Software defined networking firewall for industry 4.0 manufacturing systems
Open accessAbstract
Purpose: In order to leverage automation control data, Industry 4.0 manufacturing systems require industrial devices to be connected to the network. Potentially, this can increase the risk of cyberattacks, which can compromise connected industrial devices to acquire production data or gain control over the production process. Search engines such as Sentient Hyper-Optimized Data Access Network (SHODAN) can be perverted by attackers to acquire network information that can be later used for intrusion. To prevent this, cybersecurity standards propose network architectures divided into several networks segments based on system functionalities. In this architecture, Firewalls limit the exposure of industrial control devices in order to minimize security risks. This paper presents a novel Software Defined Networking (SDN) Firewall that automatically applies this standard architecture without compromising network flexibility. Design/methodology/approach: The proposed SDN Firewall changes filtering rules in order to implement the different network segments according to application level access control policies. The Firewall applies two filtering techniques described in this paper: temporal filtering and spatial filtering, so that only applications in a white list can connect to industrial control devices. Network administrators need only to configure this application-oriented white lists to comply with security standards for ICS. This simplifies to a great extent network management tasks. Authors have developed a prototype implementation based on the OPC UA Standard and conducted security tests in order to test the viability of the proposal.Findings: Network segmentation and segregation are effective counter-measures against network scanning attacks. The proposed SDN Firewall effectively configures a flat network into virtual LAN segments according to security standard guidelines.Research limitations/implications: The prototype implementation still needs to implement several features to exploit the full potential of the proposal. Next steps for development are discussed in a separate section.Practical implications: The proposed SDN Firewall has similar security features to commercially available application Firewalls, but SDN Firewalls offer additional security features. First, SDN technology provides improved performance, since SDN low-level processing functions are much more efficient. Second, with SDN, security functions are rooted in the network instead of being centralized in particular network elements. Finally, SDN provides a more flexible and dynamic, zero configuration framework for secure manufacturing systems by automating the rollout of security standard-based network architectures. Social implications: SDN Firewalls can facilitate the deployment of secure Industry 4.0 manufacturing systems, since they provide ICS networks with many of the needed security capabilities without compromising flexibility. Originality/value: The paper proposes a novel SDN Firewall specifically designed to secure ICS networks. A prototype implementation of the proposed SDN Firewall has been tested in laboratory conditions. The prototype implementation complements the security features of the OPC UA communication standard to provide a holistic security framework for ICS networks.
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The prototype implementation was able to complement security features in the OPC UA standard, and provided a holistic security solution for ICS networks.
“The prototype implementation was able to complement security features in the OPC UA standard, and provided a holistic security solution for ICS networks.”
From A Review of Cybersecurity Guidelines for Manufacturing Factories in Industry 4.0 (2021) · cites this paper as [29]
The Introduction (page not available in our copy) says firewall access rules and OPC UA security are complementary. But the Conclusions report that the tested prototype implemented only transport-layer filters, while §4.3 calls it an early implementation requiring further development. The copy therefore supports complementing OPC UA security, not the claim that the prototype provided a holistic ICS network security solution. (LLM, conf=0.87)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe author confirmed that the solution was tested in a virtual network of a complete environment (OPC client/server with exchange of machine data), and the firewall was able to prevent security scanners from acquiring application port and other OS level details of the OPC server.
“The author confirmed that the solution was tested in a virtual network of a complete environment (OPC client/server with exchange of machine data), and the firewall was able to prevent security scanners from acquiring application port and other OS level details of the OPC server.”
From A Review of Cybersecurity Guidelines for Manufacturing Factories in Industry 4.0 (2021) · cites this paper as [29]
[29] proposed a protective network structure based on an SDN firewall specifically designed for industrial networks, without compromising network flexibility.
“In this context, [29] has proposed a protective network structure based on a SDN firewall specifically designed for industrial networks, without compromising network flexibility (Fig. 6).”
From A Review of Cybersecurity Guidelines for Manufacturing Factories in Industry 4.0 (2021) · cites this paper as [29]
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Cites
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Flagged first, then by citations
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Sorted by citations
A Review of Cybersecurity Guidelines for Manufacturing Factories in Industry 4.0
Mullet, V., Sondi, P., & Ramat, E. (2021) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3056650 · Cited by 161 · see citing works
“In this context, [29] has proposed a protective network structure based on a SDN firewall specifically designed for industrial networks, without compromising network flexibility (Fig.”
BackgroundZero-Trust Model for Smart Manufacturing Industry
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- Authors
- Tsuchiya, A., Fraile, F., Koshijima, I., Ortiz, A., & Poler, R.
- Affiliations
- Nagoya Institute of Technology (JP)
- Universitat Politècnica de València (ES)
- Venue
- Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management
- Publisher
- Omnia Publisher SL
- Published
- 2018-04-06
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 318
- ISSN
- 2013-0953 (ISSN-L)
- 2013-8423
- OpenAlex
- W2795793765
- Cited by
- 49
- References
- 11
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 2
- FWCI
- 3.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- UPCommons institutional repository (Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya) (acceptedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- LA Referencia (Red Federada de Repositorios Institucionales de Publicaciones Científicas) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
- Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- RACO (Revistes Catalanes amb Accés Obert) (Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya) (submittedVersion)
- RiuNet (Universitat Politècnica de València) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- Funders
- European Commission (723710)
- Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (16H01837)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Software-Defined Networks and 5G
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Network Packet Processing and Optimization
- Keywords
- software-defined networking, industrial control systems, network partitioning, temporal filtering, spatial filtering, white list, OPC UA, ICS security, Shodan, cyberattack prevention, network management automation, security standards compliance
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