Relativising epistemic advantage
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In this chapter I explore the relationship between one branch of feminist epistemology – standpoint theory – and epistemic relativism. I begin by defining both views, and by briefly recounting the standard ways the connection between them is understood. So far the literature has focused on an aspect of standpoint theory called the epistemic advantage thesis , and on an aspect of relativism called equality . I show that the connection actually turns on a different aspect of standpoint theory – the standpoint thesis – and on an aspect of relativism called non-neutrality . I argue that shifting our attention to these aspects reveals that standpoint theory is clearly and unavoidably relativist, but unproblematically so – standpoint theory can capture everything it sets out to, even on a relativist understanding of the view.
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The epistemic advantage thesis is the claim that social oppression inversely correlates to epistemic advantage.
“The first is what is sometimes referred to interchangeably as the inversion thesis or epistemic advantage thesis-the claim that social oppression inversely correlates to epistemic advantage”
From Standpoint Epistemology and Epistemic Peerhood: A Defense of Epistemic Privilege (2024) · cites this paper as Ashton 2019
The “Epistemic-Advantage Thesis” section says social oppression can bring epistemic benefits—the opposite of an inverse correlation between oppression and epistemic advantage. The “Standpoint thesis” section does confirm that “inversion thesis” is another name for the epistemic-advantage thesis, but the citing sentence reverses the relationship it describes. (LLM, conf=0.88)
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- Coliva, A. Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015.
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- Harding, Sandra. Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?: Thinking from Women's Lives. Cornell University Press, 1991.
- Hartsock, Nancy C. M. "Comment on Hekman's 'Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited': Truth or Justice?" Signs 22, no. 2 (1997): 367-74.
- Hartsock, Nancy CM. "The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism." In Discovering Reality, 283-310. Springer, 1983. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/0-306-48017-4_15. · DOI
- Intemann, Kristen. "25 Years of Feminist Empiricism and Standpoint Theory: Where Are We Now?" Hypatia 25, no. 4 (2010): 778-796.
- Kusch, Martin. "Wittgenstein's On Certainty and Relativism." In Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium, edited by Harald A. Wiltsche and Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl, 29-46. De Gruyter, 2016.
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- Williams, Michael. "Why (Wittgensteinian) Contextualism Is Not Relativism." Episteme 4, no. 1 (February 2007): 93-114. https://doi.org/10.3366/epi.2007.4.1.93. Wylie, Alison. "Why Standpoint Matters." In Science and Other Cultures: Issues in Philosophies of Science and Technology, edited by Robert Figueroa and Sandra G. Harding, 26-48. Routledge, 2003. · DOI
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Standpoint Epistemology and Epistemic Peerhood: A Defense of Epistemic Privilege
TOOLE, B. (2024) · Journal of the American Philosophical Association · doi:10.1017/apa.2023.6 · Cited by 42 · see citing works
- Authors
- Ashton, N.
- Corresponding author
- Ashton, Natalie
- ORCID
- Ashton, Natalie
- Venue
- The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Published
- 2019-12-06
- Pages
- 329-338
- OpenAlex
- W2996280112
- Cited by
- 15
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 1
- FWCI
- 11.06
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- philarchive.org
- Locations
- Routledge eBooks (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy, Science, and History
- Keywords
- feminist epistemology, standpoint theory, epistemic relativism, non-neutrality, equality
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