The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Objective and Subjective Rationality in a Multiple Prior Model
Open accessAbstract
A decision maker (DM) is characterized by two binary relations. The first reflects choices that are rational in an “objective” sense: the DM can convince others that she is right in making them. The second relation models choices that are rational in a “subjective” sense: the DM cannot be convinced that she is wrong in making them. In the context of decision under uncertainty, we propose axioms that the two notions of rationality might satisfy. These axioms allow a joint representation by a single set of prior probabilities and a single utility index. It is “objectively rational” to choose f in the presence of g if and only if the expected utility of f is at least as high as that of g given each and every prior in the set. It is “subjectively rational” to choose f rather than g if and only if the minimal expected utility of f (with respect to all priors in the set) is at least as high as that of g. In other words, the objective and subjective rationality relations admit, respectively, a representation à la Bewley (2002) and à la Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Our results thus provide a bridge between these two classic models, as well as a novel foundation for the latter.
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Citations
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7455683 · Cited by 18,497
Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(73)90033-9 · Cited by 9,984 · cited 1×
“Simon (1957) introduced the concept of “bounded rationality”, and Kahneman and Tversky (1979, Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, 1974, 1981) famously showed failures of basic axioms of rationality.”
Background“Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms.”
Ellsberg, D. (1961) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884324 · Cited by 7,891
Cited by
Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing
Luhandjula, M. K. (2013) · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-35641-4-57 · Cited by 1,111
DECISION THEORY UNDER AMBIGUITY
Etner, J., Jeleva, M., & Tallon, J. (2012) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6419.2010.00641.x · Cited by 309
Uncertainty averse preferences
Cerreia-Vioglio, S., Maccheroni, F., Marinacci, M., & Montrucchio, L. (2011) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2011.05.006 · Cited by 262
Greco, S., Ishizaka, A., Matarazzo, B., & Torrisi, G. (2018) · Regional Studies · doi:10.1080/00343404.2017.1347612 · Cited by 90
Metadata
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2010
- Volume
- 78
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 755-770
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2153611288
- Cited by
- 243
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 10.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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