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The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism
Abstract
This chapter describes what may be an adequate rational defense for theism against any argument for atheism based on the existence of evil. It discusses the position of friendly atheism. In developing the argument for atheism based on the existence of evil, it will be useful to focus on some particular evil that our world contains in considerable abundance. Intense human and animal suffering, for example, occurs daily and in great plenitude in our world. If one is persuaded by the argument for atheism how might one best view the position of the theist. If no one can be rationally justified in believing a false proposition then friendly atheism is a paradoxical, if not incoherent position. But surely the truth of a belief is not a necessary condition of someone’s being rationally justified in having that belief.
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Cited by
The Problem of Evil: The Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of St Andrews in 2003
van Inwagen, P. (2006) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199245604.001.0001 · Cited by 296
Why? The Purpose of the Universe
Goff, P. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198883760.001.0001 · Cited by 112
(2009) · Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association · Cited by 31
Creation, Actualization and God's Choice among Possible Worlds
(2008) · doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00159.x · Cited by 19
Metadata
- Venue
- William L. Rowe on Philosophy of Religion
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Published
- 2017-05-15
- Pages
- 61-68
- OpenAlex
- W164756770
- Cited by
- 574
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 341.85
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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