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Polluters’ Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes
Abstract
This chapter presents a positive theory of externality control that explains the observed frequency of direct regulation as opposed to penalty taxes or charges. In the public-choice theory of policy, the interests of those who are subjected to the control instruments must be taken into account as well as the interests of those affected by the external diseconomies. The chapter emphasizes an elementary efficiency basis for preferring taxes and charges which heretofore has been neglected by economists. Economists of divergent political persuasions agree on the superior efficacy of penalty taxes as instruments for controlling significant external diseconomies which involve the interaction of many parties. There is an important economic basis for favoring the penalty tax over the direct control instrument, one that has been neglected by economists. By assessing a tax per unit of output on all firms in the industry, the government can insure that profit-maximizing decisions lead to a new and lower industry output that is Pareto optimal.
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Citations
Cites
On Taxation and the Control of Externalities
Baumöl, W. J. (2016) · American Economic Review · Cited by 765
Cited by
Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J.-S. (2010) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.24.2.3 · Cited by 1,566
Trade, Growth, and the Environment
Copeland, B. R., & Taylor, M. S. (2004) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/002205104773558047 · Cited by 1,357
Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not
Levitt, S. D. (2004) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533004773563485 · Cited by 1,152
A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy
Yackee, J. W., & Yackee, S. W. (2006) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00375.x · Cited by 515
The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure
McCubbins, M. D. (1985) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111178 · Cited by 388
Metadata
- Authors
- Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G.
- Venue
- The Theory and Practice of Command and Control in Environmental Policy
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Published
- 2018-01-12
- Pages
- 397-405
- OpenAlex
- W1524349662
- Cited by
- 542
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 71.48
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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