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Cited by 39Information and Cyber SecuritySmart Grid Security and ResilienceTransportation Systems and Safety

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Securing the Future of Railway Systems: A Comprehensive Cybersecurity Strategy for Critical On-Board and Track-Side Infrastructure

Open access
Ibadah, Nisrine, Benavente-Peces, César, Pahl, Marc-Oliver·2024·Sensors
DOI 10.3390/s24248218PMC PMC11680022
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Abstract

The growing prevalence of cybersecurity threats is a significant concern for railway systems, which rely on an extensive network of onboard and trackside sensors. These threats have the potential to compromise the safety of railway operations and the integrity of the railway infrastructure itself. This paper aims to examine the current cybersecurity measures in use, identify the key vulnerabilities that they address, and propose solutions for enhancing the security of railway infrastructures. The report evaluates the effectiveness of existing security protocols by reviewing current standards, including IEC62443 and NIST, as well as case histories of recent rail cyberattacks. Significant gaps have been identified, especially where modern and legacy systems need to be integrated. Weaknesses in communication protocols such as MVB, CAN and TCP/IP are identified. To address these challenges, the paper proposes a layered security framework specific to railways that incorporate continuous monitoring, risk-based cybersecurity modeling, AI-assisted threat detection, and stronger authentication methodologies. The aim of these recommendations is to improve the resilience of railway networks and ensure a safer, more secure infrastructure for future operations.

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  • Cyber threats affecting railway sensors and IoT systems can be grouped into three main categories: data integrity attacks, availability disruptions, and confidentiality breaches.

    “Cyber threats affecting railway sensors and IoT systems can be grouped into three main categories [1,5,14]:Data integrity attacks, such as spoofing, injection, or tampering with measurement values.”

    From Sensor-Based Cyber Risk Management in Railway Infrastructure Under the NIS2 Directive (2025) · cites this paper as [1]

    Section 3.2 (page not provided) names confidentiality, integrity, and availability as railway security objectives, and Section 2.3 describes attacks that could manipulate or corrupt sensor data. The paper does not explicitly group threats to railway sensors and IoT systems into those three attack categories; the cited passages also do not give spoofing, injection, and measurement tampering as a set of examples. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Sensor networks are critical cybersecurity assets whose reliability directly determines the resilience of railway operations.

    “The findings of this study highlight that sensor networks are not only data sources but also critical cybersecurity assets whose reliability directly determines the resilience of railway operations [1,2,7].”

    From Sensor-Based Cyber Risk Management in Railway Infrastructure Under the NIS2 Directive (2025) · cites this paper as [1]

    Section 2.3 describes sensor networks as integral to on-board and trackside operations, says their interaction is critical to safety and efficiency, and identifies their cybersecurity vulnerabilities. The Introduction also calls for making sensors more resilient to cyberattacks. The paper does not establish the stronger claim that sensor-network reliability directly determines the resilience of railway operations; that wording appears to be the citing authors’ inference. (LLM, conf=0.82)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • A compromised sensor node, falsified measurement, or disrupted data stream can propagate through operational systems, affecting traffic control, rolling stock safety, and signaling integrity.

    “A compromised sensor node, falsified measurement, or disrupted data stream can propagate through operational systems, affecting traffic control, rolling stock safety, and signaling integrity [1,2,3,4].”

    From Sensor-Based Cyber Risk Management in Railway Infrastructure Under the NIS2 Directive (2025) · cites this paper as [1]

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Research works printed but not linked: 38

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Metadata

Authors
Ibadah, N., Benavente-Peces, C., & Pahl, M.-O.
Affiliations
  • IMT Atlantique (FR)
  • Universidad Politécnica de Madrid (ES)
Corresponding author
  • Ibadah, Nisrine
  • Pahl, Marc-Oliver
ORCID
Venue
Sensors
Publisher
MDPI AG
Published
2024-12-23
Volume
24
Issue
24
Pages
8218
ISSN
1424-8220 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.3390/s24248218
PMC
PMC11680022
OpenAlex
W4405721029
Cited by
39
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 25 · 2025: 14
FWCI
2.07
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Sensors (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • HAL (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • UPM Digital Archive (Technical University of Madrid) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
  • Hispana (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
Funders
  • industrial chair Cybersecurity for Critical Networked Infrastructures (cyberCNI.fr)
  • FEDER development fund of the Brittany region
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Transportation Systems and Safety
Keywords
railway cybersecurity, critical infrastructure security, onboard sensors, IEC 62443, NIST Cybersecurity Framework, legacy system integration, CAN bus, TCP/IP, continuous monitoring, authentication, network resilience

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