The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Private Information and Insurance Rejections
Abstract
Across a wide set of nongroup insurance markets, applicants are rejected based on observable, often high-risk, characteristics. This paper argues that private information, held by the potential applicant pool, explains rejections. I formulate this argument by developing and testing a model in which agents may have private information about their risk. I first derive a new no-trade result that theoretically explains how private information could cause rejections. I then develop a new empirical methodology to test whether this no-trade condition can explain rejections. The methodology uses subjective probability elicitations as noisy measures of agents' beliefs. I apply this approach to three nongroup markets: long-term care, disability, and life insurance. Consistent with the predictions of the theory, in all three settings I find significant amounts of private information held by those who would be rejected; I find generally more private information for those who would be rejected relative to those who can purchase insurance, and I show it is enough private information to explain a complete absence of trade for those who would be rejected. The results suggest that private information prevents the existence of large segments of these three major insurance markets.
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Citations
Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
A leisurely look at the bootstrap, the jackknife, and cross-validation
Efron, B., & Gong, G. (1983) · The American Statistician · doi:10.1080/00031305.1983.10483087 · Cited by 3,229
Cited by
Health Insurance for “Humans”: Information Frictions, Plan Choice, and Consumer Welfare
Handel, B. R., & Kolstad, J. T. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20131126 · Cited by 427
Public Health Insurance, Labor Supply, and Employment Lock *
Garthwaite, C., Gross, T., & Notowidigdo, M. J. (2014) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qju005 · Cited by 282
Economic Effects of Risk Classification Bans
Dionne, G., & Rothschild, C. (2014) · The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review · doi:10.1057/grir.2014.15 · Cited by 52
Metadata
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2013
- Volume
- 81
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1713-1762
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3126043879
- Cited by
- 214
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 40.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1.1 (tdm, 973 d)
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