Safety Precautions and Operating Procedures in an (A)BSL-4 Laboratory: 1. Biosafety Level 4 Suit Laboratory Suite Entry and Exit Procedures
Open accessAbstract
Biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) suit laboratories are specifically designed to study high-consequence pathogens for which neither infection prophylaxes nor treatment options exist. The hallmarks of these laboratories are: custom-designed airtight doors, dedicated supply and exhaust airflow systems, a negative-pressure environment, and mandatory use of positive-pressure (“space”) suits. The risk for laboratory specialists working with highly pathogenic agents is minimized through rigorous training and adherence to stringent safety protocols and standard operating procedures. Researchers perform the majority of their work in BSL-2 laboratories and switch to BSL-4 suit laboratories when work with a high-consequence pathogen is required. Collaborators and scientists considering BSL-4 projects should be aware of the challenges associated with BSL-4 research both in terms of experimental technical limitations in BSL-4 laboratory space and the increased duration of such experiments. Tasks such as entering and exiting the BSL-4 suit laboratories are considerably more complex and time-consuming compared to BSL-2 and BSL-3 laboratories. The focus of this particular article is to address basic biosafety concerns and describe the entrance and exit procedures for the BSL-4 laboratory at the NIH/NIAID Integrated Research Facility at Fort Detrick. Such procedures include checking external systems that support the BSL-4 laboratory, and inspecting and donning positive-pressure suits, entering the laboratory, moving through air pressure-resistant doors, and connecting to air-supply hoses. We will also discuss moving within and exiting the BSL-4 suit laboratories, including using the chemical shower and removing and storing positive-pressure suits.
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There are a range of BSL ratings from 1-4, where 1 is least stringent and 4 is tightly regulated, rare labs generally under government control and in isolated restricted buildings.
“There are a range of BSL ratings from 1–4, where 1 is the least stringent and 4 is tightly regulated, rare labs that are generally under the control of the government and are in isolated and restricted buildings [114].”
From Biologically-Based and Physiochemical Life Support and In Situ Resource Utilization for Exploration of the Solar System—Reviewing the Current State and Defining Future Development Needs (2021) · cites this paper as [114]
The Introduction (page not specified in our copy) describes BSL-4 as requiring particular caution, specialized training, stringent facility requirements, and compliance with government regulations. It does not establish that BSL-1 is the least stringent level or that BSL-4 labs are rare, generally government-controlled, or housed in isolated buildings. (LLM, conf=0.87)
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- Authors
- Janosko, K., Holbrook, M. R., Adams, R., Barr, J., Bollinger, L., Newton, J. T., Ntiforo, C., Coe, L., Wada, J., Pusl, D., Jahrling, P. B., Kuhn, J. H., & Lackemeyer, M. G.
- Affiliations
- National Institutes of Health (US)
- The University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston (US)
- ORCID
- Venue
- Journal of Visualized Experiments
- Publisher
- MyJove Corporation
- Published
- 2016-10-03
- Issue
- 116
- ISSN
- 1940-087X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4206060301
- Cited by
- 7
- References
- 7
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 2 · 2016: 1
- FWCI
- 2.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Journal of Visualized Experiments (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
- Battelle (HHSN272200700016I)
- National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (HHS N272200700016I)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Chemical Engineering › Chemical Health and Safety › Chemical Safety and Risk Management
- Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Molecular Biology › Bacillus and Francisella bacterial research
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Infectious Diseases › Infection Control in Healthcare
- Keywords
- biosafety level 4, high-consequence pathogens, laboratory safety protocols, Fort Detrick
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