Moral Generalism and Moral Particularism

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

The way morally relevant factors combine in different contexts to determine overall moral assessment is clearly quite complex.

“the way such factors combine in different contexts to do this is clearly quite complex.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Some generalists object that the examples in support of holism are ineffective because they specify reasons incompletely.

“Some generalists object that the examples in support of holism are ineffective because they specify reasons incompletely.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Some generalists argue that holism is false because morality is based on some factors that are or generate invariable reasons.

“Some generalists argue that holism is false because morality is based on some factors that are or generate invariable reasons.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted).

Principles concerning moral reasons can incorporate as part of their content the very contextual variability of reasons that follows from holism.

“a common claim here is that principles concerning moral reasons can incorporate as part of their content the very contextual variability of reasons that follows from holism.”

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Neither party is making mere descriptive empirical claims about how people in fact deliberate.

“Neither party is making mere descriptive empirical claims about how people in fact deliberate.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Other arguments against holism target the distinction that holism requires between considerations that are reasons and other features of the broader context which can be relevant to whether some consideration is a reason without themselves being reasons.

“Other arguments against holism target the distinction that holism requires between considerations that are reasons (e.g., that I promised) and other features of the broader context which can be relevant to whether some consideration is a reason without themselves being reasons.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Ross argues that while it is possible to specify principles determining how individual nonmoral features contribute to overall moral nature, the way these contributory factors combine to determine overall moral assessment is too complex and context-sensitive to be captured by principles.

“Others, such as ross and his plurality of”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Since particularism is usually treated as a negation of generalism, there are three correspondingly different forms of generalism.

“Since particularism is usually treated as a negation of generalism, there are three correspondingly different forms of generalism.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

If the third form's claims about standards and guides are correct, principles will still have a hard time playing any fundamental role in explaining particular moral facts or guiding us to them.

“But if these claims are correct, principles will still have a hard time playing any fundamental role in explaining particular moral facts or guiding us to them.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

A genuine principle should refer only to features that are directly relevant to whether the moral feature in question obtains.

“By contrast, a genuine principle should refer only to features that are directly relevant to whether the moral feature in question obtains.”

May combine two claims.

Those judgments about what exactly is the reason may be unreliable in predictable ways, and hence a poor basis for arguments either way.

“those judgments may also be unreliable in predictable ways, and hence a poor basis for arguments either way.”

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

If reasons are composed inclusively, it becomes less plausible that what is a reason in one context may be no reason at all or even an opposite reason in a different context.

“If reasons are composed in this inclusive way, it becomes less plausible that what is a reason in one context may be no reason at all or even an opposite reason in a different context.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Generalists have contested the argument from holism both with respect to its soundness, contesting holism, and to its validity.

“Generalists have taken issue with this argument with respect both to its soundness, contesting holism, and to its validity.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Moral particularism is a family of views united by opposition to giving moral principles a fundamental or important role in morality.

“Moral particularism, as it figures in the past few decades of moral philosophy, is a family of views united by an opposition to giving moral principles a fundamental or important role in morality.”

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Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

There are three main forms which opposition to principles may take within an antinihilist agreement that some substantive moral claims are correct and knowable.

“there are three main forms which opposition to principles-whether as standards, guides, or both-may take within an antinihilist agreement that some substantive moral claims are correct and knowable.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Some substantive moral claims are correct and knowable.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The second form of particularism is that there is no good evidence for the existence of true or correct moral principles.

“The second, an epistemic variant of the first, is that there is no good evidence for the existence of true or correct moral principles.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Understood as a form of particularism about standards, the third form denies that particular moral facts and distinctions depend for their obtaining, or that moral judgments depend for their correctness, on principles.

“Understood as a form of particularism about standards, this third form of particularism denies that particular moral facts and distinctions depend for their obtaining (or that moral judgments depend for their correctness) on principles.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Contemporary particularists argue that the ways nonmoral features combine to make something morally relevant and determine its valence are too complex and context-sensitive to be captured even in contributory principles.

“contemporary particularists argue that the ways in which the nonmoral features of particular circumstances combine to make something morally relevant in the first place and determine its valence as morally positive or negative”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Principles understood as standards come in two kinds, corresponding to a distinction between contributory and overall moral claims.

“principles understood as standards come in two kinds, corresponding to a distinction between”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

A genuine moral principle should be substantive.

“a genuine moral principle should be substantive in some sense.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The third form of particularism is that morality in no way depends on the existence of moral principles.

“The third option is that morality in no way depends on the existence of moral principles.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Understood as a form of particularism about guides, the third form denies that reliable moral guidance or the practical accessibility of moral truths depends on principles.

“Understood as a form of particularism about guides, it denies that reliable moral guidance or the practical accessibility of moral truths depends on principles.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

A common conception of genuine moral standards requires that principles are explanatory of particular phenomena in some significant way.

“a common conception of genuine moral standards accordingly requires that principles are explanatory of particular phenomena in some significant way.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

What generalists and particularists dispute is whether general principles serve any fundamental theoretical or practical function in morality beyond functioning merely as useful rules of thumb.

“What generalists and particularists dispute is whether general principles serve any fundamental theoretical or practical function in morality beyond functioning merely as useful rules of thumb.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Moral generalism is a family of views united by the thought that moral principles do play some fundamental or important role in morality.

“Moral generalism is, likewise, not a single sharply defined position but a family of views united by the thought that moral principles do play some such fundamental or important role.”

May combine two claims.

Reasons can be opposed and outweighed.

“reasons can be opposed (most things have some features that count in their favor but others that count against them) and outweighed (considerations on one side are stronger than those on the other).”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

One form of particularism is that there are no true or correct moral principles.

“One form of particularism is that there are no true or correct moral principles.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Overall moral assessment is determined jointly by the various morally relevant factors.

“Overall moral assessment is determined jointly by the various morally relevant factors.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

A principle counts as a valuable guide if people can more reliably act in morally valuable ways and avoid immoral actions with its assistance than without it.

“a principle counts as a valuable”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Moral particularism is defined by opposition to general principles concerning not just the overall but also the contributory.

“We have seen that moral particularism is defined by opposition to general principles concerning not just the overall but also the contributory.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Debates about whether there are overall or merely contributory principles are typically classified as family disputes within generalism, whereas particularists are united by their opposition to principles of both kinds.

“the point for now is that debates about whether there are overall or merely contributory principles are typically classified as family disputes within generalism, whereas particularists are united by their opposition to principles of both kinds.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

A different response to the argument from holism is to argue that holism is compatible with generalism and hence does not support particularism even if true.

“a different response to the argument from holism is to argue that holism is compatible with generalism and hence does not support particularism even if true.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The claims on both sides should be understood as concerning whether agents can get their moral judgments reliably right.

“The claims on both sides should be understood as concerning whether these agents can get their moral judgments reliably right.”

May combine two claims.

Summary generalizations lack the modal and explanatory implications of genuine principles and are in principle dispensable in deliberation.

“Such summary generalizations will lack the modal and explanatory implications discussed earlier.they are also in principle dispensable in deliberation.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

A reliable guide for acting well need not be an algorithmic decision procedure that will achieve this goal without fail and can be applied to particular cases without further exercise of judgment.

“a reliable guide for”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The most prominent argument for particularism appeals to a general claim about the nature of moral principles and their role in morality, known as the argument from holism.

“the most prominent argument for particularism also appeals to a general claim that bears on the nature of moral principles and their role in morality.this is known as the argument from”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Some particularists deny that specific virtues and vices are invariably relevant in the same way.

“In reply, some particularists deny that specific virtues and vices are invariably relevant in the same way.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Some prominent accounts of laws of nature take them to be mere necessary universal generalizations in their logical form.

“another issue is that some prominent accounts of laws of nature take them to be mere necessary universal generalizations in their logical form (”

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Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The success of the strategy of allowing hedged principles requires an account of how hedged principles can be explanatory if they permit exceptions and how grasping them can improve our reliability in detecting reasons, disablers, enablers, and the like.

“the success of this strategy requires an account of how hedged principles can be explanatory if they permit exceptions and how grasping them can improve our reliability in detecting reasons, disablers, enablers, and the like.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

One particularist reply to this defense of generalism is that the argument from holism is best understood as indirect: although holism is compatible with generalism, particularism provides a better explanation of holism.

“One particularist reply to this defense of generalism is that the argument from holism is best understood as indirect.although holism is compatible with generalism, particularism provides a better explanation of holism.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

How the notion of explanation is best understood in ethics remains controversial.

“One issue is that how the notion of explanation is best understood in ethics remains controversial.42”

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing).

One strategy is to pursue unhedged principles that enumerate the potential disablers and enablers, aiming to complete a list of requisite qualifications and exceptions, thus arriving at least at contributory principles that hold without exception.

“One strategy is to pursue”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Generalism need not recommend that people adhere dogmatically to the principles they accept and close their minds to moral improvement.

“thus it need not recommend that people adhere dogmatically to the principles they accept and close their minds to moral improvement.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

The particularist recommendation of 'principle abstinence' would seem to require that an appropriate sensitivity to the particulars will be sufficient for reliably acting well.

“this would seem to require that an appropriate sensitivity to the particulars will be sufficient for reliably acting well.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

As a view about the structure of morality, generalism has no commitment to any particular substantive view about the content of the correct moral principles.

“as a view about the structure of morality, generalism has no commitment to any particular substantive view about the content of the correct moral principles.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Given holism, it would be a mere cosmic accident, rather than anything supporting the dependence of morality on principles, if reasons behaved in a way that can be captured in general principles.

“Given holism, it would be a mere”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

If moral principles were explanatorily idle in this way, the result might not be particularism.

“If moral principles were explanatorily idle in this way, the result might not be particularism.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Generalists no less than particularists can acknowledge that our actual moral outlooks are works in progress and that resolving uncertainty, error, and disagreements about particular moral principles requires thinking hard about a wide range of notoriously difficult and controversial concrete moral problems.

“Generalists no less than particularists can acknowledge that our actual moral outlooks are works in progress and that resolving uncertainty, error, and disagreements about particular moral principles requires thinking hard about a wide range of notoriously difficult and controversial concrete moral problems.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

For all that information says, a given particular case can go any which way morally.

“For all that information says, a given particular case can go any which way morally.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

The move to interpret general moral truths such as that pain is bad as default statuses promises to provide a more robust basis for moral knowledge.

“this move promises to provide a more robust basis for moral knowledge.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

Acceptance of principles might be better understood as informing and shaping one's responsiveness to reasons and bringing with it a commitment to further cultivating moral sensitivity and judgment.

“acceptance of principles might be better understood as informing and shaping one's responsiveness to reasons and bringing with it a commitment to further cultivating moral sensitivity and judgment.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

Particular moral facts and distinctions might still depend on a suitable supply of moral principles.

“particular moral facts and distinctions might still depend on a suitable supply of moral principles.”

May combine two claims.

Since the roles of principles as standards and as guides are distinct, they can come apart.

“But since the roles of principles as standards and as guides are distinct, they can come apart.47”

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

The same is not true for the color of my shoelaces even if wearing red shoelaces is bad in certain circumstances, such as when my doing so sends a signal to my accomplice in crime.

“the same is not true for the color of my shoelaces even if wearing red shoelaces is bad in certain circumstances, such as when my doing so sends a signal to my accomplice in crime.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

All this matters also to our understanding of particularism, since generalism and particularism are defined as negations of each other.

“all this matters also to our understanding of particularism, since these positions are defined as negations of each other.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

The notion of a default can be understood in several ways and it remains disputed whether there is a notion of default reasons or default moral status which is both independently plausible and delivers a distinctively particularist account of moral knowledge.

“however, the notion of a default can be understood in several ways (e.g., as a pragmatic, epistemic, or metaphysical fact) and it remains disputed whether there is a notion of default reasons or default moral status which is both independently plausible and delivers a distinctively particularist account of moral knowledge.51”

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

It is not very clear how moral knowledge-or even reliable moral guidance-would be available to the multitude of us who are still trying to refine our moral sensitivities and judgment and advance on our path toward practical wisdom.

“It is thus not very clear how moral knowledge-or even reliable moral guidance-would be available to that multitude of us who are still trying to refine our moral sensitivities and judgment and advance on our path toward practical wisdom.”

May combine two claims.

Certain ways of hedging principles would trivialize them; a principle amounting merely to 'Breaking promises is wrong, except when it is not' could not explain when or why breaking promises is wrong.

“to be sure, certain ways of hedging principles would trivialize them.If”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The epistemological challenge to particularists is particularly pressing insofar as particularists want to agree that, as a general matter, pain is bad and breaking promises is wrong, and that we can know these kinds of general moral truths even while they fall short of counting as moral principles.

“this challenge is particularly pressing insofar as particularists want to agree that, as a general matter, pain is bad and breaking promises is wrong, and that we can know these kinds of general moral truths even while they fall short of counting as moral principles.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Laws of nature conceived as mere necessary universal generalizations would seem unable to explain their instances.

“Laws of nature so conceived would then seem to be unable to explain their instances (why a particular F is G).”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

Relying on principles that are more than mere rules of thumb for guidance need not mean dogmatism, rigidity, or narrow-mindedness.

“But relying on principles that are more than mere rules of thumb for guidance need not mean dogmatism, rigidity, or narrow-mindedness.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Both generalists and particularists can agree that the best remedy for poor moral judgment is better moral judgment.

“Both can agree that the best remedy for poor moral judgment is better moral judgment.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Generalists can try to accommodate holism in two different ways depending on whether genuine principles must hold without exception or may include qualifiers.

“Generalists can try to accommodate holism in two different ways depending on this issue.”