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Market Failure and the Structure of Externalities
Abstract
These simple facts about the nature of depletable and renewable resources point to a seemingly obvious conclusion: the United States and the rest of the world will eventually have to make a transition to alternative or renewable sources of energy. However, the knowledge that the world will ultimately transition back to renewable resources is not sufficient reason for policies to promote those resources. Such transitions will happen regardless of policy, simply as a result of market incentives.
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As far as renewable energy is concerned, market failures primarily relate to knowledge spillovers.
“As far as renewable energy is concerned, market failures primarily relate to knowledge spillovers (Gillingham and Sweeney, 2010).”
From The EU ETS and its companion policies: any insight for China's ETS? (2021) · cites this paper as Gillingham and Sweeney, 2010
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Metadata
- Authors
- Gillingham, K. T., & Sweeney, J. L.
- Venue
- Harnessing Renewable Energy in Electric Power Systems
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Published
- 2010-09-23
- Pages
- 87-109
- OpenAlex
- W2186586279
- Cited by
- 62
- References
- 40
- Citations by year
- 2025: 3 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 2 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 8 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 17.16
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Routledge eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Climate Change Policy and Economics
- Physical Sciences › Energy › Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment › Global Energy and Sustainability Research
- Physical Sciences › Energy › Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment › Renewable energy and sustainable power systems
- Keywords
- market failure, externalities, non-renewable resources, renewable resources, energy transition, alternative energy, market incentives, energy policy
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