The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper analyzes the general nonlinear optimal income tax for couples, a multidimensional screening problem. Each couple consists of a primary earner who always participates in the labor market, but makes an hours-of-work choice, and a secondary earner who chooses whether or not to work. If second-earner participation is a signal of the couple being better (worse) off, we prove that optimal tax schemes display a positive tax (subsidy) on secondary earnings and that the tax (subsidy) on secondary earnings decreases with primary earnings and converges to zero asymptotically. We present calibrated microsimulations for the United Kingdom showing that decreasing tax rates on secondary earnings is quantitatively significant and consistent with actual income tax and transfer programs.
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Citations
Cites
Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation
Stiglitz, J. E. (1982) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(82)90020-2 · Cited by 761
La redistribution fiscale face au chômage
Piketty, T. (1997) · Revue française d'économie · doi:10.3406/rfeco.1997.1016 · Cited by 122
Cited by
Chetty, R., Friedman, J. N., Olsen, T., & Pistaferri, L. (2011) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjr013 · Cited by 794
Piketty, T., & Saez, E. (2013) · Handbook of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-53759-1.00007-8 · Cited by 290
Redistributive Taxation in the Roy Model*
Rothschild, C., & Scheuer, F. (2013) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjs076 · Cited by 167
Metadata
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2009
- Volume
- 77
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 537-560
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1891656132
- Cited by
- 186
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 23.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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