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The University of Chicago Law Review

Rawls, John·2017·Justice

Abstract

The idea of public reason belongs to a conception of a well ordered constitutional democratic society. The content of public reason is given by a family of political conceptions of justice, and not by a single one. Central to the idea of public reason is that it neither criticizes nor attacks any comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious, except insofar as that doctrine is incompatible with the essentials of public reason and a democratic polity. It is important to observe that the introduction into public political culture of religious and secular doctrines, provided the proviso is met, does not change the nature and content of justification in public reason itself. From the point of view of public reason, citizens must vote for the ordering of political values they sincerely think the most reasonable. Moreover, that the Catholic Church&s;s nonpublic reason requires its members to follow its doctrine is perfectly consistent with their also honoring public reason.

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Metadata

Authors
Rawls, J.
Venue
Justice
Publisher
Routledge
Published
2017-07-12
Pages
251-293
OpenAlex
W2982314133
Cited by
2,003
References
0
FWCI
983.55
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The University of Chicago Law Review. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.4324/9781315193496-12
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Rawls, J. (2017). The University of Chicago Law Review. Justice. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315193496-12

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