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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 58 of the 58 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 6 of the 21 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Resh(AI)ping Good Administration: Addressing the Mass Effects of Public Sector Digitalisation

Open access
Sanchez-Graells, Albert · 2024 · Laws

Abstract

Public sector digitalisation is transforming public governance at an accelerating rate. Digitalisation is outpacing the evolution of the legal framework. Despite several strands of international efforts to adjust good administration guarantees to new modes of digital public governance, progress has so far been slow and tepid. The increasing automation of decision-making processes puts significant pressure on traditional good administration guarantees, jeopardises individual due process rights, and risks eroding public trust. Automated decision-making has, so far, attracted the bulk of scholarly attention, especially in the European context. However, most analyses seek to reconcile existing duties towards individuals under the right to good administration with the challenges arising from digitalisation. Taking a critical and technology-centred doctrinal approach to developments under the law of the European Union and the Council of Europe, this paper goes beyond current debates to challenge the sufficiency of existing good administration duties. By stressing the mass effects that can derive from automated decision-making by the public sector, the paper advances the need to adapt good administration guarantees to a collective dimension through an extension and a broadening of the public sector’s good administration duties: that is, through an extended ex ante control of organisational risk-taking, and a broader ex post duty of automated redress. These legal modifications should be urgently implemented.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

This doctrinal article argues that the EU's right to good administration (Article 41 CFR) rests on an individualistic logic that cannot cope with the mass effects of digitalised public sector decision-making, and that neither the EU AI Act nor the Council of Europe's AI Convention will sufficiently close the gap. It proposes extending good administration duties to ex ante control of organisational risk-taking (via licensing/permissioning) and broadening them to an ex post duty of automated redress.

Key findings

  • The right to good administration under Article 41 CFR (with Article 47 CFR remedies) is individualistic: substantive protection is triggered only when an individual situation is susceptible to decision-making, and techno-organisational decisions cannot be challenged pre-emptively or in abstracto, making protection "too little, too late."
  • The EU AI Act is limited by two threshold issues: it applies only to "AI" as defined following the OECD definition, and its obligations bite mainly for prohibited and high-risk uses (no longer a closed list), so it covers only "a fraction of AI uses by the public sector." It also lacks individual enforcement rights, offering only a complaint route to market surveillance authorities.
  • The CoE AI Convention adds little: it follows the same OECD AI definition, uses a "minimum common denominator" approach with broad state discretion, reproduces the risk-based threshold issue, and creates no individual enforcement rights beyond existing fundamental rights protection.
  • Mass effects are the crucial challenge: scandals such as Australia's Robodebt, the UK Post Office Horizon case, and the Netherlands' SyRI system show population-level harm that is hard to redress individually; interconnected "data lakes" can make harms "snowball" across procedures, and courts could be overwhelmed by "thousands or even hundreds of thousands of claims" from a single techno-organisational decision.
  • Proposed fixes: an extended ex ante control through licensing/permissioning managed by an "AI in the Public Sector Authority" (AIPSA), with an individual right not to be affected by decisions from unlicensed systems; and a broadened ex post duty requiring administrations to suspend the AI, proactively redress all affected persons without individual claims, report to the licensing authority, and cooperate across administrations.

Methods

  • Design: critical, technology-centred doctrinal analysis of legal developments under EU law (Article 41 and 47 CFR, EU AI Act) and Council of Europe law (CoE AI Convention, CoE Principles of Administrative Law), drawing on ECJ case law and secondary literature.
  • Data/sample: no empirical dataset; the paper analyses legal instruments, case law, and reported scandals (Robodebt, Horizon, SyRI) as illustrative examples. The Data Availability Statement says "Data are contained within the article."
  • Analysis: normative legal argument identifying shortcomings in the current framework and advancing two reform proposals; the paper notes it focuses on Europe but claims relevance to OECD jurisdictions sharing the individualistic logic.

Limitations

  • Stated: the paper says a detailed assessment of implementation issues (modifying Articles 41 and 47 CFR and likely domestic legislation) "exceeds the possibilities of this paper," and that a detailed assessment of exercising rights collectively through representative institutions "exceeds the scope of this paper." It also notes the EU AI Act analysis was conducted while the final text was still being revised.
  • Evident from the text: the argument is normative and doctrinal with no empirical testing of the proposed licensing or redress mechanisms; the analysis is confined to the EU/CoE context (with claimed broader OECD relevance asserted rather than demonstrated); and the proposals depend on institutional designs (e.g., AIPSA) developed elsewhere by the author rather than fully specified here.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.3390/laws13010009

Cites

58 of 58 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

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Claims the paper makes

5 Valid · 1 Not valid · 13 Not checked · 56 Own results and interpretations

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Citations

Cites

Show all 46 references

Research works printed but not linked: 9

  1. Bednarz, Zofia, and Zalnieriute, Monika (2023). Money, Power, and AI. Automated Banks and Automated States, Cambridge University Press. · DOI
  2. Bednarz, Zofia, and Zalnieriute, Monika (2023). Money, Power, and AI. Automated Banks and Automated States, Cambridge University Press. · DOI
  3. Craig, Paul, Hofmann, Herwig C. H., Schneider, Jens-Peter, and Ziller, Jacques (2015). ReNEUAL Model Rules on EU Administrative Procedure, Oxford University Press.
  4. Bednarz, Zofia, and Zalnieriute, Monika (2023). Money, Power, and AI. Automated Banks and Automated States, Cambridge University Press. · DOI
  5. Fink, Melanie (2023b). Redressing Fundamental Rights Violations by the EU: The Promise of the ‘Complete System of Remedies’, Cambridge University Press. Available online: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4566098.
  6. Demková, Simona, Fink, Melanie, and Gentile, Giulia (2023, December 18). The Digital Future of European Public Administration: Introduction to the Symposium on Safeguarding the Right to Good Administration in the Age of AI. Available online: https://digi-con.org/the-digital-future-of-european-public-administration-introduction-to-the-symposium-on-safeguarding-the-right-to-good-administration-in-the-age-of-ai/.
  7. Engel, Annegret, and Groussot, Xavier (2023). New Directions in Digitalisation: Perspectives from EU Competition Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Springer. Available online: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4550655.
  8. 2022, Automation, Artificial Intelligence and Sound Administration. A Few Insights in the Light of the Spanish Legal System, European Review of Digital Administration & Law, 3, 9
  9. Bednarz, Zofia, and Zalnieriute, Monika (2023). Money, Power, and AI. Automated Banks and Automated States, Cambridge University Press. · DOI

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Sanchez-Graells, A.
Affiliations
Law School, Faculty of Arts, Law and Social Sciences, University of Bristol, Clifton Campus, Bristol BS8 1RJ, UK
Venue
Laws
Publisher
MDPI AG
Published
2024-02-16
Volume
13
Issue
1
Pages
9
ISSN
2075-471X (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4391882433
Cited by
12
References
46
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 4
FWCI
19.22
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Laws (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
  • Bristol Research (University of Bristol) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • Explore Bristol Research (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Law › Administrative Law and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Law › Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › E-Government and Public Services
Keywords
right to good administration, digitalization of public administration, automated decision-making, due process rights, public trust, European Union law, Council of Europe

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Resh(AI)ping Good Administration: Addressing the Mass Effects of Public Sector Digitalisation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3390/laws13010009
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Sanchez-Graells, A. (2024). Resh(AI)ping Good Administration: Addressing the Mass Effects of Public Sector Digitalisation. Laws. https://doi.org/10.3390/laws13010009

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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