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CacheQuote: Efficiently Recovering Long-term Secrets of SGX EPID via Cache Attacks

Open access
Dall, Fergus, De Micheli, Gabrielle, Eisenbarth, Thomas, Genkin, Daniel, Heninger, Nadia, Moghimi, Ahmad, Yarom, Yuval · 2018 · IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Cited by 66

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) allows users to perform secure computation on platforms that run untrusted software. To validate that the computation is correctly initialized and that it executes on trusted hardware, SGX supports attestation providers that can vouch for the user’s computation. Communication with these attestation providers is based on the Extended Privacy ID (EPID) protocol, which not only validates the computation but is also designed to maintain the user’s privacy. In particular, EPID is designed to ensure that the attestation provider is unable to identify the host on which the computation executes. In this work we investigate the security of the Intel implementation of the EPID protocol. We identify an implementation weakness that leaks information via a cache side channel. We show that a malicious attestation provider can use the leaked information to break the unlinkability guarantees of EPID. We analyze the leaked information using a lattice-based approach for solving the hidden number problem, which we adapt to the zero-knowledge proof in the EPID scheme, extending prior attacks on signature schemes.

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Crossref · 10.46586/tches.v2018.i2.171-191

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Metadata

Authors
Dall, F., De Micheli, G., Eisenbarth, T., Genkin, D., Heninger, N., Moghimi, A., & Yarom, Y.
Venue
IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Published
2018-05-08
Pages
171-191
ISSN
2569-2925 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4252137572
Cited by
66
References
3
FWCI
5.09
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: CacheQuote: Efficiently Recovering Long-term Secrets of SGX EPID via Cache Attacks. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.46586/tches.v2018.i2.171-191
The paper
Dall, F., De Micheli, G., Eisenbarth, T., Genkin, D., Heninger, N., Moghimi, A., & Yarom, Y. (2018). CacheQuote: Efficiently Recovering Long-term Secrets of SGX EPID via Cache Attacks. IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems. https://doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2018.i2.171-191

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