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The University of Chicago Law Review
Abstract
The idea of public reason belongs to a conception of a well ordered constitutional democratic society. The content of public reason is given by a family of political conceptions of justice, and not by a single one. Central to the idea of public reason is that it neither criticizes nor attacks any comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious, except insofar as that doctrine is incompatible with the essentials of public reason and a democratic polity. It is important to observe that the introduction into public political culture of religious and secular doctrines, provided the proviso is met, does not change the nature and content of justification in public reason itself. From the point of view of public reason, citizens must vote for the ordering of political values they sincerely think the most reasonable. Moreover, that the Catholic Church&s;s nonpublic reason requires its members to follow its doctrine is perfectly consistent with their also honoring public reason.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Rawls, J.
- Venue
- Justice
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Published
- 2017-07-12
- Pages
- 251-293
- OpenAlex
- W2982314133
- Cited by
- 2,003
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 983.55
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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