The DOI matches its Crossref record; 51 of the 51 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Monitoring and enforcement of environmental policy
Open accessAbstract
This article reviews the economics literature on monitoring and enforcement of environmental policy. In the last few years there has been a rapid growth in both theoretical developments and empirical studies of monitoring and enforcement. Various factors have contributed to this growth, including (1) the growth of the law and economics literature and its interest in issues of law enforcement and penalties, (2) increased emphasis on enforcement by EPA and other regulatory agencies, and (3) the availability of data on firm compliance. The economics literature on environmental monitoring and enforcement has closely followed the related field of optimal penalties in the law and economics literature. The scope of the article includes both public and private mechanisms designed to compel firms (and individuals) to comply with environmental formal regulations and informal rules of conduct or social norms. For purposes of this paper, monitoring and enforcement includes monitoring and inspections by enforcement authorities as well as sanctions, remedial actions, and other mechanisms designed to punish and/or bring a firm into compliance. It also includes non-governmental actions such as citizen suits authorized by the government and informal mechanisms such as public pressure. It does not include the role of liability laws (torts, nuisance actions, etc.) in compelling polluters to reduce emissions. The paper begins with a fundamental question--why do firms comply with environmental laws? Next, I consider the various economic theories of government behavior and how they have been used to help explain observed enforcement behavior. Following these positive analyses, I turn to normative theories of optimal penalties as it relates to environmental regulation, including recent developments that have incorporated the complexities associated with sanctioning both organizations and their employees. The paper continues with an assessment of empirical studies on environmental enforcement. In addition to studies of government enforcement, I examine empirical studies of private enforcement mechanisms (e.g., citizen suits) and the role of market forces in compelling compliance behavior. A concluding section assesses the most critical gaps in our knowledge and contains suggestions for future research.
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Cites
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
Becker, G. S. (1968) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259394 · Cited by 13,999
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation
Peltzman, S. (1976) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466865 · Cited by 4,729
The Impact of Environmental Management on Firm Performance
Klassen, R. D., & McLaughlin, C. P. (1996) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.42.8.1199 · Cited by 2,725
Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship
Shavell, S. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003319 · Cited by 1,285
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Hamilton, J. T. (1995) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1006/jeem.1995.1007 · Cited by 1,089
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Self-citationThe Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy
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Shavell, S. (1980) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/467626 · Cited by 747
Informal Regulation of Industrial Pollution in Developing Countries: Evidence from Indonesia
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Cited by
Determinants of environmental innovation in US manufacturing industries
Brunnermeier, S. B., & Cohen, M. A. (2003) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/s0095-0696(02)00058-x · Cited by 1,586
Self-citationGreenstone, M. (2002) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/342808 · Cited by 1,122
Does Air Quality Matter? Evidence from the Housing Market
Chay, K., & Greenstone, M. (1998) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w6826 · Cited by 675
The Effects of Environmental Regulation on the Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing
Greenstone, M., List, J. A., & Syverson, C. (2012) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2145006 · Cited by 577
Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out
Cardenas, J. C., Stranlund, J., & Willis, C. (2000) · World Development · doi:10.1016/s0305-750x(00)00055-3 · Cited by 559
Metadata
- Authors
- Cohen, M. A.
- Venue
- The International Yearbook of Environmental and Resource Economics 1999/2000
- Publisher
- Edward Elgar Publishing
- Published
- 1999-05-26
- Pages
- 44-106
- OpenAlex
- W4407939911
- Cited by
- 300
- References
- 51
- FWCI
- 55.47
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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