Securing DNP3 broadcast communications in SCADA systems
Abstract
The Distributed Network Protocol version 3 (DNP3) provides Secure Authentication (DNP3-SA) as the mechanism to authenticate unicast messages from a master station to its outstations in supervisory control and data acquisition systems. In large-scale systems, it may be necessary to broadcast a critical request from a master station to multiple outstations at once. The DNP3 protocol standard describes the use of broadcast communication; however, it does not specify its security. This paper is the first to present DNP3 Secure Authentication for Broadcast (DNP3-SAB), a new lightweight security scheme for broadcast mode communication. This scheme is based on hash chain and only makes use of the existing cryptographic primitives specified in DNP3-SA. The scheme integrates itself into the DNP3-SA key update process. The proposed scheme is modeled, validated, and verified using colored Petri Nets against the most common protocol attacks such as modification, injection, and replay. Performance analysis on our scheme and the existing DNP3-SA modes (NACR and AGM) shows that DNP3-SAB reduces the communication overhead significantly at the cost of an increase with a constant term in processing and storage overhead. This benefit is maintained even when DNP3-SAB is under attack.
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DNP3-SA significantly improves resistance to unauthorized control manipulation in fielded systems despite added key management complexity.
“Despite added key management complexity, DNP3-SA significantly improves resistance to unauthorized control manipulation in fielded systems [25,26].”
From Encryption for Industrial Control Systems: A Survey of Application-Level and Network-Level Approaches in Smart Grids (2026) · cites this paper as [26]
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A Survey on SCADA Systems: Secure Protocols, Incidents, Threats and Tactics
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“Amoah et al. [125] developed a security mechanism for the broadcast communication mode of the DNP3 protocol.”
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“Despite added key management complexity, DNP3-SA significantly improves resistance to unauthorized control manipulation in fielded systems [25,26].”
- Authors
- Amoah, R., Camtepe, S., & Foo, E.
- Affiliations
- Queensland University of Technology (AU)
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
- Published
- 2016-08
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1474-1485
- ISSN
- 1551-3203 (ISSN-L)
- 1941-0050
- OpenAlex
- W2473954534
- Cited by
- 72
- References
- 19
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 14 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 2
- FWCI
- 8.41
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics (publishedVersion)
- QUT ePrints (Queensland University of Technology) (submittedVersion)
- Griffith Research Online (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Industrial Automation and Control Systems
- Keywords
- DNP3, broadcast communication, SCADA security, hash chains, lightweight authentication, key update, colored Petri nets, replay attacks, injection attacks, modification attack, communication overhead, industrial control systems
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