The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Contracting Problems and Regulation: The Case of the Fishery
Abstract
Regulations in the Texas shrimp and other fisheries are incomplete, leaving many options for rent dissipation uncontrolled, because of high contracting costs among fishermen and political factors that mold government actions. Contracting costs are high among heterogeneous fishermen, who vary principally with regard to fishing skill. The chapter describes the private agreements that have been reached in a number of fisheries in the absence of government support. Models of fishery exploitation generally begin by noting that property rights to the resource stock are absent. As a more structured arrangement for restricting outsiders and for policing compliance of members, fishermen unions and trade associations are an alternative to more nebulous informal agreements. Heterogeneity of fishermen can be seen from an analysis of daily catch data from one fish house for the fall 1978 bay shrimp season. A fish house is a packing house that buys shrimp from fishermen and sells it to dealers and processors.
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Cites
Coase, R. H. (1960) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466560 · Cited by 18,255
The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery
Gordon, H. S. (1954) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/257497 · Cited by 3,971
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Scott, A. (1955) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/257653 · Cited by 1,059
The lobster fiefs: Economic and ecological effects of territoriality in the maine lobster industry
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Cognition and the Catch: The Location of Fishing Spots in a Brazilian Coastal Village
Forman, S. L. (1967) · Ethnology · doi:10.2307/3772828 · Cited by 70
Cited by
Collective action and the evolution of social norms.
Ostrom, E. (2000) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.137 · Cited by 4,195
Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis
Schlager, E., & Ostrom, E. (1992) · Land Economics · doi:10.2307/3146375 · Cited by 2,663
CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS
Libecap, G. D. (2018) · Property Rights · doi:10.2307/j.ctv301f7w.14 · Cited by 766
Self-citationPacheco, D. F., Dean, T. J., & Payne, D. S. (2010) · Journal of Business Venturing · doi:10.1016/j.jbusvent.2009.07.006 · Cited by 663
Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work
Ostrom, E., & Gardner, R. (1993) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.7.4.93 · Cited by 600
Metadata
- Authors
- Johnson, R. N., & Libecap, G. D.
- Venue
- Fisheries Economics
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Published
- 2019-10-28
- Pages
- 345-362
- OpenAlex
- W1592355286
- Cited by
- 389
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 33.55
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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