The DOI matches its Crossref record; 68 of the 68 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 8 of the 41 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
The EU ETS and its companion policies: any insight for China's ETS?
Open accessAbstract
This paper analyses the role that companion policies have had in the reduction of emissions regulated by the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) and the related policy interactions, with a view to identifying relevant insights for China's forthcoming Emissions Trading System (ETS). The investigation rests on: (a) the observation of the EU's and China's ETSs and policy mixes; (b) economic theory concerning companion policies and ETS design; and (c) empirical ex-post evidence from the EU ETS. Three main conclusions emerge from the analysis. First, China's ETS, while not imposing a fixed cap on emissions, will not be immune to waterbed effects of companion policies. Second, the European experience stresses the importance of making explicit the objectives pursued by companion policies, and of balancing policies for innovation and policies for adoption of low-carbon technologies. Third, in the presence of a major market surplus, only permanent adjustments to allowance supply can be effective in raising prices.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This review analyzes how companion policies affected emissions regulated by the EU ETS and draws lessons for China’s forthcoming ETS. It concludes that China’s ETS will still face waterbed effects, that policy mixes need careful calibration, and that only permanent allowance-supply adjustments reliably raise prices when surplus is large.
Key findings
- China’s ETS, though a tradable performance standards system with relative caps and allowance supply that adjusts with output, will not be immune to waterbed effects from companion policies that affect emission efficiency—such as emission standards, energy-efficiency policies, local pollution policies, and renewable-energy expansion via indirect emissions—unless benchmarks are revised; such policies may then fail to be environmentally effective and will reduce allowance demand and prices.
- EU experience shows companion policies, especially renewable-electricity support, did much of the abatement: Weigt et al. estimate German power-sector emissions would have been 11–20% higher without new RES capacity versus 1–3% higher without the EU ETS; Van den Bergh et al. find 10–16% higher emissions without RES deployment; Gloaguen and Alberola attribute over half of a 1.1 billion tonne reduction to RES and EE policies.
- Abatement costs of RES support often far exceeded carbon prices: Rey et al. report PV implicit carbon prices over €700/tCO2 in most countries; Marcantonini and Ellerman estimate wind at €57/tCO2 and PV at €552/tCO2 in Germany; Marcantonini and Valero estimate wind at €165/tCO2 and PV at €1000/tCO2 in Italy; Abrell et al. report ranges of €105–276/tCO2 for wind and €411–972/tCO2 for PV in Germany, and €82–258/tCO2 for wind and €784–1944/tCO2 for PV in Spain.
- In the EU ETS, a market surplus of about two billion allowances had accumulated by the start of Phase III, exceeding total annual regulated emissions; EUA prices stayed below €10 most of 2012–2018 with dips below €5. Only permanent supply adjustments—the tightened Phase IV cap and enhanced MSR—had the desired effect, with the expectation alone sufficient for prices to return to €25–30.
Methods
- Review article; the investigation rests on (a) observation of the EU’s and China’s ETSs and policy mixes, (b) economic theory concerning companion policies and ETS design, and (c) empirical ex-post evidence from the EU ETS.
- Synthesizes literature on abatement attribution, implicit carbon prices, and allowance-price drivers; no new primary data collection or original model estimation by the authors is reported.
- Discusses insights for China’s ETS across three themes: waterbed effects, calibration of the policy mix, and permanent adjustments to allowance supply.
Limitations
- The paper states it does not consider governance of a complex policy mix, which is relevant to China’s climate policy mix; identifying and evaluating transferability would require an in-depth analysis of both institutional frameworks beyond the paper’s scope.
- The paper notes that empirical ex-post evidence is modest, especially on policy-mix interactions; only one study to the authors’ knowledge quantifies impacts of RES generation and other determinants on EUA prices, and in Gloaguen and Alberola the EUA price impact cannot be identified due to insufficient data points.
- Evident from the text: the analysis is qualitative and review-based, relies mainly on EU evidence from early EU ETS phases, and China’s first-phase benchmarks and price-floor details were not yet defined at the time of writing, limiting concrete calibration assessment.
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Claims the paper makes
8 Valid · 5 Not valid · 25 Not checked · 40 Own results and interpretations
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“In the EE domain, suboptimal investments are also explained by market failures, which however mainly relate to information failures, split incentives (as with the 'landlord-tenant dilemma') and transaction costs, as well as by investors' bounded rationality (Linares and Labandeira, 2010).”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Linares and Labandeira, 2010 source
Section 2.1 (pp. 6–8) links low energy-efficiency investment to market failures and behavioral factors. It identifies information failures, the principal–agent problem illustrated by owners and tenants, potentially reducible transaction costs, and bounded rationality; it treats bounded rationality as distinct from a market failure. (LLM, conf=0.88)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“For PV generation, the implicit carbon price is much higher, averaging e 552/tCO2 over the same period.”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Marcantonini and Ellerman (2016) source
Table 8 in Section 4.1 (Carbon surcharge and implicit carbon price) reports the annual implicit carbon price for solar of 571, 627, 461, 571, 562 €/tCO2 for 2006-2010 with an average of 552 €/tCO2 (average weighted over CO2 emission reductions, data in €(2011)). Appendix D (Solar equalized remunerations) independently states the average implicit carbon price of 552 €/tCO2 for solar without learning effects. The scope (Germany, solar/PV, 2006-2010) matches the claim exactly. (LLM, conf=0.95)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Compared to the results for Germany in the previous study, implicit carbon prices turn out to be much higher, averaging e 165/tCO2 and e 1000/tCO2 for wind and PV, respectively.”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Marcantonini and Valero (2017) source
Table 6 (annual carbon surcharge and annual implicit carbon price for wind energy) reports the 2008-2011 average implicit carbon price for wind at 164 €/tCO2 (annual values 116, 180, 172, 170), and Section 5.1 states the period average as 162 for wind and 1018 for solar, so the citing sentence's ~€165/tCO2 for wind and ~€1000/tCO2 for PV reproduces the paper's figures to within rounding. The comparative element is also in the paper: the Conclusion (and Abstract) state the Italian values are much higher than those computed for Germany in the earlier study ('about twice as high'). One caveat: the Conclusion passage reverses the labels, calling 164 the carbon surcharge and 150 the implicit carbon price, whereas Table 6 and Section 5.1 assign 150 to the carbon surcharge and 162-164 to the implicit carbon price — the tabulated definition is the one matching the claim. (LLM, conf=0.82)
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- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“The empirical evidence summarised in section 4, which mainly covers the first two trading periods of the EU ETS, clearly shows that: (a) emissions in the electricity sector were primarily abated by companion policies, rather than by carbon prices, and (b) that their abatement costs were much higher than concurrent carbon prices.”
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Rey et al. (2013)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Partly supportedcites Marcantonini and Ellerman (2016) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Our copy supports the cost side only for solar: section 4.1 (and the EUA-price comparison) states that 'the carbon surcharges of wind tend to be higher than EUA prices but of the same order of magnitude' while 'the implicit carbon prices for solar were always much above the prices for the EUA' (wind ~€45/tCO2 surcharge, €57 implicit price vs average EUA €10.7; solar ~€537/€552, Table 8, §4.1). So the blanket claim that companion-policy abatement costs were 'much higher' than concurrent carbon prices overstates the source for wind, which the authors explicitly place in the same order of magnitude. Moreover, the paper does not address the first attributed point at all — it never shows that electricity-sector emissions were primarily abated by companion policies rather than by carbon prices; it only computes the abatement and cost of the German RE incentives, noting (§ Abstract/intro) that because of the EU ETS cap, RE-induced reductions in German power are displaced elsewhere, and that it does not estimate the REI's effect on the EUA price. (LLM, conf=0.78)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Abrell et al. (2019) source
boostedstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Not matched
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Compared to the results for Germany in the previous study, implicit carbon prices turn out to be much higher, averaging e 165/tCO2 and e 1000/tCO2 for wind and PV, respectively.”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Marcantonini and Valero (2017) source
Section 5.1 states the implicit carbon price is very close to the carbon surcharge and gives the 2008-2011 averages of 162 (Table 6: 164) €/tCO2 for wind and 1018 €/tCO2 for solar PV, so the claim's ~€1000/tCO2 for PV (and ~€165 for wind) matches the paper's own averages, rounded. Table 6 confirms the wind implicit-carbon-price average of 164 €/tCO2, and the Conclusion reports 1018 €/tCO2 for solar. The comparative framing is also carried by our copy: the Additional-information section compares Italy with Marcantonini and Ellerman (2015) for Germany and finds Italian values 'about twice as high' (German surcharges 21-62 €/tCO2 wind, 439-627 €/tCO2 solar), though the paper explicitly frames that cross-country comparison on the carbon surcharge rather than the implicit carbon price. (LLM, conf=0.88)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
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Claims other papers make about this one
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In the citing paper
“As the carbon market develops, the national carbon market would require a gradual transition to realize the fairness of the initial allocation, and set the retention price of paid allocation to avoid a potential low carbon price, which could incentivize entities in emission reduction [34].”
From The first compliance cycle of China's National Emissions Trading Scheme: insights and implications (2022) · cites this paper as [34]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Citations
Cites
The Environment and Directed Technical Change
Acemoglu, D., Aghion, P., Bursztyn, L., & Hemous, D. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.1.131 · Cited by 3,734 · cited 2×
“…show that policy mixes inclusive of both carbon pricing and policies targeting one or more of said failures can achieve emission reductions at significantly lower costs than any single policy (Fischer and Newell, 2008; Fischer and Preonas, 2010; Acemoglou et al., 2012; Fischer et al., 2017).”
BackgroundUnruh, G. C. (2000) · Energy Policy · doi:10.1016/s0301-4215(00)00070-7 · Cited by 3,304 · cited 1×
“Insufficient carbon price levels, by delaying low-carbon investments, determine a lock-in of carbon-intensive infrastructure and ultimately greater decarbonisation costs (Unruh, 2000; Seto et al., 2016).”
BackgroundCarbon lock-in: types, causes, and policy implications
Seto, K. C., Davis, S. J., Mitchell, R. B., Stokes, E. C., Unruh, G., & Ürge-Vorsatz, D. (2016) · Annual Review of Environment and Resources · doi:10.1146/annurev-environ-110615-085934 · Cited by 1,346
Environmental and technology policies for climate mitigation
Fischer, C., & Newell, R. G. (2008) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2007.11.001 · Cited by 1,157 · cited 2×
“…show that policy mixes inclusive of both carbon pricing and policies targeting one or more of said failures can achieve emission reductions at significantly lower costs than any single policy (Fischer and Newell, 2008; Fischer and Preonas, 2010; Acemoglou et al., 2012; Fischer et al., 2017).”
BackgroundKoch, N., Fuss, S., Grosjean, G., & Edenhofer, O. (2014) · Energy Policy · doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2014.06.024 · Cited by 448 · cited 1×
“Using time series analysis and EU-level monthly data, Koch et al. (2014) investigate the relative importance of different factors in explaining the dynamics of EUA prices.”
MethodWinning coalitions for climate policy
Meckling, J., Kelsey, N., Biber, E., & Zysman, J. (2015) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aab1336 · Cited by 422
The safety valve and climate policy
Jacoby, H. D., & Ellerman, A. D. (2004) · Energy Policy · doi:10.1016/s0301-4215(03)00150-2 · Cited by 302 · cited 1×
“17By the same token, a price ceiling represents a safety valve against the risk of excessively high abatement costs (see Jacoby and Ellerman, 2004; Burtraw et al., 2010).”
BackgroundCarbon pricing and deep decarbonisation
Tvinnereim, E., & Mehling, M. (2018) · Energy Policy · doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2018.06.020 · Cited by 261 · cited 1×
“In recent years, economists have given increasing consideration to this limitation of carbon pricing, which largely is a problem of political feasibility (HLCCP, 2017; Tvinnereim and Mehling, 2018; Hepburn et al., 2020).”
BackgroundEnergy efficiency: economics and policy
Linares, P., & Labandeira, X. (2010) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6419.2009.00609.x · Cited by 230 · cited 1×
“16 In the EE domain, suboptimal investments are also explained by market failures, which however mainly relate to information failures, split incentives (as with the ‘landlord-tenant dilemma’) and transaction costs, as well as by investors’ bounded rationality (Linares and Labandeira, 2010).”
BackgroundEmission abatement: Untangling the impacts of the EU ETS and the economic crisis
Bel, G., & Joseph, S. (2015) · Energy Economics · doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2015.03.014 · Cited by 222 · cited 1×
“It all started with the economic recession of 2008–2009, which caused amajor fall in regulated emissions and, therefore, in allowance demand (Bel and Joseph, 2015; Chèze et al., 2020).”
Background
Research works printed but not linked: 11
- Quemin, S (2020) Using supply-side policies to raise ambition: the case of the EU ETS and the 2021 Review. Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Working Paper 335, London School of Economics.
- 2020, China's Emissions Trading Scheme
- Acworth, 2017, Emissions Trading and the Role of A Long run Carbon Price Signal: Achieving Cost Effective Emission Reductions Under an Emissions Trading System
- 2019, Trends and Projections in Europe 2019. Tracking Progress Towards Europe's Climate and Energy Targets
- 2020, Energy, Transport and Environment Statistics
- McWilliams, 2020, Bruegel Electricity Tracker of COVID-19 Lockdown Effects
- 10.2139/ssrn.2613821 · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2613821
- 2017, Report of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices
- 2020, Emissions Trading Worldwide: Status Report 2020
- Jalard, 2015, Exploring the EU ETS Beyond 2020, 17
- Sandalow, 2019, 2019 Guide to Chinese Climate Policy
Cited by
Price and scale effects of China's carbon emission trading system pilots on emission reduction
Wu, Q. (2022) · Journal of Environmental Management · doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2022.115054 · Cited by 106
From Bitcoin to carbon allowances: An asymmetric extreme risk spillover
Febo, E. D., Ortolano, A., Foglia, M., Leone, M., & Angelini, E. (2021) · Journal of Environmental Management · doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2021.113384 · Cited by 82
Blockchain-enhanced trading systems for construction industry to control carbon emissions
Shu, Z., Liu, W., Fu, B., Li, Z., & He, M. (2022) · Clean Technologies and Environmental Policy · doi:10.1007/s10098-022-02292-3 · Cited by 60
“So far, all EU member states have met their emission reduction targets (EC 2020; Verde et al. 2021).”
BackgroundMao, Y., & Yu, X. (2023) · Journal of Environmental Management · doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2023.119873 · Cited by 59
Do carbon emissions trading pilot policies contribute to urban green transportation development?
Zhang, C., Wu, S., Huang, M., Skitmore, M., Yao, W., & Lu, X. (2025) · Transportation Research Part D Transport and Environment · doi:10.1016/j.trd.2025.104654 · Cited by 31
Metadata
- Authors
- Verde, S. F., Galdi, G., Alloisio, I., & Borghesi, S.
- Affiliations
- European University Institute (IT)
- University of Siena (IT)
- Corresponding author
- Borghesi, Simone
- Venue
- Environment and Development Economics
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2021-03-08
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 302-320
- ISSN
- 1355-770X (ISSN-L)
- 1469-4395
- OpenAlex
- W3135847143
- Semantic Scholar
- ee68524de0b4bc42822570e5fe3b2dd920cd43a1
- Cited by
- 39
- References
- 64
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 2
- FWCI
- 4.57
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Environment and Development Economics (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Institutional Research Information System (Università degli Studi di Trento) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Use Siena air (University of Siena) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Cadmus - EUI Research Repository (European University Institute) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- European Commission (LIFE15 GIC/IT/000051, LIFE15)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Climate Change Policy and Economics
- Social Sciences › Law › EU Law and Policy Analysis
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Energy, Environment, Economic Growth
- Keywords
- EU Emissions Trading System, waterbed effect, allowance prices, low-carbon technology adoption, innovation policy, policy mix, market surplus, carbon pricing
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The EU ETS and its companion policies: any insight for China's ETS? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s1355770x20000595
- The paper
- Verde, S. F., Galdi, G., Alloisio, I., & Borghesi, S. (2021). The EU ETS and its companion policies: any insight for China's ETS? Environment and Development Economics. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1355770x20000595
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