn from cited studies, and comparative conclusions are qualitative and may not generalize to all ICS deployments.
- Evident from the text: some protocol sections appear abbreviated or fragmented in the provided version, and deployment claims are not independently validated by the authors.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
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Cites
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Verification
Claims the paper makes
2 Valid · 15 Not valid · 19 Not checked · 39 Own results and interpretations
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“SA mitigates spoofing and replay through counters and freshness checks; it does not encrypt telemetry or control payloads.”
§ Encryption for Industrial Control Systems: A Survey of Application-Level and Network-Level Approaches in Smart Grids > 4.1.3. DNP3 with Secure Authentication (IEEE 1815)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A statement the paper makes itself — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“To address these gaps, ICCP is commonly secured using overlay mechanisms such as TLS or IPsec.”
§ Encryption for Industrial Control Systems: A Survey of Application-Level and Network-Level Approaches in Smart Grids > 4.1.6. ICCP (TASE.2) with TLS/IPsec Overlays
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
In the paper
“MACsec is increasingly used within substation LANs to secure communications among IEDs, protection relays, and switchgear controllers [16].”
§ Encryption for Industrial Control Systems: A Survey of Application-Level and Network-Level Approaches in Smart Grids > 3.2.3. Usage
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites [16] Zhao, Q., Zhang, X., Meng, Z., Yan, P., Liang, Z., and Yang, R. Study on Substation High Reliable Communication and Deterministic-Delay. Proceedings of the 16th Annual Conference of China Electrotechnical Society: Volume I.
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
In the paper
“Recent measurements of Sun-Spec Modbus/TCP over TLS on embedded controllers report that enforcing TLS increases average per-request latency from around 1 ms to approximately 1.6-1.8ms, depending on the cipher suite [21].”
§ Encryption for Industrial Control Systems: A Survey of Application-Level and Network-Level Approaches in Smart Grids > 4. Application-Level Encryption
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [21] Ferst, 2025, Implementation and Analysis of a Secure Communication with SunSpec Modbus and Transport Layer Security Protocols for Short-Term Energy Management Systems, IEEE Access source
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“However, the original ICCP specification does not include native encryption, authentication, or integrity validation, leaving communications exposed to interception, spoofing, or unauthorized manipulation.”
§ Encryption for Industrial Control Systems: A Survey of Application-Level and Network-Level Approaches in Smart Grids > 4.1.6. ICCP (TASE.2) with TLS/IPsec Overlays
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
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Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Encryption for Industrial Control Systems: A Survey of Application-Level and Network-Level Approaches in Smart Grids > 6.4. Post-Quantum Cryptography in ICS
“PQC algorithms such as lattice-based or hashbased key encapsulation [38] and signatures must be evaluated for feasibility within the constrained environments of RTUs and PLCs.”
§ Encryption for Industrial Control Systems: A Survey of Application-Level and Network-Level Approaches in Smart Grids > References
“38. Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team. Recommended Practice: Improving Industrial Control System Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies; Technical Report; Department of Homeland Security (DHS): Washington, DC, USA, 2016.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Encryption for Industrial Control Systems: A Survey of Application-Level and Network-Level Approaches in Smart Grids > 4. Application-Level Encryption
“Recent measurements of Sun-Spec Modbus/TCP over TLS on embedded controllers report that enforcing TLS increases average per-request latency from around 1 ms to approximately 1.6-1.8ms, depending on the cipher suite [21].”
§ Encryption for Industrial Control Systems: A Survey of Application-Level and Network-Level Approaches in Smart Grids > References
“21. Carcano, A.; Fovino, I.N.; Masera, M.; Trombetta, A. Scada malware, a proof of concept.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Encryption for Industrial Control Systems: A Survey of Application-Level and Network-Level Approaches in Smart Grids > 6.2. Hybrid Encryption Architectures
“Inspired by defense-indepth principles of NIST [37], these hybrid implementations aim to secure data across the entire communication stack.”
§ Encryption for Industrial Control Systems: A Survey of Application-Level and Network-Level Approaches in Smart Grids > References
“37. Ugwuanyi, S.; Ghanem, K.; Abdulhadi, I. Implementing secure layer 2 tunneling protocols for IEC 61850-90-5 based routable and non-routable GOOSE and SV messages.”
Citations
Cites
The Purdue enterprise reference architecture
Williams, T. J. (1994) · Computers in Industry · doi:10.1016/0166-3615(94)90017-5 · Cited by 632 · cited 1×
“As illustrated by the Purdue Model [1] in Figure 1, the reference architecture that organizes ICS into hierarchical levels from the physical process up to enterprise IT—ICS encompasses tightly coupled Operational Technology (OT) and IT layers, In power-system deployments, many of these functions…”
Cyber-security in smart grid: survey and challenges
Mrabet, Z. E., Kaabouch, N., Ghazi, H. E., & Ghazi, H. E. (2018) · Computers & Electrical Engineering · doi:10.1016/j.compeleceng.2018.01.015 · Cited by 482
An introduction to information security
Nieles, M., Dempsey, K., & Pillitteri, V. Y. (2017) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-12r1 · Cited by 164
DNPSec: Distributed network protocol version 3 (DNP3) security framework
Majdalawieh, M., Parisi-Presicce, F., & Wijesekera, D. (2007) · Advances in Computer, Information, and Systems Sciences, and Engineering · doi:10.1007/1-4020-5261-8_36 · Cited by 95 · cited 1×
“The Distributed Network Protocol version 3 (DNP3) is commonly used in SCADA systems for power transmission and distribution [22,23].”
Securing DNP3 broadcast communications in SCADA systems
Amoah, R., Camtepe, S., & Foo, E. (2016) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2016.2587883 · Cited by 72 · cited 1×
“Despite added key management complexity, DNP3-SA significantly improves resistance to unauthorized control manipulation in fielded systems [25,26].”
Cybersecurity and Confidentiality in Smart Grid for Enhancing Sustainability and Reliability
Jha, R. K. (2023) · Recent Research Reviews Journal · doi:10.36548/rrrj.2023.2.001 · Cited by 53 · cited 1×
“Segmentation is also used for effective resource allocation [17].”
Smart Grid DNP3 Vulnerability Analysis and Experimentation
Darwish, I., Igbe, O., Celebi, O., Saadawi, T., & Soryal, J. (2015) · IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud) · doi:10.1109/cscloud.2015.86 · Cited by 51 · cited 1×
“Usage: In modern smart grids, DNP3 is mainly used for communication between RTUs, IEDs, and SCADA control centers [24].”
Securing SCADA and critical industrial systems: From needs to security mechanisms
Abou el Kalam, A. (2021) · International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection · doi:10.1016/j.ijcip.2020.100394 · Cited by 38
SDN-based Self-Configuration for Time-Sensitive IoT Networks
Bulbul, N. S., Ergenc, D., & Fischer, M. (2021) · 2021 IEEE 46th Conference on Local Computer Networks (LCN) · doi:10.1109/lcn52139.2021.9524979 · Cited by 32
Scada Malware, a Proof of Concept
Carcano, A., Fovino, I. N., Masera, M., & Trombetta, A. (2009) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-03552-4_19 · Cited by 31 · cited 1×
“…in its original form, was specified without native security mechanisms, so Modbus/TCP transmits messages in plaintext, making it highly susceptible to cyber threats such as unauthorized command execution [20], denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, replay attacks, and man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.”
Research works printed but not linked: 8
- Ujvarosi, A. (2016). Evolution of SCADA systems. Bulletin of the Transilvania University of Brasov. Series I-Engineering Sciences, Transilvania University Press.
- Raj, 2020, Chapter Six—Industry 4.0: Industrial Internet of Things (IIOT), The Digital Twin Paradigm for Smarter Systems and Environments: The Industry Use Cases, Volume 117, 129
- George, 2024, The impact of IT/OT Convergence on digital transformation in manufacturing, Partn. Univers. Int. Innov., 2, 18
- Chaiyasoonthorn, S., Wiboonrat, M., Mitatha, S., Sriudomsilp, T., and Siripongdee, S. (2024, January 10–13). The Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) Convergence in Industrial World. Proceedings of the CBI+EDOC’24 (BIWeek 2024)—Case Reports, Vienna, Austria.
- Ehuan, 2025, Cybersecurity Implications of IT and OT Convergence, Chem. Eng., 122, 28
- Dubroca, S. (2016, January 10–12). MACsec: Encryption for the wired LAN. Proceedings of the Netdev 1.1, Seville, Spain.
- Nousiainen, A. (2024). Applying Cybersecurity for IEC 60870-5-104 Communication Between Control Station and Substation. [Master’s Thesis, University of Vaasa, School of Technology and Innovations].
- Saleki, N. (2023). Establishing Secure Remote Access Within Ics Network. [Master’s Thesis, Eindhoven University of Technology, Department of Mathematics and Computer Science].
Cited by
Computational Analysis of DNP3 Security Implementations for Smart Grid
Narayanan, M., Eemani, H., & Munir, A. (2026) · IEEE SoutheastCon · doi:10.1109/southeastcon63549.2026.11476252
“Modern smart grids demand not only high reliability and operational resilience but also robust cybersecurity, particularly in control system communications that underpin monitoring, protection, and automation functions [1].”
Self-citationSuprianto, D., Adi, G. S., Rifai, A., et al. (2026) · Laboratories · doi:10.3390/laboratories3030019
“Future implementations should adopt AES-GCM, which provides both confidentiality and message authentication, as recommended in [19,20] for production LoRa deployments.”
Megherbi, O., Hamiche, H., & Bettayeb, M. (2026) · Journal of the Franklin Institute · doi:10.1016/j.jfranklin.2026.109105
Metadata
- Authors
- Narayanan, M., Hafeez, M. A., & Munir, A.
- Affiliations
- Florida Atlantic University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Munir, Arslan
- Venue
- Journal of Cybersecurity and Privacy
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2026-01-04
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 11
- ISSN
- 2624-800X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W7118179005
- Cited by
- 3
- References
- 24
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3
- FWCI
- 7.65
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Journal of Cybersecurity and Privacy (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (DE-CR0000050)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Power Systems and Technologies
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Smart Grid and Power Systems
- Keywords
- industrial control systems, smart grid security, encryption, DNP3, IEC 60870-5-104, IEC 61850, Modbus, OPC UA, MQTT, virtual private networks, IPsec, MACsec, key management, NERC CIP, IEC 62351, IEC 62443, post-quantum cryptography, zero-trust architecture, critical infrastructure cybersecurity, renewable energy integration
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