The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism
Abstract
This paper constructs an e cient, budget-balanced, Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism for a general dynamic environment with private information.As an intermediate result, we construct an e cient, ex post incentive-compatible mechanism, which is not budget balanced.We also provide conditions under which participation constraints can be satis ed in each period, so that the mechanism can be made self-enforcing if the horizon is in nite and players are su ciently patient.In our dynamic environment, agents observe a sequence of private signals over a number of periods (either nite or countable).In each period, the agents report their private signals, and make public (contractible) and private decisions based on the reports.The probability distribution over future signals may depend on both past signals and past decisions.The construction of an e cient mechanism hinges on the assumption of \private values" (each agent's payo is determined by his own observations).Balancing the budget relies on the assumption of \independent types" (the distribution of each agent's private signals does not depend on the other agents' private information, except through public decisions).
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Citations
Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
Rogerson, W. P. (1992) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297997 · Cited by 356
Cited by
Introduction to Multi-Armed Bandits
Slivkins, A. (2019) · Foundations and Trends® in Machine Learning · doi:10.1561/2200000068 · Cited by 780
An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
Börgers, T., Krähmer, D., & Strausz, R. (2015) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001 · Cited by 379
Metadata
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2013
- Volume
- 81
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 2463-2485
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2166421991
- Cited by
- 210
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 31.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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