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Cognition as Intuitive Statistics
Abstract
Originally published in 1987, this title is about theory construction in psychology. Where theories come from, as opposed to how they become established, was almost a no-man’s land in the history and philosophy of science at the time. The authors argue that in the science of mind, theories are particularly likely to come from tools, and they are especially concerned with the emergence of the metaphor of the mind as an intuitive statistician. In the first chapter, the authors discuss the rise of the inference revolution, which institutionalized those statistical tools that later became theories of cognitive processes. In each of the four following chapters they treat one major topic of cognitive psychology and show to what degree statistical concepts transformed their understanding of those topics.
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Citations
Cited by
GPOWER: A general power analysis program
Erdfelder, E., Faul, F., & Buchner, A. (1996) · Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers · doi:10.3758/bf03203630 · Cited by 4,864
Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality.
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1996) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.103.4.650 · Cited by 3,504
Self-citationTooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (1990) · Ethology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1016/0162-3095(90)90017-z · Cited by 1,787
Things I have learned (so far).
Cohen, J. (1990) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.45.12.1304 · Cited by 1,781
Probabilistic mental models: a Brunswikian theory of confidence
Gigerenzer, G., Hoffrage, U., & Kleinbölting, H. (1991) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.98.4.506 · Cited by 1,506
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Metadata
- Authors
- Gigerenzer, G., & Murray, D. J.
- Venue
- Psychology Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Psychology Press
- Published
- 2015-08-14
- OpenAlex
- W1985808424
- Cited by
- 453
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 3.52
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.