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Naturalizing The Mind
Abstract
Naturalizing the Mind skillfully develops a representational theory of the qualitative, the phenomenal, the what-it-is-like aspects of the mind that have defied traditional forms of naturalism. How can the baffling problems of phenomenal experience be accounted for? In this provocative book, Fred Dretske argues that to achieve an understanding of the mind it is not enough to understand the biological machinery by means of which the mind does its job. One must understand what the mind's job is and how this task can be performed by a physical system—the nervous system. Naturalizing the Mind skillfully develops a representational theory of the qualitative, the phenomenal, the what-it-is-like aspects of the mind that have defied traditional forms of naturalism. Central to Dretske's approach is the claim that the phenomenal aspects of perceptual experiences are one and the same as external, real-world properties that experience represents objects as having. Combined with an evolutionary account of sensory representation, the result is a completely naturalistic account of phenomenal consciousness. * Not for sale in France or Belgium. Bradford Books imprint
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Citations
Cited by
Barsalou, L. W. (1999) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x99002149 · Cited by 6,887
On a confusion about a function of consciousness
Block, N. (1995) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00038188 · Cited by 3,364
Grounding conceptual knowledge in modality-specific systems
Barsalou, L. W., Kyle Simmons, W., Barbey, A. K., & Wilson, C. D. (2003) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(02)00029-3 · Cited by 1,256
Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness
Lau, H., & Rosenthal, D. (2011) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.05.009 · Cited by 869
A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness
LeDoux, J. E., & Brown, R. (2017) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1619316114 · Cited by 690
Metadata
- Authors
- Dretske, F., Editions, C., & Recanati, F.
- Venue
- The MIT Press eBooks
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 1995-07-06
- Volume
- 31
- Issue
- 4
- OpenAlex
- W2084987477
- Cited by
- 1,982
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 18.57
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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