CacheQuote: Efficiently Recovering Long-term Secrets of SGX EPID via Cache Attacks
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) allows users to perform secure computation on platforms that run untrusted software. To validate that the computation is correctly initialized and that it executes on trusted hardware, SGX supports attestation providers that can vouch for the user’s computation. Communication with these attestation providers is based on the Extended Privacy ID (EPID) protocol, which not only validates the computation but is also designed to maintain the user’s privacy. In particular, EPID is designed to ensure that the attestation provider is unable to identify the host on which the computation executes. In this work we investigate the security of the Intel implementation of the EPID protocol. We identify an implementation weakness that leaks information via a cache side channel. We show that a malicious attestation provider can use the leaked information to break the unlinkability guarantees of EPID. We analyze the leaked information using a lattice-based approach for solving the hidden number problem, which we adapt to the zero-knowledge proof in the EPID scheme, extending prior attacks on signature schemes.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
Kocher, P., Genkin, D., Gruss, D., Haas, W., Hamburg, M., Lipp, M., Mangard, S., Prescher, T., Schwarz, M., & Yarom, Y. (2018) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1801.01203 · Cited by 1,850
Self-citationCacheZoom: How SGX Amplifies the Power of Cache Attacks
Moghimi, A., Irazoqui, G., & Eisenbarth, T. (2017) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-66787-4_4 · Cited by 237
Self-citationLipp, M., Schwarz, M., Gruss, D., Prescher, T., Haas, W., Mangard, S., Kocher, P., Genkin, D., Yarom, Y., & Hamburg, M. (2018) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1801.01207 · Cited by 17
Self-citation
Cited by
Security Vulnerabilities of SGX and Countermeasures: A Survey
Fei, S., Yan, Z., Ding, W., & Xie, H. (2022) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3456631 · Cited by 122
Microwalk: A framework for finding side channels in binaries
Wichelmann, J., Moghimi, A., Eisenbarth, T., & Sunar, B. (2018) · Proceedings of the 34th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference · doi:10.1145/3274694.3274741 · Cited by 74
Self-citationRaziel: Private and Verifiable Smart Contracts on Blockchains
Sánchez, D. C. (2018) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1807.09484 · Cited by 41
SoK: SGX.Fail: How Stuff Gets eXposed
Van Schaik, S., Seto, A., Yurek, T., Batori, A., AlBassam, B., Genkin, D., Miller, A., Ronen, E., Yarom, Y., & Garman, C. (2024) · 2024 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp54263.2024.00260 · Cited by 31
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Dall, F., De Micheli, G., Eisenbarth, T., Genkin, D., Heninger, N., Moghimi, A., & Yarom, Y.
- Venue
- IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
- Published
- 2018-05-08
- Pages
- 171-191
- ISSN
- 2569-2925 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4252137572
- Cited by
- 66
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 5.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- diamond
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: CacheQuote: Efficiently Recovering Long-term Secrets of SGX EPID via Cache Attacks. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.46586/tches.v2018.i2.171-191
- The paper
- Dall, F., De Micheli, G., Eisenbarth, T., Genkin, D., Heninger, N., Moghimi, A., & Yarom, Y. (2018). CacheQuote: Efficiently Recovering Long-term Secrets of SGX EPID via Cache Attacks. IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems. https://doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2018.i2.171-191
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.