Standpoint Epistemology and Epistemic Peerhood: A Defense of Epistemic Privilege

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The epistemic advantage thesis is the claim that social oppression inversely correlates to epistemic advantage.

“The first is what is sometimes referred to interchangeably as the inversion thesis or epistemic advantage thesis-the claim that social oppression inversely correlates to epistemic advantage”

• cites Dror 2022Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Tanesini 2019 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Ashton 2019 sourceDisputed

  The “Epistemic-Advantage Thesis” section says social oppression can bring epistemic benefits—the opposite of an inverse correlation between oppression and epistemic advantage. The “Standpoint thesis” section does confirm that “inversion thesis” is another name for the epistemic-advantage thesis, but the citing sentence reverses the relationship it describes. (LLM, conf=0.88)

  Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Some socially situated standpoints are epistemically privileged compared to others.

“Thus, a second way of cashing out epistemic privilege involves what Alessandra Tanesini calls the 'standpoint thesis': that some socially situated standpoints are epistemically privileged compared to others”

• cites Tanesini 2019 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

The epistemic advantages of oppression are not guaranteed by social positioning; the marginalized can suffer from false consciousness, motivational epistemic disadvantages, or be especially in the sway of ideology.

“Of course, as Lidal Dror observes, these advantages are not guaranteed by social positioning, as the marginalized can 'suffer from false consciousness', 'may have some motivational epistemic disadvantages relating to the workings of social marginalization', or may otherwise be 'especially in the sway of ideology'”

• cites Dror 2022: 4, 7-8Not matched

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Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The situated knowledge thesis holds that features typically taken to be epistemically irrelevant because non-epistemic, such as social identity and material conditions, influence the sorts of experiences subjects are likely to have and shape and limit what we know.

“Briefly, the situated knowledge thesis holds that features that are typically taken to be epistemically irrelevant because non-epistemic, features such as one's social identity and the material conditions of one's life, influence the sorts of experiences subjects are likely to have and, in turn, shape and limit what we know”

• cites Hartsock 1983: 285Not matched

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• cites Haraway 1988 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Wylie 2003: 31Not matched

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Marginalized standpoints must be achieved through the practice of consciousness-raising, which is roughly comparable to training that facilitates expertise within a domain.

“Marginalized standpoints must be achieved through the practice of consciousness-raising, a process that is roughly comparable to the sort of training that facilitates expertise within a domain.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

The epistemic privilege thesis can be understood in two ways: as the epistemic advantage thesis (marginalized social locations confer epistemic advantages) and as the standpoint thesis (marginalized standpoints generate better, more accurate knowledge).

“I first distinguish between two readings of the thesis: the thesis that marginalized social locations confer some epistemic advantages (the epistemic advantage thesis) and the thesis that marginalized standpoints generate better, more accurate knowledge (the standpoint thesis).”

May combine two claims.

While marginalization is necessary (though not sufficient) for epistemic advantage, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for the epistemically privileged knowledge made available from marginalized standpoints.

“However, while marginalization may be necessary (but not sufficient) for epistemic advantage, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for the epistemically privileged knowledge made available from marginalized standpoints.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Marginalization may be epistemically advantageous in that it may place one in a position to gather more evidence (evidential superiority) or to develop certain beneficial epistemic virtues and habits (cognitive superiority).

“Marginalization may be epistemically advantageous in that it may place one in a position to gather more evidence (evidential superiority) or to develop certain beneficial epistemic virtues and habits (cognitive superiority).”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

A standpoint is informed by the epistemic advantages associated with social location.

“It is thus informed by the epistemic advantages associated with social location.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

A standpoint is a particular view of the world that takes as its starting point the marginalized lives that form its basis.

“Roughly, a standpoint is itself a particular view of the world that takes as its starting point the marginalized lives that form its basis”

• cites Harding 1992Not matched

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May combine two claims.

If social identity makes a difference in what a person experiences and understands, then it may also confer the epistemic advantages canvassed above.

“For if social identity makes a difference in what a person experiences and understands, then it is not unreasonable to suggest that it may also confer the epistemic advantages canvassed above.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Epistemic privilege does not come from viewing things from the perspective of those in subordinate positions, but from that perspective together with an awareness of social, political, and other factors that maintain the status quo.

“Sharon Crasnow also seems to endorse a view of epistemic privilege according to which it is a feature of standpoints: 'Epistemic privilege does not come from viewing things from the perspective of those in subordinate positions, but rather from that perspective together with an awareness of social, political, and other factors that maintain the status quo'”

• cites Crasnow 2008: 1093-94Not matched

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Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Standpoints put the critically conscious knower in a position to grasp the effects of power relations on their own understanding and that of others.

“Alison Wylie also draws attention to this distinction, writing that 'standpoints (as opposed to locations) have the especially salient advantage that they put the critically conscious knower in a position to grasp the effects of power relations on their own understanding and that of others'”

• cites Wylie 2003: 34Not matched

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Expertise involves both the person's knowledge or information and their skill or performance ability.

“expertise involves both 'the person's knowledge or information, and . . .[their] skill or performance ability' (Goldman : ”

• cites Goldman Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Membership in a standpoint is achieved through the process of consciousness-raising.

“As I discuss above, the epistemic privilege (or standpoint) thesis applies to standpoints, and membership in a standpoint is achieved through the process of consciousness-raising.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Marginalized standpoints are epistemically privileged in that they generate knowledge that is less partial and distorted.

“Standpoint theorists argue that it is marginalized standpoints that are epistemically privileged, in that they generate knowledge that is 'less partial and distorted'”

• cites Harding 1992: 454Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

May combine two claims.

The status of experts as epistemically advantaged is acquirable, and by extension so is the knowledge that such a position makes available.

“Thus, the status of experts as epistemically advantaged is acquirable and, by extension, so, too, the knowledge that such a position makes available.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Training makes an individual more sensitive to evidence that laypersons who have not undergone such training might overlook.

“Presumably, such training makes an individual more sensitive to evidence that laypersons, who have not undergone such training, might overlook.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Training leads one to be epistemically superior in the domains in which one has received training.

“To show that it is, something must be said about why training leads one to be epistemically superior (in the domains in which one has received training).”

• cites Goldman Not matched

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• cites Goldman Not matched

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Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

If epistemic privilege is understood as a result of or arrived at in virtue of marginalization, then that status is not acquirable by anyone who lacks the relevant positioning, and neither is the knowledge made available by that standpoint.

“Thus, if epistemic privilege is, like epistemic advantage, understood as a result of or arrived at in virtue of marginalization, then that status is not acquirable by anyone who lacks the relevant positioning, and by extension, neither is the knowledge made available by that standpoint.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Anyone can become an expert in a subject, given the motivation and opportunity.

“Presumably anyone can become an expert in a subject, given the motivation and opportunity.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The achievement thesis distinguishes the epistemic privilege associated with standpoints from the epistemic advantages associated with social locations.

“The achievement thesis thus distinguishes the epistemic privilege associated with standpoints from the epistemic advantages associated with social locations.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Feminist standpoints make available a particular and privileged vantage point on male supremacy.

“Nancy Hartsock, arguably the progenitor of feminist standpoint theory, observes that feminist standpoints 'make available a particular and privileged vantage point on male supremacy'”

• cites Hartsock 1983: 284Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The achievement thesis provides support for the epistemic privilege of standpoints.

“The achievement thesis, however, might be understood as providing support for the epistemic privilege of standpoints.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

A standpoint may be thought of as a critical consciousness on knowledge production that takes into account the nature of our social location and the difference it makes epistemically.

“Moreover, as Wylie writes, a standpoint may be thought of as a 'critical consciousness' on knowledge production, one that takes into account 'the nature of our social location and the difference it makes epistemically'”

• cites Wylie 2003: 31Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

May combine two claims.

There are two asymmetries: between the achievement of expert status and the achievement of a marginalized standpoint; and between epistemic advantage as it applies to experts and the epistemic advantages of oppression.

“These worries point to two asymmetries: first, between the achievement of expert status and the achievement of a marginalized standpoint; second, and by extension, between epistemic advantage as it applies to experts and the epistemic advantages of oppression.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

A standpoint is struggled for, achieved, by epistemic agents who are critically aware of the conditions under which knowledge is produced and authorized.

“A standpoint is 'struggled for, achieved, by epistemic agents who are critically aware of the conditions under which knowledge is produced and authorized'”

• cites Wylie 2003: 31Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Marginal lives ground knowledge for standpoint approaches.

“This is the sense in which marginal lives ground knowledge for standpoint approaches”

• cites Harding 1992: 451Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

May combine two claims.

Both expert status and marginalized standpoint require a sort of training, the cultivation of a critical outlook on the experiences one has and the evidence those experiences make available.

“Rather, both require a sort of training, the cultivation of a critical outlook on the experiences one has (and the evidence those experiences make available).”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

It is controversial whether marginalized social positioning is necessary or sufficient either for the epistemic advantage of social locations or for the epistemic privilege characteristic of standpoints.

“Thus, it is a matter of some controversy whether marginalized social positioning is necessary or sufficient either for the epistemic advantage of social locations or for the epistemic privilege characteristic of standpoints.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

If we understand marginalization to yield epistemic advantages roughly comparable to the epistemic advantages associated with expert status, then claims of epistemic advantage should be uncontroversial.

“If we understand marginalization to yield epistemic advantages roughly comparable to the epistemic advantages associated with expert status, like auto mechanics and oncologists, then claims of epistemic advantage should be uncontroversial.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Both the epistemic advantage and epistemic privilege theses take marginalization to be not only epistemically relevant but also epistemically beneficial.

“What both the epistemic advantage and epistemic privilege thesis share, however, is that they take it that marginalization is not only epistemically relevant, but also epistemically beneficial.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

Marginalized standpoints and the epistemically privileged knowledge generated from that standpoint represent an achievement that is earned through a process of collective struggle.

“Further, it specifies both that marginalized standpoints and the epistemically privileged knowledge generated from that standpoint represent an achievement that is earned through a process of collective struggle.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Consciousness-raising involves becoming aware of patterns in experiences, patterns that may escape the attention of others.

“Consciousness-raising, then, involves becoming aware of patterns in experiences, patterns that may escape the attention of others.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Standpoint epistemology asserts that marginalization can yield epistemic advantages.

“Standpoint epistemology is distinct in that it asserts that marginalization can yield such epistemic advantages.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Standpoints require a critical consciousness on the epistemic insights that a particular social location makes available.

“This is because standpoints require a critical consciousness on the epistemic insights that a particular social location makes available.”

May combine two claims.

Marginalization facilitates epistemic advantages, which in turn grounds the epistemic privilege of knowledge produced from marginalized standpoints.

“As I discuss below, marginalization facilitates epistemic advantages, which in turn grounds the epistemic privilege of knowledge produced from marginalized standpoints.”

May combine two claims.

Being oppressed is a necessary condition for having some of the experiences that are epistemically advantageous, but it is not a sufficient condition for occupying an epistemically privileged standpoint.

“While being oppressed is a necessary condition for having some of the experiences that are epistemically advantageous (in that they increase one's evidential base), it is not a sufficient condition for occupying an epistemically privileged standpoint, any more than 'being employed as an oncologist' is a sufficient condition for expert status”

• cites Saint-Croix 2020: 492 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Marginalized standpoints are informed by marginalized perspectives, perspectives that bring with them experiences and habits that dominant standpoints overlook and are inadequate for conceptualizing.

“In short, then, marginalized standpoints are informed by marginalized perspectives, perspectives that bring with them experiences and habits that dominant standpoints overlook and are inadequate for conceptualizing.”

May combine two claims.

Operative ideologies interpellate subjects, creating our identities and shaping our consciousness.

“As Marx (: ), Louis Althusser ( []: ), and countless others have observed, operative ideologies interpellate subjects, creating our identities and shaping our consciousness.”

• cites Marx Not matched

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• cites Althusser Not matched

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May combine two claims.

Membership in a marginalized group is neither necessary nor sufficient for epistemic privilege.

“The first is that membership in a marginalized group is neither necessary nor sufficient for epistemic privilege.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Starting off thought from the lives of marginalized people provides fresh and more critical questions about how the social order works than does starting off thought from the unexamined lives of members of dominant groups.

“'[s]tarting off thought from these lives provides fresh and more critical questions about how the social order works than does starting off thought from the unexamined lives of members of dominant groups' (: ).”

• cites Harding Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

In the social domain, a second nature is a persistent mode of engagement with the world in virtue of some aspect of one's social identity.

“In the social domain, a second nature is a persistent mode of engagement with the world in virtue of some aspect of one's social identity.”

May combine two claims.

Because marginalized standpoints possess a more robust set of resources, occupants of that standpoint are likely to notice features of the world that dominant knowers overlook, because they have the resources needed to understand those features.

“Second, because marginalized standpoints possess a more robust set of resources, occupants of that standpoint are likely to notice features of the world that dominant knowers overlook, because they (but not dominant knowers) have the resources needed to understand those features.”

May combine two claims.

Marginalized standpoints are epistemically privileged, and those who occupy these standpoints satisfy the conditions for epistemic advantage developed above.

“Consequently, marginalized standpoints are epistemically privileged, and those who occupy these standpoints satisfy the conditions for epistemic advantage developed above.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

When marginalized, one must see the world from two perspectives-that of the oppressed and that of the oppressor.

“captures the idea that, when marginalized, one must see the world from two perspectives-that of the oppressed and that of the oppressor.”

• cites Du Bois Not matched

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• cites hooks Not matched

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• cites Collins Not matched

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

The next step in consciousness-raising involves the development of conceptual resources to name and attend to the experiences one has qua one's position of marginalization.

“The next step in consciousness-raising involves the development of conceptual resources to name and attend to the experiences one has qua one's position of marginalization (such as colorism: see Fricker ; Pohlhaus ; Toole ).”

• cites Fricker Not matched

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• cites Pohlhaus Not matched

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• cites Toole Not matched

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May combine two claims.

Consciousness-raising allows one to see the real motive forces and to reason free from the influence of the oppressive system that these forces might otherwise render invisible.

“consciousness-raising allows one to see these 'real motive forces' and to reason free from the influence of the oppressive system that these forces might otherwise render invisible.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

A second nature is a tendency or habit to notice certain features, a capacity that one develops either through training or as a result of cumulative experience.

“Think of second natures as a tendency or habit to notice certain features, a capacity that one develops either through training or as a result of cumulative experience.”

• cites Kukla Not matched

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Bad ideology refers to structures of thought and practice whose function it is to obscure the truth in order to sustain systems of oppression.

“Bad ideology refers to structures of thought and practice whose function it is to obscure the truth in order to sustain systems of oppression (Srinivasan ).”

• cites Srinivasan Not matched

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May combine two claims.

Knowledge generated from marginalized standpoints offers a more truthful, or less distorted, account of the social world or a deeper understanding of some of its features.

“knowledge generated from these standpoints '[offers] a more truthful, or less distorted, account of the social world or a deeper understanding of some of its features' (Tanesini : ).”

• cites Tanesini Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Epistemic advantage can be understood in terms familiar from the epistemological literature on disagreement.

“Epistemic advantage can be understood in terms familiar from the epistemological literature on disagreement.”

May combine two claims.

Bad ideology serves to legitimize and justify oppression, and in so doing elides the fact of oppression and injustice from view.

“Bad ideology serves to legitimize and justify this oppression, and, in so doing, elides the fact of oppression and injustice from view.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

For the marginalized, consciousness-raising involves becoming aware of patterns of oppression that one experiences in virtue of one's marginalization.

“For the marginalized, this process involves becoming aware of patterns of oppression that one experiences in virtue of one's marginalization (Smith ; Medina : ; Mills : -).”

• cites Smith Not matched

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• cites Medina Not matched

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• cites Mills Not matched

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May combine two claims.

The concepts we possess determine what aspects of the world we attend to (the bodies of evidence to which we have access) and how we see those aspects (how we interpret the evidence).

“It does so in part because the concepts we possess determine what aspects of the world we attend to (that is, the bodies of evidence to which we have access), and how we see those aspects to which our attention is drawn (that is, how we interpret the evidence to which we have access) (Woomer ).”

• cites Woomer Not matched

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Consciousness-raising represents a triumph over bad ideology.

“Consciousness-raising makes this possible because it represents a triumph over bad ideology.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

Members of marginalized groups must both engage with the world from their position of powerlessness and anticipate the way in which the dominant engage with the world.

“Members of marginalized groups must both engage with the world from their position of powerlessness and anticipate the way in which the dominant engage with the world (Jaggar ; Pohlhaus ; McKinnon ).”

• cites Jaggar Not matched

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• cites Pohlhaus Not matched

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• cites McKinnon Not matched

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

As we become attuned to patterns that turn up in our experience, we come to develop a second nature whereby we notice these patterns over time.

“As we become attuned to patterns that turn up in our experience, we come to develop a second nature whereby we notice these patterns over time.”

May combine two claims.

While marginalization may be necessary for some epistemic advantages, it is not sufficient, and it is neither necessary nor sufficient for occupying an epistemically privileged standpoint.

“Thus, while marginalization may be necessary for some epistemic advantages, it is not sufficient, and it is neither necessary nor sufficient for occupying an epistemically privileged standpoint.”