Reputation for Quality
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We propose a new model of flrm reputation that interprets reputation directly as the market belief about product quality. Quality is persistent and is determined endogenously by the flrm’s past investments. We analyse how investment incentives depend on the flrm’s reputation and derive implications for reputational dynamics. We consider three types of consumer learning. When consumers learn about quality through good news, investment incentives are decreasing in reputation, leading to a unique work-shirk equilibrium and convergent dynamics. When consumers learn through bad news, investment incentives are increasing in reputation, leading to a continuum of shirk-work equilibria and divergent dynamics. Finally, when consumers learn through Brownian news and the cost of investment is low, incentives are hump-shaped but a work-shirk equilibrium exists and is essentially unique.
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Citations
Cites
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260996 · Cited by 3,653 · cited 1×
“Klein and Leffler (1981), Mailath and Samuelson (2001)), by taking the quality obsolescence rate λ to infinity.”
BackgroundManagerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
Entry, Exit, and firm Dynamics in Long Run Equilibrium
Hopenhayn, H. A. (1992) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951541 · Cited by 2,857
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 · Cited by 2,494
The value of reputation on eBay: A controlled experiment
Resnick, P., Zeckhauser, R., Swanson, J., & Lockwood, K. (2006) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-006-4309-2 · Cited by 1,118
The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay
Cabral, L., & Hortacsu, A. (2004) · doi:10.3386/w10363 · Cited by 149
Cited by
Johnson, M. S. (2020) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20180501 · Cited by 246
The career effects of scandal: Evidence from scientific retractions
Azoulay, P., Bonatti, A., & Krieger, J. L. (2017) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/j.respol.2017.07.003 · Cited by 118
“This suggests a version of the career concerns model of Holmström (1999) that allows for lumpy output and coarse signals, similar to Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013) or Bonatti and Hörner (2017a).”
Metadata
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2013
- Volume
- 81
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 2381-2462
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2253314716
- Cited by
- 159
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 17.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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