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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 8 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Evolving Concepts of Epistemic Injustice

Open access
Fricker, Miranda · 2017 · The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice

Abstract

This chapter delineates a distinctive class of wrongs, namely those in which someone is ingenuously downgraded and/or disadvantaged in respect of their status as an epistemic subject. A first point to make is that this kind of epistemic injustice is fundamentally a form of (direct or indirect) discrimination. The cause of testimonial injustice is a prejudice through which the speaker is misjudged and perceived as epistemically lesser (a direct discrimination). The cause of a hermeneutical injustice is a background inequality of hermeneutical opportunity - specifically, hermeneutical marginalisation in relation to some area of social experience. Hermeneutical injustice is the actualisation of unequal hermeneutical opportunity, which can be somewhat mitigated by especially virtuous epistemic and communicative conduct on the part of any individual hearer. The new applications of the concepts of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice exemplify the ground-up energies that will no doubt somewhat evolve the concepts themselves, perhaps ultimately broadening them out in unforeseen ways.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

Fricker clarifies and defends bounded concepts of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice as forms of discriminatory epistemic injustice, distinguishing them from distributive injustice and deliberate credibility manipulation. She argues the concepts should remain strict about non-deliberateness while evolving through applications such as healthcare and structural testimonial injustice.

Key findings

  • Fricker distinguishes “discriminatory epistemic injustice” — testimonial and hermeneutical injustice — from “distributive epistemic injustice,” such as receiving less than one’s fair share of education, expert advice, or information, while advocating continued strictness for the discriminatory category.
  • Testimonial injustice is an ingenuous, prejudiced misjudgement of a speaker’s credibility; deliberate manipulation of credibility relations, such as Ripley inducing Greenleaf’s sexist misperception of Marge in *The Talented Mr Ripley*, is closely related but distinct and should not blur what Ripley does and what Greenleaf does.
  • Hermeneutical injustice is caused by structural hermeneutical marginalisation and unequal hermeneutical opportunity, not individual bad faith; individual virtuous listening can mitigate it, but eradication requires sufficient social equality to prevent new forms of marginalisation.
  • The concepts are extended to healthcare and psychiatry: Carel and Kidd on illness, Kyratsous and Sanati on delusion diagnosis, and Anderson’s structural testimonial injustice example of an unrefreshed expert witness list, which Fricker calls “pre-emptive testimonial injustice.”

Methods

  • Conceptual and normative philosophical essay; no empirical sample, data collection, or quantitative analysis is reported.
  • Draws on Fricker’s prior account, secondary literature, thought experiments, and examples, including *The Talented Mr Ripley*, an imagined unrefreshed expert witness list, and applications in healthcare and psychiatry.
  • Main analysis clarifies definitions, boundaries, aetiology, and implications of the concepts of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice.

Limitations

  • Stated: Fricker says she “would never pretend it delivers all the answers, or makes other perspectives redundant,” and treats “start thought from marginalized lives” strictly as an enlivening methodological slogan, not as a general theory of epistemically privileged perspectives.
  • Stated: the distinction between “discriminatory” and “distributive” is not intended as a deep and/or exclusive demarcation.
  • Evident: the chapter offers no empirical data or systematic measurement; its claims rely on conceptual analysis and illustrative examples, so they are not empirically tested here.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.4324/9781315212043-5

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Metadata

Authors
Fricker, M.
Corresponding author
Fricker, Miranda
Venue
The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice
Publisher
Routledge
Published
2017-03-31
Pages
53-60
OpenAlex
W2597520020
Cited by
515
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 103 · 2025: 109 · 2024: 96 · 2023: 78 · 2022: 44 · 2021: 51 · 2020: 23 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 5
FWCI
51.77
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Routledge eBooks (publishedVersion)
  • White Rose Research Online (University of Leeds, The University of Sheffield, University of York) (acceptedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Hermeneutics and Narrative Identity
Keywords
epistemic injustice, testimonial injustice, hermeneutical injustice, discrimination, epistemic status, prejudice, intellectual virtues, social inequality

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Evolving Concepts of Epistemic Injustice. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.4324/9781315212043-5
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Fricker, M. (2017). Evolving Concepts of Epistemic Injustice. The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315212043-5

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.