Trusted Execution Environments for Cloud/Fog-based Internet of Things Applications
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Prominent implementations of TEE are Intel SGX, AMD SEV, and ARM TrustZone.
“Prominent implementations of TEE, namely Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX) [31], AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) [32], and ARM TrustZone [28], are studied in Section 4.1.”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [28]
ARM TrustZone utilizes distinct page tables, hardware privilege layers (e.g., EL3 and Secure EL2/EL1/EL0), and a TrustZone address space controller (TZASC4) for its implementation.
“In contrast, ARM TrustZone [28] utilizes distinct page tables, hardware privilege layers (e.g., EL3 and Secure EL2/EL1/EL0), and a TrustZone address space controller (TZASC4) for its implementation.”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [28]
Technologies such as Intel SGX and ARM TrustZone utilize the secure space concept, creating isolated secure spaces where sensitive code and data can operate in a controlled, confidential manner.
“Technologies such as Intel SGX [52] and ARM TrustZone [28] utilize this concept, creating isolated secure spaces where sensitive code and data can operate in a controlled, confidential manner.”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [28]
ARM TrustZone architecture can be isolated in two logical states: a secure/trusted world and a normal (insecure) world.
“ARM TrustZone architecture can be isolated in two logical states: a secure/trusted world and a normal (i.e., insecure) world Figure 5.”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [28]
In ARM TrustZone, the normal world cannot access memory allocated to the secure world, while the secure world can access normal-world memory.
“While the normal world cannot access memory allocated to the secure world, the secure world can access normal-world memory.”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [28]
All other CPU cores of a multi-core ARM TrustZone system can remain in normal-world mode uninterruptedly.
“All other CPU cores of a multi-core system can remain in normal-world mode uninterruptedly.”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [28]
When an application executes in an ARM TrustZone secure world, TrustZone can isolate parts of the memory for its use by preventing access to these locations by applications executing in the real world.
“Therefore, when an application executes in a secure world, TrustZone can isolate parts of the memory for its use via preventing access to these locations by the applications executing in the real world [28].”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [28]
ARM TrustZone is a secure space-based TEE hardware architecture that extends the security aspect to the entire system design, allowing any part of the system to be protected.
“ARM TrustZone is another secure space-based TEE hardware architecture that extends the security aspect to the entire system design, allowing any part of the system to be protected.”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [28]
When an SMC instruction is invoked from the normal world, the CPU core performs a context switch to the secure world and freezes its normal-world execution.
“When an SMC instruction is invoked from the normal world, the CPU core performs a context switch to the secure world and freezes its normal-world execution.”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [28]
Communication with the ARM TrustZone secure world occurs from the insecure world through the Secure Monitor Call (SMC) instruction.
“Communication with the secure world occurs from the insecure world through the Secure Monitor Call (SMC) instruction.”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [28]
ARM TrustZone can separate physical memory into two partitions, with one partition exclusively accessible by the secure world.
“To facilitate secure world processing, TrustZone can separate physical memory into two partitions, with one partition being exclusively accessible by the secure world.”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [28]
The isolation of ARM TrustZone memory partitions is enforced by the memory controller providing access control for memory regions based on the current state.
“This isolation is enforced by the memory controller providing access control for memory regions based on the current state.”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [28]
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Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study
Zobaed, S., & Amini Salehi, M. (2025) · Software Practice and Experience · doi:10.1002/spe.3398 · Cited by 21 · see citing works
- Authors
- Valadares, D., Will, N., Spohn, M., Santos, D., Perkusich, A., & Gorgonio, K.
- Affiliations
- Instituto Federal de Educação, Ciência e Tecnologia de Pernambuco (BR)
- Universidade Tecnológica Federal do Paraná (BR)
- Universidade Federal da Fronteira Sul (BR)
- Universidade Federal de Campina Grande (BR)
- Federal University of Campina Grande, Informatics and Electrical Engineering Center, Computer Science, Campina Grande, PB, Brazil, --- Select a Country ---
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Cloud Computing and Services Science
- Published
- 2021
- Pages
- 111-121
- OpenAlex
- W3157202946
- Cited by
- 10
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 1
- FWCI
- 0.81
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by-nc-nd
- Locations
- International Conference on Cloud Computing and Services Science (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › IoT and Edge/Fog Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Cloud Data Security Solutions
- Keywords
- trusted execution environments, cloud computing, fog computing, Internet of Things, security (computing), trusted computing
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