Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
CoChat
Cited by 401

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Propaganda as Signaling

Open access
Huang, Haifeng · 2015 · Comparative Politics

Abstract

Why do authoritarian governments engage in propaganda when citizens often know that their governments are propagandizing and therefore resist, ignore, or disparage the messages? While propaganda is traditionally understood as a means to indoctrinate the masses with pro-regime values and attitudes, i.e., it “brainwashes” people, I propose a theory that propaganda is often not used for indoctrination, but rather to signal the government’s strength in maintaining social control and political order, i.e., it intimidates citizens. I use unique survey data from China to test the argument. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, Chinese college students with more exposure to state propaganda in the form of ideological and political education do not have a more positive view of China’s government and political system, but they are more likely to believe that the regime is strong in maintaining political order and social stability, and less willing to participate in political dissent. Additional evidences consistent with the theory are also briefly discussed.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.5129/001041515816103220

Cites

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cited by

See all 401

Metadata

Authors
Huang, H.
Venue
Comparative Politics
Published
2015-07-01
Volume
47
Issue
4
Pages
419-444
ISSN
0010-4159 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3122792763
Cited by
401
References
0
FWCI
38.76
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Propaganda as Signaling. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.5129/001041515816103220
The paper
Huang, H. (2015). Propaganda as Signaling. Comparative Politics. https://doi.org/10.5129/001041515816103220

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.