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Perceptual representation, veridicality, and the interface theory of perception
Open accessAbstract
Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash (henceforth, HSP) argue that perception was not selected for veridical representation, hence that, contrary to a very widespread consensus, there's much less of the latter than you might expect in perception. And they put forward an alternative "interface" theory, on which perception is an adaptively useful but truth-obscuring veil between perceiver and perceived. But HSP's case against veridical perception, and their case for an alternative account, turn crucially on significant misapprehensions in the early going about what veridicality amounts to. In this paper I'll identify this mistake, and then argue that it both undercuts HSP's arguments against perceptual veridicality and prevents them from seeing that their own preferred conception of perception is itself committed to veridical representation, rather than an alternative to it. In the end, I'll conclude, HSP give us no reasons to abandon the standard view that perception veridically represents the world.
Overview
CoChat Summary
## TL;DR
Cohen argues that Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash’s case against perceptual veridicality depends on a mistaken understanding of veridical representation. He concludes that their “interface” theory and evolutionary simulations do not show that perception fails to veridically represent the world.
## Key findings
- HSP’s definition of veridicality is criticized as effectively an absurd identity theory, since it treats veridical representation as if perceptual contents had to be identical to world states.
- Cohen proposes the more standard content-based account: a perceptual state is veridical iff it has a content and that content obtains in the world.
- In HSP’s evolutionary games, Cohen says the compared strategies are both veridical in different ways: one veridically represents resource quantities, the other veridically represents payoffs.
- In HSP’s second game, after 500 generations the emerging strategies assign perceptual states to low- vs high-payoff squares; Cohen argues this still compares two veridicality-requiring strategies, not veridical vs non-veridical ones.
## Methods
- Brief philosophical critique of HSP’s arguments, organized as a conceptual analysis of veridicality/content and a rebuttal of their evolutionary game-theoretic examples.
- Uses HSP’s described simulations and examples (dragonflies, jewel beetles, computer interfaces, and two genetic-algorithm games) as case studies for argument.
- Main analysis is deductive/conceptual rather than empirical: Cohen assesses what the examples and simulations do and do not show about representational content.
## Limitations
- The paper does not present original empirical data or reanalyze the simulations; it is limited to a critique of HSP’s conceptual framework and interpretation of their results.
- The text makes evident that some objections depend on how perceptual content is assigned; Cohen notes this is not settled by the examples themselves.
- Cohen also notes generic worries about the external validity of HSP’s simulations, including omitted physical constraints and simplified assumptions about independent traits, but these are presented as concerns about the simulations’ scope rather than a formal limitation section.
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Claims the paper makes
0 Valid · 3 Not valid · 3 Not checked · 58 Own results and interpretations
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“so it's not open to HSP, who want to infer from adaptive advantage to the structure of perceptual strategies, to hold that states represent but do so falsidically.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In the end, I'll conclude, HSP give us no reasons to abandon the standard view that perception veridically represents the world.”
- Also stated in: § Perceptual representation, veridicality, and the interface theory of perception · plain
“In the end, I'll conclude, HSP give us no reasons to abandon the standard view that perception veridically represents the world.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Also stated in: § Perceptual representation, veridicality, and the interface theory of perception · plain
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Again, given those differences between their elements, of course it can't be that X ⊆ W .”
boosted- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“it's not true that the evolutionary simulations under discussion compare realist, veridicality-requiring perceptual strategies against interface strategies that do not require veridicality. Rather, these games compare one veridicality-requiring strategy against a different veridicality-requiring strategy.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“This mistake both undercuts their arguments against perceptual veridicality and prevents them from seeing that their own preferred conception of perception is itself committed to veridical representation, rather than an alternative to it.”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
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Citations
Cites
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Campbell, J. (2002) · doi:10.1093/0199243816.001.0001 · Cited by 1,525
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience
Harman, G. (1990) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.2307/2214186 · Cited by 1,409
A theory of content and other essays
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Ten problems of consciousness a representational theory of the phenomenal mind
Tye, M. (n.d.) · Cited by 697
Travis, C. (2004) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/113.449.57 · Cited by 469
(2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289769.001.0001 · Cited by 445
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Disjunctivism and Perceptual Psychology
Burge, T., & University of Arkansas Press (2005) · Philosophical Topics · doi:10.5840/philtopics20053311 · Cited by 326
Cited by
Understanding Perspectivism: Scientific Challenges and Methodological Prospects
Massimi, M., & McCoy, C. D. (2019) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315145198 · Cited by 87
The problem of perceptual invariance
Buccella, A. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03402-2 · Cited by 13
Berke, M., Walter‐Terrill, R., Jara‐Ettinger, J., & Scholl, B. J. (2022) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/cogs.13195 · Cited by 12
Martínez, M. (2019) · Grazer Philosophische Studien · doi:10.1163/18756735-09603004 · Cited by 8
On Bayesian Simplicity in Human Visual Perceptual Organization
van der Helm, P. A. (2017) · Perception · doi:10.1177/0301006617719604 · Cited by 8
Metadata
- Authors
- Cohen, J.
- Affiliations
- University of California San Diego (US)
- Corresponding author
- Cohen, Jonathan
- ORCID
- Cohen, Jonathan
- Venue
- Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
- Published
- 2015-10-09
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1512-1518
- ISSN
- 1069-9384 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5320
- OpenAlex
- W2125402297
- Cited by
- 15
- References
- 15
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 1 · 2019: 3 · 2017: 2
- FWCI
- 1.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Psychonomic Bulletin & Review (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- eScholarship (California Digital Library) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- interface theory of perception, perceptual representation
- MeSH terms
- Biological Evolution, Humans, Perception, Psychological Theory
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