The DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy
Abstract
We test the proposition that the federal bureaucracy exhibits a “bias toward business” during notice and comment rulemaking. We analyze over 30 bureaucratic rules and almost 1,700 comments over the period of 1994 to 2001. We find that business commenters, but not nonbusiness commenters, hold important influence over the content of final rules. We also demonstrate that as the proportion of business commenters increases, so too does the influence of business interests. These findings contrast with previous empirical studies and generally suggest that notice and comment procedures have not succeeded in “democratizing” the agency policymaking process to the extent sometimes suggested in the normative rulemaking literature.
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Cites
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Cited by
Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying
de Figueiredo, J. M., & Richter, B. K. (2014) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-100711-135308 · Cited by 367
Leveraged interests: Financial industry power and the role of private sector coalitions
Pagliari, S., & Young, K. L. (2014) · Review of International Political Economy · doi:10.1080/09692290.2013.819811 · Cited by 277
Interest Group Success in the European Union: When (and Why) Does Business Lose?
Dür, A., Bernhagen, P., & Marshall, D. (2015) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414014565890 · Cited by 264
Fraussen, B., Albareda, A., & Braun, C. (2020) · Policy Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11077-020-09382-3 · Cited by 93
How Are Politicians Informed? Witnesses and Information Provision in Congress
BAN, P., PARK, J. Y., & YOU, H. Y. (2023) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055422000405 · Cited by 48
Metadata
- Authors
- Yackee, J. W., & Yackee, S. W.
- Venue
- The Journal of Politics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2006-02
- Volume
- 68
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 128-139
- ISSN
- 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2508
- OpenAlex
- W2125952025
- Cited by
- 515
- References
- 42
- FWCI
- 12.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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