The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Adverse Selection in Competitive Search Equilibrium
Open accessAbstract
We extend the notion of competitive search equilibrium to an environment with adverse selection. Uninformed principals post contracts to attract informed agents. Agents observe the contracts and apply for one, trading off the probability of matching with a principal against the terms of trade offered by the contract. We characterize equilibria as the solution to a constrained optimization problem and show that in equilibrium principals offers separating contracts to attract different types of agents. We then present a set of examples to illustrate the usefulness of our model.
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Citations
Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Spence, M. (1973) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1882010 · Cited by 19,518
Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading
Kyle, A. S. (1985) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913210 · Cited by 9,580
Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy
Lucas, R. E. (1978) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913837 · Cited by 5,014
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information
Rothschild, M., & Stiglitz, J. (1976) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885326 · Cited by 4,987
Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device
Shapiro, C., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1986) · Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511559594.004 · Cited by 4,652
Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover
Jovanovic, B. (1979) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260808 · Cited by 3,092
Indivisible labor, lotteries and equilibrium
Rogerson, R. (1988) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3932(88)90042-6 · Cited by 1,227
A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
Wilson, C. (1977) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(77)90004-7 · Cited by 1,035
Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
Banks, J. S., & Sobel, J. (1987) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913604 · Cited by 919
Cited by
Liquidity: A New Monetarist Perspective
Lagos, R., Rocheteau, G., & Wright, R. (2017) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20141195 · Cited by 267
Metadata
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2010
- Volume
- 78
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1823-1862
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1934785551
- Cited by
- 267
- References
- 25
- FWCI
- 21.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.