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Cited by 124Taxation and Compliance StudiesCorruption and Economic DevelopmentCrime, Illicit Activities, and Governance

Corruption in Tax Administration: Lessons from Institutional Reforms in Uganda

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Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge·2006·International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption
DOI 10.4337/9781847203106.00027
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Abstract

Over the past two decades many developing countries have implemented comprehensive reforms of their tax administrations in order to increase revenue and curb corruption. This paper examines recent experiences in the fight against corruption in the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA). It argues that the technocratic remedies supported by donors have underplayed the degree to which progress in tax administration depends upon a thorough ‘cultural change’ in the public service. The motives of individual actors are often inextricably tied to the interests of the social groups to which they belong. In the URA patronage runs through networks grounded on ties of kinship and community origin. As such, people recognize the benefits of large extended families and strong kinship ties, even as their social and economic aspirations may be indisputably modern.\nThis implies that such social relations may undermine formal bureaucratic structures and positions. If these problems, which are rooted in social norms and patterns of behaviour rather than administrative features, are overlooked, the result may be to distort incentives. As a consequence, the government’s commitment to reforming the tax administration may also be undermined.

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  • The apparent mixed performance may understate real improvements, as revenue has largely been sustained despite a decline in both trade tax revenue and income tax rates, but it also appears to reflect the relative persistence of corruption and politicization, particularly in low-income countries.

    “This may understate real improvements, as revenue has largely been sustained despite a decline in both trade tax revenue and income tax rates, but it also appears to reflect the relative persistence of corruption and politicization, particularly in low-income countries (Fjeldstad 2006; Bird 2008).”

    From Tax And Development: Donor Support To Strengthen Tax Systems In Developing Countries (2014) · cites this paper as Fjeldstad 2006

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Research works printed but not linked: 32

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Authors
Fjeldstad, O.-H.
Affiliations
Chr. Michelsen Institute (NO)
Corresponding author
Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge
ORCID
Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge
Venue
International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption
Publisher
Edward Elgar Publishing
Published
2006-10-27
DOI
10.4337/9781847203106.00027
OpenAlex
W2142893774
Cited by
124
References
0
Citations by year
2025: 1 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 33 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 10 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 3
FWCI
26.21
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
Licence
public-domain
Locations
  • Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks (publishedVersion, public-domain)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Chapters (submittedVersion)
  • NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • BIBSYS Brage (BIBSYS (Norway)) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Taxation and Compliance Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance
Keywords
corruption, tax administration, Uganda Revenue Authority, institutional reform, patronage networks, kinship ties, social norms, bureaucratic reform, public service culture, technocratic reform, donor support, tax collection, Uganda

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